G.R. No. 44204. December 24, 1938
ENRIQUE, TOMAS, VICENTE, ELVIRA, ARTURO, AND JOSEFA, SURNAMED BERNIA, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. JOSE M. KERR AND JULIANA SANTOS, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
DIAZ, J.:
the judgment of the lower court is whether or not they are bound to pay
plaintiffs P56,327 plus legal interest from December 27, 1934 and the
costs of the suit. The judgment appealed from declares them bound to
pay said sum. Appellants, however, contend that the lower court, in
rendering judgment, committed the following errors set forth in their
brief:
“I. The lower court erred in not
finding that the defendants-appellants had been in prior possession of
the land in question by themselves and their predecessors in interest
since time immemorial.“II. The lower court erred in not
finding that there was voluntary delivery of the material possession of
the land in question by the plaintiffs-appellees through their
administrator, the Pampanga Sugar Mills, to the defendants-appellants.“III. The lower court erred in not finding that the defendants-appellants were possessors in good faith of the land in question.
“IV. The lower court erred in not finding that the
defendants-appellants voluntarily abandoned possession of the land in
question after the harvest of the 1925-1926 sugar cane crop.“V. The lower court erred in not finding that the plaintiffs-appellees
could have recovered possession of the land in question without the
necessity of filing the present action.“VI. The lower
court erred in condemning the defendants-appellants to pay damages in
the sum of P56,327 and to pay interest thereon from the time of the
filing of the complaint.“VII. The lower court erred in
not holding that the plaintiffs-appellees should reimburse the
defendants-appellants for the expenses they incurred in the land in
question during the time of their possession.“VIII. The
lower court erred in not granting defendants-appellants’ motion for new
trial and in not absolving said defendants-appellants from the
plaintiffs-apnellees’ complaint.”
The
proven facts which must be taken into account in deciding the question
may be briefly restated as follows: The intestate estate of appellees’
predecessor in interest, through its judicial administratrix commenced
in the justice of the peace court of Floridablanca, Province of
Pampanga, on October 5, 1925, civil case No. 148 for forcible entry,
entitled “Sebastiana Rodriguez, Judicial Administratrix of the
Intestate Estate of the deceased Arturo Bernia, plaintiff, vs. Jose
Kerr, defendant”, for the purpose of seeking restitution of the land
which plaintiff in said case alleged to have been usurped from the
intestate estate of which she was the administratrix by defendant Kerr,
and for the payment by the latter to said administratrix of the sum of
P500 as damages occasioned by the usurpation. It having been snown in
said justice of the peace court that the land in question was also the
subject of litigation between the same parties in registration case No.
584 of Pampanga, the justice of the peace court refused to act thereon,
limiting itself to remanding the case to the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga. Upon the case reaching the latter court, Sebastiana
Rodriguez, plaintiff therein, in her capacity as judicial
administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased Arturo Bernia,
reproduced her complaint on December 18, 1925, but instead of asking
for P500 by way of indemnity for damages, she prayed therein for the
sum of P5,000 (civil case No. 3312 of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga; G. R. No. 44204, Dec. 24, 1938). In answer to the complaint,
defendant Kerr denied generally and specifically the facts alleged
therein. Subsequently, and with the consent of the parties, the court
ordered that said case be heard jointly with registration cases Nos.
584 (G. L. R. O. Rec. No. 23476) and 710 (G. L. R. O. Rec. No. 27661)
which were also pending therein and in which Jose M. Kerr et al. were
applicants and Enrique Bernia et al. were oppositors (case No. 584),
and the latter, in turn, were applicants and Jose M. Kerr et al.,
oppositors (case No. 710). On July 30, 1926, also with the consent of
the parties, the court ordered the postponement of the hearing of said
case (civil case No. 3312) until the two registration cases
aforementioned have been decided.
In view of certain facts
which took place after the filing of the first complaint, Enrique
Bernia, Tomas Bernia, Elvira Bernia, Arturo Bernia, and Josefa Bernia,
all of whom are children of the late Arturo Bernia, acting in
substitution of Sebastiana Rodriguez, who had been judicial
administratrix of the intestate estate of said deceased, filed on
December 27, 1934, a supplementary pleading not only against Jose M.
Kerr this time, but also against his wife Juliana Santos for the
purpose of recovering from the last two payment of the following
amounts: P11,000 representing the value of 1,100 piculs of centrifugal
sugar which, they alleged, defendants had appropriated to themselves;
that of P54,000 representing the produce which they were unable to
enjoy allegedly because the defendants usurped the land in question
from the years 1926 to 1934; and P5,000 by way of indemnity for having
been deprived of the quota corresponding to them for said land by
reason of defendants’ fault, besides the costs of the suit. Defendants
Jose M. Kerr and Juliana Santos filed two separate answers to said
supplementary complaint, denying generally and specifically the facts
alleged therein, without interposing any special defense. After trial
the lower court rendered judgment against defendants who appealed
therefrom.
The land alleged to have been usurped by
defendants, which pertained to plaintiffs’ predecessor in interest
(Arturo Bernia) is included in the area having the following boundaries:
On the north, lands of Arturo Bernia; on the east, land of Arturo
Bernia or of Ignacio Dimson; on the south, land of Maximo Dimal,
Canlaman or Malabo River and its branch called estero Panayupan; and on
the west, lands of Lamberto Songco derived from Juan Beltran, if there
were no Dinalupihan road. This land was definitely declared by this
court as the property of plaintiffs in land registration cases Nos. 584
and 710 (G. R. Nos. 35746 and 35747, Apr. 11, 1934) in which the
principal parties were also the appellees and appellants in this case.
After carefully considering the evidence adduced by the parties in the
lower court, this court declared in those cases that Arturo Bernia,
appellees’ predecessor in interest, had exercised acts of ownership not
only over the land now in question, occupying and possessing the same
as owner, but also over the great mass of land of which it formed and
still continues to be a part since a period much earlier than the
commencement of the said registration cases and the original case
instituted by the judicial administratrix of the intestate estate of
the late Arturo Bernia in the justice of the peace court of
Floridablanca to demand from appellant Jose M. Kerr the restitution of
said land and the payment by the latter of the sum of P500 for damages.
Before the rendition of the final decision of this court in the
aforesaid registration cases (Nos. 584 and 710; G. R. Nos. 35746 and
35747 of this court), which was promulgated on April 11, 1934, another
decision was rendered on November 13, 1923 in registration cases Nos.
242, G. L. R. O. Rec. No. 14314, and 273, G. L. R. O. Rec. No. 14879,
G. R. No. 20912 of this court, Nov. 13,1923), in which Arturo Bernia et
al., on one side, and Jose M. Kerr et al., on the other, litigated the
ownership of the same lands which later were the subject matter of the
two cases aforementioned, namely, cases Nos. 710 and 584 or G. R. Nos.
35746 and 35747, respectively. That decision affirmed in substance that
of the lower court by recognizing the rights of Arturo Bernia to have
recorded in his name in the registry some of the lands for which he
applied and denying his application with respect to the others due to
the opposition of Jose M. Kerr and other oppositors, but neither did it
declare the latter, much less Kerr for that matter, as having any right
to some or to any portion of the lands aforementioned. In view of the
outcome of cases Nos. 242 and 273, Arturo Bernia and the herein
appellees commenced another registration case No. 710, G. L. R. O. Rec.
No. 27661 (G. R. No. 35747), and the appellants spouses Jose M. Kerr
and Juliana Santos, on their part, instituted registration case No.
584, G. L. R. O. Rec. No. 23476 (G. R. No. 35746) Which terminated in
the manner set forth in the decision rendered on April 11, 1934.
(Exhibit A, Bernia.)
When the complaint was filed in the
justice of the peace court of Floridablanca in case No. 148
aforementioned of which the justice of the peace refused to take
cognizance for lack of jurisdiction and which led to the filing of the
original as well as the amended and supplementary complaints in case
No. 3312 (G. R. No. 44204) by the judicial administratrix of the
intestate estate of Arturo Bernia and by the appellees, respectively,
they (the administratrix and the appellees) no longer had possession of
the land in question nor could they enjoy the fruits thereof until the
year 1934 for the reason that appellants occupied the same and disposed
of the sugar therein produced, selling the same for their benefit under
the following circumstances: A little over one year after the
promulgation of the judgment of this court in land registration cases
Nos. 242 and 273 (Exhibit 1), G. R. No. 20912[1]
(Exhibit 2), that is, either in May or June, 1925, appellants, through
Jose M. Kerr, making use of a copy of said judgment, went to the
manager of the Pampanga Sugar Mills which at that time administered the
land in question together with other lands belonging to the appellees
and their predecessor in interest Arturo Bernia in order to demand from
said manager the possession of the land aforesaid, notwithstanding that
they then knew that the estate of said deceased was under
administration and under the charge of the judicial administratrix
Sebastiana Rodriguez, alleging that they won the same in the courts.
Having accomplished their purpose, they possessed the land from then on
until the year 1934, in spite of the opposition of said Sebastiana
Rodriguez and of the appellees and enjoyed the fruits thereof to the
exclusion of the latter and, in consequence, to their damage and
prejudice. This constituted in itself a strategy to dispossess the
intestate estate of Arturo Bernia and the appellees of the said land
because the only person with whom they should have dealt, had they
acted in good faith, was the judicial administratrix of the intestate
estate, who alone was called upon to defend the interests of the same.
Resorting to the same strategy, appellants were able to withdraw on
March 25, 1926 from the Pampanga Sugar Mills a warehouse receipt which
represented 415 piculs of sugar belonging to the intestate estate of
Arturo Bernia and to the appellees, which was the produce of the cane
planted on the land in question during the agricultural year 1925-26
(Exhibits B-1 and B-2, Bernia). Said warehouse receipt was subject to a
lien of P1,157 in favor of the Pampanga Sugar Mills. Were it not for
the objection of this company, based on another lien in its favor,
which amounted to P11,584.41, appellants would have also withdrawn
therefrom another warehouse receipt of the intestate estate and of the
appellees which represented 479.5968 piculs of sugar (Exhibit 11). Said
warehouse receipt is now in the possession of the company.
In the milling for the agricultural year 1925-26, the land in question
produced for its owner or owners alone 894 piculs of sugar which is the
total of those set forth in the two warehouse receipts
aforementioned—one for 415 piculs and another for 479.5968 piculs. The
price of sugar at that time, according to the valuation given by Kerr
himself, was P9.50 per picul (Exhibit B, Bernia) from which it results
that the 415 piculs of sugar taken by appellants from the manager of
the Pampanga Sugar Mills under the circumstances above stated, were
valued at P3,942.50 without deducting what appellants are presumed to
have paid for the lien which the Pampanga Sugar Mills had on the
warehouse receipt corresponding to the said quantity of sugar. If the
deduction were made, said sum would be likewise reduced to P2,785.50.
In the millings for 1926-27 and 1927-28, it must be presumed that the
same land produced for its owners alone at least the same yield of 894
piculs of sugar. At that time, the price of sugar was P7.55 per picul
(Exhibit E), which means that if the owners of the land had occupied
and planted the sugar cane as they had done in previous years, they
could have obtained an income of P6,749.70 in each of said years.
In the milling for 1928-29, upon the same basis of 894 piculs of sugar
as yearly produce for the owners of the land only, the market value of
said article at that time being P6.36 per picul, appellees could have
benefited from said price, but were not able to do so for the reason
that appellants had taken possession of the land so that the loss
suffered by the former in said year was P5,685.84.
In the
milling for 1929-30, the current price of sugar was P5.41 per picul.
Consequently, upon the same supposition that the land produced at least
894 piculs of sugar during that agircultural year, the owner suffered a
loss of P4,836.54.
In the milling for 1930-31, the price of
sugar was P5.51 per picul; in that for 1931-32, it was P3.58; in that
of 1932-33, it was P5.12; and in that of 1933-34 it was P5.31,
resulting accordingly—assuming, of course, that the land did not
produce less than 894 piculs of sugar per year had appellees cultivated
it—in the following losses suffered by the latter: P4,925.94 in the
first year; P3,200.52 in the second; P4,577.28 in the third; and
P4,747.14 in the last. In other words, appellees failed to receive the
fruits and rents of the land in question in the millings from 1925-1926
to 1933-34, valued at P44,258.16, without including the value of the
warehouse receipt for 479.5968 piculs of sugar which is still in the
hands of the manager of the Pampanga Sugar Mills for the reason that
appellants were unable to withdraw the sugar which it represented when
they secured the warehouse receipt for 415 piculs.
The
evidence shows that for the production of a picul of sugar, planting
therefor the necessary amount of cane, the planter incurs an expense of
P2.22. Consequently, in the production of 7,152 piculs of sugar to
which the total produce which should have corresponded exclusively to
the appellees in the millings for 1926-27 to 1933-34 must have mounted,
the outlay of P15,877.44 must be taken into account, for it must be
supposed that appellees would have to meet that expense to produce the
same quantity of sugar. Performing the necessary operation, the loss
suffered by the appellees amounted only to P28,380.72.
Upon
consideration of the question and of the conflicts between appellants
and appellees in the light of the facts proven at the trial, which are
set forth in this decision, we arrive at the conclusion and so hold
that appellants, by means of strategy, were able to take possession of
the land in question in the early part of August, 1925; that their
possession from that time has not been in good faith; that at that time
and even much prior thereto appellees and their predecessor in interest
had possession of said land as owners and, as such, had been planting
the same to sugar cane without interruption; that said land produced
per year 894 piculs of sugar for its owners alone, excluding the part
of the crop corresponding to the central which took charge of the
milling of the cane; that during the agricultural years 1925-26 to
1933-34, inclusive, the land yielded a total of 8,046 piculs; that at
its current market price, the value of said produce, excluding the
value of 479.5968 piculs which are in the possession of the manager of
the Pampanga Sugar Mills and further deducting the cost of production
for the agricultural years between 1926-27 to 1933-34, is that of
P28,380.72; and that this latter sum should be paid by appellants to
the appellees by way of indemnity.
Having reached this
conclusion, we do not find it necessary to consider the question
whether or not the lower court should have granted appellants’ motion
for new trial on the ground that its judgment was contrary to law and
not supported by the evidence. Said question is implicitly disposed of
in this decision.
In view of all the foregoing, the judgment
appealed from is hereby modified in the sense of sentencing appellants
to pay appellees the sum of P28,380.72 with legal interest from
December 27, 1934, the date of the filing of the amended complaint and
of the supplemental pleading, until complete payment. In other
respects, said judgment is affirmed, without special pronouncement as
to costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
[1] November 13, 1923.