LA URBANA, SOCIEDAD MUTUA DE CONSTRUCCION Y PRESTAMOS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MARIA F. VILLA ABRILLE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This action was commenced in the Court of
First Instance of Davao for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage
which was given as security for the payment of a loan of P40,000
obtained by the appellant from the appellee. Upon the evidence
presented by the parties in support of their respective pleadings, the
trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and appellee
for the sum of P42,492.18, with interest at the rate of twelve per cent
per annum from December 23, 1933 until the said amount is fully paid.
Defendant and appellant was also ordered to pay the plaintiff and
appellee the sum of P6,000 as attorney’s fees.

In support of this appeal, counsel for the appellant has assigned four errors which we shall presently discuss.

1. It is contended for the appellant that the court below
   erred in overruling the demurrer interposed By her on the ground that
   the complaint filed by the plaintiff and appellee was ambiguous,,
   unintelligible, and uncertain. We find no merit in this contention. Far
   from being unintelligible and uncertain, the complaint goes to the
   extent of giving an itemized statement of the indebtedness covered by
   the mortgage. It states in a sufficiently clear language the
   circumstances which constitute the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Code
   of Civil Procedure, see. 90.)

2. It is also
   urged on behalf of the appellant that the principal amount claimed by
   the plaintiff and appellee comes within the penal sanction of the Usury
   Law. On the other hand, counsel for the appellee contend that the
   appellant cannot now invoke the defense of usury in view of the fact
   that the answer filed by her was not made under oath. This contention
   seems to be based on the provisions of section 9 of the Usury Law (No.
   2655) which reads as follows:

“The person or corporation sued shall file its
answer in writing under oath to any complaint brought or filed against
said person or corporation before a competent court to recover the
money or other personal or real property, seeds or agricultural
products, charged or received in violation of the provisions of this
Act. The lack of taking an oath to an answer to a complaint will mean
the admission of the facts contained in the latter.”

It will be noticed upon careful examination that this section does
not apply to the present case. It has reference to an answer filed to a
complaint brought to recover money or other personal or real property
charged or received in violation of the provisions of the Usury Law. In
other words, where the victim of usury files an action to recover what
has been exacted from him in violation of the Usury Law, the answer to
such a complaint must be under oath, otherwise the facts alleged in the
complaint will be deemed admitted.

The question of usury is therefore properly raised by the answer,
and it becomes necessary to consider whether the charges included in
the principal amount awarded by the court below are usurious in
character. There can be no question that the interests expressly
stipulated in the contract of mortgage—namely, 10 per cent and 12 per
cent, according to whether the terms of the agreement are complied with
or not—are within the limits prescribed by law; and with respect to the
other charges covered by the agreement, the same are those usually made
by building and loan associations and which have received the sanction
of the law. (Lopez and Javelona vs. El Hogar Filipino, 47 Phil., 249.)

3. The third error assigned by the appellant
   relates to the admission of the depositions contained in Exhibit K and
   of Exhibits A and B mentioned in the deposition of Luis Garcia
   Aldeguer, the secretary of the plaintiff corporation. Exhibit A is the
   deed of mortgage, while Exhibit B is a statement of the account of the
   appellant with the appellee. Appellant claims that in the taking of the
   depositions, the requirements of section 361 of the Code of Civil
   Procedure were not complied with. The evidence shows, however, that
   these depositions were taken in the City of Manila before a notary
   public; that notice was served on the appellant eight days before the
   time fixed for taking the depositions. The notice was served on the
   appellant and not on her attorney, since, at the time of the sending of
   such notice, the plaintiff had no knowledge of the appointment of the
   latter.

We find that there has been a substantial compliance with the
requirements of section 361 of the Code of Civil Procedure, regarding
the taking of depositions.

4. The fourth assignment of error concerns, the
   amount of P6,000 awarded by the court below as attorney’s fees. While
   it is true that the decision of the court in this respect is fully in
   accord with the terms of the mortgage contract, £this court has held
   that the amount stipulated by the parties as attorney’s fees may be
   reduced to what is considered a reasonable amount under the
   circumstances attending the case. (Bachrach vs. Golingco, 39 Phil.,
   138; Manila Trading & Supply Co. vs. Tamaraw Plantation Co., 47
   Phil., 513.) Considering the circumstances of this case, we think that
   the amount of P3,000 is a reasonable allowance for attorney’s fees.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed with the only modification
that the amount of P6,000 therein awarded as attorney’s fees be reduced
to P3,000. Costs will be taxed against the appellant. So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.