LOPEZ SUGAR CENTRAL MILL CO., INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MAGDALENA GONZAGA VIUDA DE CUAYCONG ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This
appeal was interposed by the defendants in a civil case commenced by
the Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., Inc., in the Court of First Instance
of Occidental Negros. They now seek to have the judgment of that court
reversed and to secure an order from this court commanding the
plaintiff corporation to restore to the appellants a stretch of land
owned by them which the former has occupied for the widening of its
railroad yard and to pay further the value of some rails and of 800
cubic meters of earth taken from appellants’ sugarcane fields. It must
be noted that the appeal as to the defendants Josefina, Maria Cristina
and Anita, all surnamed G. Cuaycong, was dismissed on their failure to
file their brief. This decision is, therefore, rendered with respect to
the appeal of the other defendants.

The Hacienda Magdalena,
which belongs to the defendants and appellants, is one of the haciendas
bound to the sugar central of the plaintiff corporation by virtue of a
contract executed in October, 1927 for the milling of the sugar, cane
produced in said hacienda. The central has a railroad system for the
transportation of the sugar cane the main line of which formerly
terminated near the Hacienda Magdalena at a concrete wall which may be
seen on the plan Exhibit C.

Since 1928 when, it appears, the
first milling by the central took place, the number of haciendas bound
to the company has increased almost three times so that the amount of
cane milled by it has likewise increased. When the central was
constructed, its minimum milling capacity was 400 tons daily which is
equivalent to about 750 piculs of sugar. When the complaint was filed
in February, 1931 the central had an output of 750 tons which was
equivalent to about 1,300 piculs. As the number of haciendas bound to
the central increased along with the output, the number of cars for the
transportation of the cane also increased, for while the central used
to employ only ten cars for this purpose, now it uses thirty-five or
forty cars at a time. This gave rise to the necessity of extending the
main line of its railroad which was done by occupying the portion of
land which is the subject of this suit. Said portion has a length of
128 meters on the northeast side and 112 meters on the southeast side
and a width of seven meters, and is comprised within the Hacienda
Magdalena which belongs to the defendants. The extension of the main
line of the railroad system over the portion of land in question was
necessary in order that the cars which carry the cane and are pulled by
the locomotive may reach the extreme northeastern part of that portion
and be pushed back afterwards by the locomotive so as to make them
enter the railroad yard of the central. The aforementioned portion of
land appears in Exhibit C, while the switch which opens the way for the
cars which move backwards, pushed by the locomotive until they reach
the railroad yard, is marked No. 1.

The defendants having
refused to grant gratuitously to the plaintiff corporation the
aforesaid portion of land, the same filed its complaint in this case to
have the court declare that under the milling contract above-mentioned,
it has a right of way over said portion for its railroad and railway
system. In the meantime a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by
the court in order to enjoin the defendants from obstructing or
preventing the construction by plaintiff of the extension of said
railroad over the portion in question.

After trial the
judgment appealed from was rendered in accordance with the prayer of
the complaint, declaring permanent the writ of preliminary injunction
issued at the commencement of the action.

In their brief
appellants contend that the court committed the twelve errors set forth
therein which may be reduced to the following questions:

First. Has plaintiff a right to the free use of the portion of land in
question for what it regards as an extension of the main line of its
railroad system and what defendants allege, on the other hand, to be a
widening of its railroad yard?

Second. Did plaintiff take
possession of sixty-eight rails and remove 800 cubic meters of earth
from defendants’ lands? In the affirmative case, what should be the
amount of indemnify to be paid defendants by the central?

Paragraph 6 of the milling contract of defendants, as amended by the parties on October 21, 1927, says:

“In
case the central decides to construct a railroad as above stated, the
planter shall give gratuitously, during the period of this contract,
all the land needed for rights of way over the hacienda or over any
other land of the planter in the said Province of Occidental Negros as
the central may need for the laying of its permanent railroad lines,
the installation of its telephone lines, pipes, water deposits or
reservoirs, aqueducts or other conduits, and any other additional land
which it may need for its excavation work and embankment building and
the construction of switches and crossings and any other buildings
which the central may require for the operation of its railroad. The
right of way for the railroad shall include a distance of not more than
3½ meters on each side from the center of the railway line. The free
right of way above-mentioned shall not include growing crops found on
said lands, the value of which must be paid at the price agreed upon by
the parties, and in case said parties cannot agree, they shall appoint
a committee of three to be formed by a representative of the central, a
representative of the planter and a third to be appointed by both. The
central shall also pay for damages caused to the planter through other
works of demolition. The total area of the land which the planter shall
be bound to sell to the central for the construction of its buildings
and other improvements which it may erect, with the exception of the
right of way for the railroad line, shall not exceed two (2) hectares,
for which the central shall pay P1,000 for each hectare under the same
conditions above set forth as to the damages.” Appellants do not deny
that the portion of land in question is needed by the company for its
railroad system, but they contend that what plaintiff attempts to
obtain as a right of way is in reality a widening of its railroad yard.

Even under the concept of “yard” is denned in the American Civil
Engineer Handbook and quoted in the brief of the appellants, the
extension of the railroad line over the land of said appellants can not
be considered as a widening of the railroad yard of the central. The
definition is as follows:

“A yard is a
system of tracks within denned limits for receiving, separating and
making up trains, cars and other purposes. A large yard will have some
or all of the following features. An incoming train leaves the main track and enters a receiving yard, where the train may wait temporarily * * *.”

The underlined portions clearly show that the cars entering the yard
have to leave the main line: “An incoming train leaves the main track
and enters a receiving yard, * * * This is precisely what happens in
the instant case. The cars loaded with cane and pulled by the
locomotive have to leave the main line before entering the railroad
yard upon opening of the switch. As may be seen from the plan Exhibit
C, the main line formerly reached as far as point No. 2 which is a
concrete wall, and from there the locomotive pushed the cars backwards
until they entered the yard, the switch which is indicated with number
1 in ink in said plan opening for that purpose. The extension of the
railway line from the said concrete wall over the portion of land
above-described does not, therefore, constitute a widening of the yard
as the defendants contend but an extension of the main line. The yard
begins from the switch indicated with number 1 on the plan. Before the
filing of the complaint and the occupation of the portion of land of
the defendants, the line from the concrete wall to the switch had
already existed as part of the main line which comes from a remote
distance. That part of the line which extends from the switch up to the
concrete wall is, as may be realized from a simple view of the same,
nearly equal to 1/8 of the entire length of the line which was
constructed over the portion of land in question so that the line
constructed over that portion does not begin from the switch marked No.
1 on the plan, but from the concrete wall which is 1/8 of the length of
the extension of the main line from the switch. On this assumption, it
can not be said that the extension of the line over the said portion is
a widening of the yard, but an extension of or an addition to the main
line which had existed up to the concrete wall. That is to say, that
between the point (the concrete wall) from which the extension of the
main line over the portion in question commences and the yard which
begins from the switch, there was and had existed before a portion of
the principal line, that from the switch up to the concrete wall. It,
therefore, follows that the portion of land aforesaid merely
constitutes an extension of the old main line of the railway system. It
is not an addition to the railroad yard, but to the main line, which
had already existed, with the view that, once the switch has been
opened and passed, the last of the thirty-five or forty cars now in
use, may move back and thus all the cars may enter the railroad yard on
being pushed backward by the locomotive.

As has been said,
the necessity for the extension of the line in the manner
above-described has not been denied by the defendants and appellants,
nor can it be denied for the reason that without such extension the
thirty-five or forty cars used by the central for the transportation of
the cane would not be able to enter the yard. Their entrance would not
be possible, unless it be said that such transportation could be done
with ten cars at a time, so that all the thirty-five or forty cars used
by the central might enter the yard. This would not be practical and
would be very costly. It would result in great loss of time in the
transportation of the cane and in the milling of the same and would
lead likewise to great expenses and big losses.

We,
therefore, hold against the contention of the defendants in their brief
as the second error committed by the lower court and declare that
plaintiff has the right to extend the main line of its railroad even
against their consent because, according to paragraph 6 of the milling
contract as amended, defendants are bound to cede gratuitously to the
central all the land necessary for its right of way through and over
the hacienda which the central may need in laying its permanent railway
line.

Defendants contend in their third assignment of error
that the court erred in not finding that defendant Viuda de Cuaycong
had delivered to the plaintiff sufficient land for its railroad yard,
but that plaintiff, to the prejudice of the defendants, did not devote
said land to that use but to another not agreed upon between it and
said Viuda de Cuaycong; and in not finding that, for this reason,
plaintiff can not now claim an equitable remedy like injunction
inasmuch as it did not itself observe equity.

For the
purpose of showing that the court committed the third assigned error,
it is alleged that in the year 1927 the representative of the central
“on acquiring from defendant Viuda de Cuaycong the land for the
millsite, agreed with said defendant that the railroad yard of said
mill would be installed on the northeastern side in order that the main
line may lead directly to the Hacienda Conchita which belonged and
still belongs to the defendants and is bound to the central.” “But
plaintiff,” they say, “instead of making a yard of said place, utilized
the same as site for the buildings of its employees and as a wee golf
course, and made its railroad yard on the other side of the provincial
road to the prejudice of the defendants.” We believe that this
contention is without merit for even on the supposition that all that
defendants allege were true, it is entirely immaterial whether or not
the land acquired by the central from the Hacienda Magdalena has been
devoted to a railroad yard, for the reason that, as we think it to have
been shown further above, there has been no addition to the yard but an
extension of the main line of plaintiff’s railroad.

As to
the questions raised in the cross-complaint of appellants, it is a fact
admitted and proved that plaintiff has taken possession of the
sixty-eight rails belonging to defendants without the latter’s consent.
It is also admitted that plaintiff removed for its use and benefit 800
cubic meters of earth from defendants’ land. We believe that defendants
are entitled as a matter of course to the payment of the value of the
rails and the aforementioned 800 cubic meters of earth. Defendants, in
their brief, ask that they be paid P1,300 for the value of the rails;
P800 for the earth removed from their land, and P1,000 for damages
caused by the excavation made by order of plaintiff.

We
believe that the valuation given by plaintiff of the sixty-eight rails
is acceptable. According to this valuation, said rails, if new, would
cost P2,600 per kilometer; but as they are already ten years old, they
now cost P450 per kilometer. As regards the 800 cubic meters of earth,
plaintiff contends that the amount of the damages caused by the
excavation has not been shown. We believe, however, that the sum of
P800 is a reasonable compensation caused by the excavation of said 800
cubic meters of earth.

In view of all the foregoing, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed; defendants’ counterclaim for
damages arising out of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction not having been proved, the same is dismissed; and by virtue
of the cross-complaint plaintiff is sentenced to pay defendants the sum
of P450 as the value of sixty-eight rails and P800 as indemnity for
damages. There is no pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Laurel, JJ., concur.