MATIAS DE LOS SANTOS ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, HIS DEPUTIES AND DELEGATES, RAFAEL LARA, EDUARDO TATCO, AND THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPI…

Four complaints were successively filed in
this case. Demurrers were interposed and sustained as to each of the
first three complaints: the original, and the second and third amended
complaints. Upon petition of the defend ants, the fourth and last
amended complaint was dismissed by the trial court in an order of
November 27, 1934, as follows:

“AUTO

“Habiendose presentado la ultima demanda enmendada
en esta causa fuera del tiempo fijado por la orden del juz gado de 30
de octubre de 1934, y adoleciendo, ademas, dicha demanda enmendada de
los mismos defectos senalados en los demurrers anteriores, se ordena el
sobreseimiento de esta causa, sin especial condena de costas. Asi se
ordena.

“Pasig, Rizal, I. F., 27 de noviembre de 1934.
	(Fdo.) “PEDRO TUASON
		“Juez”

It appears that on October 30, 1934, the trial court issued an
order sustaining the demurrer to the third amended complaint of October
5, 1934 and directing the plaintiffs to amend the complaint within ten
days from receipt of notice of the order. Plaintiffs received notice of
the order on November 3, 1934, but filed their last amended complaint
only on November 14, 1934, after the expiration of the ten-day period
allowed. The trial court committed no error in disallowing the last
amended complaint. The Court of First Instance is vested with authority
to fix, with or without terms, the time within which pleadings adjudged
defective may be amended and, if the party fails to amend his pleadings within the time limited or elects not to amend, to render such
judgment upon the subject matter involved as the law and the facts set
forth in the pleadings warrant (sec. 101, Code of Civil Procedure; Rule
14 of Courts of First Instance). Under this express power and the incidental power of every court to compel obedience to its judgments,
orders, and process in an action or proceeding pending therein (sec.
11, par. 3, Code of Civil Procedure), the trial court is authorized to
disregard the pleading filed beyond the period fixed. The last amended
complaint of November 14, 1934, having been filed out of time and dis
allowed by the lower court on that account, the order of November
27, 1934 dismissing the case should be interpreted to refer to the third
amended complaint of October 5, 1934, demurred to by the defendant on
October 29, 1934, which demurrer was sustained by the trial court on
October 30 following, and duly excepted to by the plaintiffs.

The question now to be determined is whether the court erred in
sustaining the demurrer to the third amended com plaint of October 5,
1934. The grounds of the demurrer were: (a) ambiguity, (b) failure to state facts sufficient to constitute cause of action, and (c)
defect of parties. As to the first ground, we hold that the allegations
are sufficiently clear and definite as to give the defendants notice
of what the plaintiffs are complaining against them. Not only the
specific wrong complained of but also the particular acts constituting
the same are intelligibly stated. The damages which the plaintiffs
demand for the alleged invasion of their property rights have been
fixed at P150,000. The defendants cannot be misled in making their
defense, and the court may render a definite judgment upon the subject
matter involved. “While a com plaint may be awkwardly drafted, and for
this reason be subject to criticism with respect to incidental particulars, it will be held sufficient if it fairly apprises the defendant
of the plaintiff’s real claims and contentions in such manner that the
defendant is not misled to his surprise or injury.” (Lizarraga
Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil., 504.)

Neither is there good ground for the general objection based on
insufficiency of facts. The plaintiffs allege that they and their
predecessors in interest have been in the peaceful and continuous
possession, in good faith and under a claim of ownership, of the two
parcels of land described in the complaint even before 1890 (par. 2, B.
E., p. 22) ; that they have constructed on said lands about 150 houses
belonging to them, and have made other improvements thereon consisting
of fruit trees, cane, palay and other plantations (par. 3, B. E., p.
23).; and, that the defendants, in conspiracy with one another, were
demolishing said 150 houses of the plaintiffs and were destroying the
other improvements on the land thereby causing to plaintiffs damages
amounting to P150,000 (par. 4, B. E., p. 23). It is further alleged
that the parcel of land over which the defendants might levy on
execution by virtue of the final judgment in the case of Bank of the
Philippine Islands vs. Acuna (59 Phil., 183), is different
from, and not included within any portion of, the two parcels of land
claimed by the plaintiffs in this case (pars, 5 and 6, B. E., pp. 23,
24). These averments, taken for granted in the demurrer, are sufficient
to constitute a cause of action. They plainly show the substantial
facts which form the basis of the primary right of the plaintiffs and
the culpatory acts of the defendants. The rules of pleading limit the
statement of the cause of action only to such operative facts as give
rise to the right of action of the plaintiff to obtain relief against
the wrongdoer. The details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence, statements, of law, inferences and arguments need not be
stated (Pomeroy, Code Remedies, sec. 420, p. 635; Philips, Code
Pleading, sec. 182, p. 163; vide Ortiz vs. Garcia, 15 Phil., 192; Canete vs. Wislizenus and Serna, 36 Phil., 428, 432; La Insular vs. Jao Oge, 42 Phil., 366, 372; Valmilero vs. Kong Chang Seng, 33 Phil., 84; Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Laguna Cocoanut Oil Co. and Fidelity and Surety Co., 44 Phil., 618; Robinson vs. City of Glendale, 182 Cal., 211; 187 Pac, 741).

The contention of the defendants that the plaintiffs should set
forth the specific extent of their respective shares in the parcels of
land claimed by them as well as the specific nature of their title is
not well taken. They are merely matters of evidence which the
plaintiffs, under the rules herein above referred to, need not allege
and which they may prove at the trial on the merits in support of their
claim of ownership. A general allegation of ownership is a sufficient
averment of the ultimate fact, and a complaint containing it
sufficiently pleads plaintiff’s ownership (Robinson vs. City of Glendale, 182 Cal., 211; 187 Pac, 741, 742; Payne vs. Treadwell, 16 Cal., 243; Fudickar vs. East Riverside, etc., Co., 109 Cal., 36; 41 Pac, 1024; Hoeser vs. Miller, 77 Cal., 193; 19 Pac, 375; Johnson vs. Vance, P6 Cal., 130; 24 Pac, 863; Gray vs. Walker, 157 Cal., 384; 108 Pac, 278; Shurtleff vs.
Kehrer, 163 Cal., 26; 124 Pac, 724). The defendants can not be
permitted to vary the areas of the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and
the amount of damages sought to be recovered in the action. The
defendants by demurring to the amended complaint in question can not
change or set out new facts. The facts involved in a demurrer are only
those set out in the pleading demurred to, and the demurrer merely
raises a question of law as to the insufficiency of those facts to
constitute a cause of action. The defendants assume pro re nata
the truth of the plaintiffs’ allegations and submit to the court the
question of law whether they are obliged to proceed further in the suit
upon the assumed state of facts (Suther land, Code Pleading and
Practice, sec. 237).

As regards the defendants’ claim of defect of parties, it
sufficient to state that “when a demurrer is presented for a defect or
mis joinder of parties and the court finds upon examination of the
petition that the demurrer is well found ed, it is its duty not to dismiss the action but to order the inclusion in the case of a defect of parties and the exclusion in the case of a misjoinder of parties.” (Sanchez vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 40 Phil., 155, 159.)

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed and
the cause is hereby remanded to the trial court, with instruction that
the defendants be required to answer the third amended complaint
presented on October 5, 1934 within ten days from receipt of notice of
this decision and the case thereafter allowed to take its ordinary
course in accordance with law. So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., VillaReal, Abad Santos, Diaz, and Concepion, JJ., concur.

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IMPERIAL, J.,

I concur in the result but I do not agree to the ground upon which
it is based. It is stated that as the third amended complaint (not the
fourth amended complaint because there were only three amended
complaints, the first complaint being the original) was correctly and
legally rejected by the court upon the ground that it was filed out of
time, it should be interpreted that the appealed order of November 27,
1934, in dismissing the case, referred to the second amended complaint
of October 5, 1934, the demurrer to which was sustained in the order
of October 30th of said year. I do not adhere to this reasoning because
a pleading which was not under consideration by the court, having been
substituted by another, is revived thereby and because the appeal is
directed against an order which is not the one really appealed from,
although it is true that it was excepted to.

When a demurrer to a complaint is sustained and an amended
complaint is filed after the order sustaining the demurrer has been
excepted to, it is the amended complaint and not the original complaint
that is before the court be cause the latter has been replaced by the
former, and the original complaint so replaced does not form a part of
the record (Reynes vs. Compania General de Tabacos, 21 Phil., 416; Redell vs. Baltimore,.etc., R. Co., 245 Fed., 788; U. S. vs. Gentry, 119 Fed., 70; Lasky vs. Newtown Min. Co., 56 Fed., 628; Barnes vs. Union Pac. R. Co., 54 Fed., 87; Cramer vs.
Mack, 12 Fed., 803). Under this principle of procedural nature, it
appears that this court cannot base its decision upon the sufficiency
of the allegations of an amended complaint which before the law has
been replaced by another amended complaint, no longer forms a part of
the record and is not the basis of the appealed order of November 27,
1934. To so proceed would be to change entirely the appellants’ theory
inasmuch as their appeal would then be directed against the order of
October 30, 1934, instead of that of November 27th of said year, which
is really the order appealed from and disputed by the par ties.

The decision is based upon the theory that as the third amended
complaint had been filed out of time and had not been admitted by the
court, this pleading is but a mere scrap of paper and it has no legal
existence in the record. The fact, however, is that the pleading was
attached to the record and the rejection thereof by the court was de
creed subsequently. If the negligence incurred by the party which
presented it out of time is excusable and the allegations thereof
constitute a cause of action, the decision rendered by this court,
reversing the appealed order, must be based upon the sufficiency of the
allegations of said pleading.

Referring now to the filing of the third amended com plaint, it appears
that said complaint was filed on the day following the expiration of
the period of ten days fixed ‘by the court. Although I agree that the
court had discretionary power to dismiss the case on the ground that
the third amended complaint was presented out of time, I am of the
opinion that it should not have done so because, after all, only one
day of delay had elapsed. Section 127, paragraph 3, of the Code of
Civil Procedure provides that the court may dismiss an action when the
plaintiff fails, for an unreasonable length of time, to prosecute his
ac tion. I am of the opinion that the one day that elapsed in this case
can not be considered ail unreasonable length of time.

With respect to the sufficiency of the third amended complaint, I
understand that the allegations thereof constitute sufficient causes
of action as stated in the decision, referring to the allegations of
the second amended com plaint. In fact the allegations of both
pleadings are virtually the same, for which reason the
respondents-appellees insisted that their last demurrer should likewise
be sustained.