THE PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, APPLICANT, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLEE. CIRIACO CHUNACO AND JOSE ARAMBURO, OPPOSITORS AND APPELLANTS.

On February 12, 1930, the Province of
Camarines Sur, thru its provincial fiscal, filed with the Court of
First Instance of said province an application for the registration of
several parcels of land comprised in the agricultural school site of
the province. The Director of Lands opposed the registration on the
ground that these parcels are public lands. An opposition was also
filed on January 19, 1931, by Ciriaco Chunaco but only with respect to
lot No. 3 of Plan 11-12638, Amd., Exhibit A. Jose Aramburo, who had
sold this lot to Ciriaco Chunaco, joined the latter on account of his
warranty in case of eviction.

The present controversy relates only to lot No. 3 as the other
parcels of land had already been adjudicated by the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur to the applicant and the Insular Government.
The parties appear to have agreed upon the identity of the controverted
lot (t. s. n., pp. 15, 147).

After hearing, His Honor, Judge Eulalio Garcia, on October 29,
1934, denied the application of the Province of Camarines Sur,
overruled the opposition of Ciriaco Chunaco and Jose Aramburo, and
declared lot No. 3 public land which had been reserved by the
Governor-General on October 19, 1933 for use as site of the Camarines
Sur Agricultural School. The oppositors, Ciriaco Chunaco and Jose
Aramburo, moved for reconsideration and new trial which motion was
denied. Exception was taken and the case finally elevated to this court
by bill of exceptions.

Oppositors by their counsel assign ten errors all of which,
however,—with the exception of the last one with reference to the
alleged error in refusing a new trial—may be reduced to one single
proposition, namely: Whether or not upon the evidence presented, the
court below erred in declaring lot No. 3 public land subject to
reservation by the Chief Executive for the stated public purpose,
instead of adjudicating the same and ordering its registration in the
name of the oppositor-claimant Ciriaco Chunaco.

Appellants claim that they and their predecessors in interest have
been since time immemorial in the continuous, open, peaceful and
adverse possession of lot No. 3 under a bona, fide claim of ownership
arid that, therefore, they are entitled to the registration of the same
under the provisions of Act No. 496 or, in the alternative, under the
beneficial provisions of Act No. 926, section 54, paragraph 6, and Act
No. 2874, Chapter VIII, section 45, paragraph (b), respectively.

The appellants called to the witness-stand eight witnesses to
substantiate their claim. Documentary evidence was also presented and
admitted (Exhibits 1 to 23). No claim is made that the lot had been
acquired either by purchase from or composition title with the
Government (Royal Decree of June 25, 1880). No step was even taken
towards securing possessory information title under the Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894 and the provisions of .the Spanish Mortgage Law of
July 14, 1893. The appellants, therefore, cannot invoke the provisions
of section 19, paragraph 3, of Act No. 496, as amended by section 1 of
Act No. 2164, which require that an applicant for registration of title
must claim “to own or hold any land under a possessory information
title, acquired under the provisions of the Mortgage Law of the
Philippine Islands and the general regulations for the execution of
same.” (Fernandez Hermanos vs. Director of Lands, 57 Phil.,
929, 933.) The failure of the appellants’ predecessors in interest to
legalize their possession of the land in question by the institution of
possessory information proceedings for the gratuitous grant of title
from the Spanish Government, thereby perfecting and converting their
possessory right into one of ownership, caused the land to revert to
the Government. (Fuster vs. Director of Lands, G. R. No. 40129, 61 Phil., 1015; Li Seng Giap & Co. vs. Director of Lands, 59 Phil., 687; Heirs of Datu Pendatun vs. Director of Lands, 59 Phil., 600.) In the first cited case, this court said:

“No existe en autos prueba alguna que demuestre que
Severino Tamayo y Juan de la Cruz, ni sus companeros, hayan solicitado
la composicion de los terrenos en controversia de acuerdo con el
meneionado Reglamento, cuyo objetivo era precisamente el kgitimar la
posesion de los que poseian ilegitimamente terrenos del Estado, ni de
que se hayan acogido a los benefieios del Real Decreto de 13 de febrero
de 1894 que tenia por especial fin dar una vez mas oportunidad a dichos
poseedores a que pudiesen obtener titulo gratuito previos los tramites
de informacion posesoria, ni tampoco a los del Real Decreto de 21 de
febrero de 1895. Si fuera cierto, como la solieitante apelada Antonia
C. Fuster ha tratado de probar, que Severino Tamayo y Juan de la Cruz y
companeros hubieran estado en posesion continua del referido terreno y
lo hubieran estado cultivando por medio de inquilinos hasta que
traspasaron sus derechos sobre el mismo a Matias Fuster el 15 de mayo
de 1895 (Exh. I), no se comprende c6mo no se habian acogido ni a los
beneficios del Real Pecreto de 25 de junio de 1880, para lo cual tenian
tiempo hasta el 17 de abril de 1894, ni a los beneficios del Real
Decreto de 13 de febrero de 1894, ni a los del Real Decreto de 21 de
febrero de 1895, para legitimar su posesidn y adquirir titulo gratuito
de propiedad sobre dicho terreno. Si hubiesen estado tan empeiiados
e.interesados en cultivar el citado terreno, hasta el extremo de poner encargados
en el, ipor que no pusieron el mismo empeno e interes en legitimar su
posesion, y adquirir titulo gratuito de propiedad sobre el mismo,
aprovechandose de la oportunidad y de los medios que las leyes les
brindaban para ello y asegurando de este modo el fruto de sus desvelos,
trabajo y privaciones? No se pretende que no habian tenido conocimiento
de dichos reales decretos; por consiguiente, es de presumir que se ha
cumplido con lo ordenado en el articulo 17 de Reglamento tantas veces
citado de que se diese la mayor publicidad al mismo en las Islas a fin
de que se conocieran las f acilidades que por sus disposiciones se
daban para legitimar la posesidn ilegal de terrenoa del Estado y
adqiuirir la propiedad de los mismos.” (Fuster vs. Director of Lands, supra.)

The appellants, however, also invtoke the benefits of paragraph 6
of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (6) of section 45
of Act No. 2874 and contend that they and their predecessors in
interest had possessed the land not only “for a period of ten years
next preceding the 26th day of July 1904” as said Act No.’ 926
provides, but from the year 1874. They claim that the repeal of Act No.
926 by Act No. 2874 cannot adversely affect their vested right of
ownership under the former Public Land Law because of the
constitutional inhibition against the enactment of ex post facto law or bill of attainder. In the first place, it should be observed that the constitutional provision that no ex post facto
law. or bill of attainder shall be enacted cannot be invoked to protect
allegedly vested civil rights, because it is only applicable to
criminal proceedings, and not to civil proceedings which affect private
rights retrospectively (See Mekin vs. Wolfe, 2 Phil., 74; Paynaga vs. Wolfe, 2 Phil., 146; U. S. vs. Ang Kan Ko, 6 Phil., 376; Concepcion vs. Garcia, 54 Phil., 81; and U. S. vs.
Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370; 51 Law. ed., 1098; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742; 11
Ann. Cas., 688). In the second place, section 54 of Act No. 926
provides that. “* * * persons or their legal successors in right,
occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such lands
have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor * * *.” No
application was filed under Act No. 926 by the appellants or their
predecessors in interest, and it is clear that without such application
no confirmation of their claims could be had and much less the issuance
of a certificate of title in their favor. Under these circumstances, no
vested right could have accrued to them.

The claim that the appellants should, in the alternative, be the
recipients of the beneficial provisions of Act No. 2874 (par. [6], sec.
45) is also without merit. Paragraph (b), section 45 of Act
No. 2874 substantially incorporates paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act
No. 926. The possession and occupation under both laws must not only be
under a bona fide claim of ownership but must also be open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious to give rise to a presumptive grant
from the State;

It has been uniformly held by this court that to justify judicial
confirmation of title to a public agricultural land, the claimant must
prove actual and physical occupation of said land, and that the
possession must be continuous, open, exclusive, notorious, adverse and
under a bona fide claim of ownership from July 26, 1894 (Tiglao vs. Insular Government, 7 Phil, 80, aff’d in 215 U. S., 410; 54 Law. ed., 257; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 129; 40 Phil., 1029; Vafio vs. Insular Government, 41 Phil., 161; Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abadejos, G. R. No. 21184, March 12, 1924; Gallado vs. Director of Lands, G. R. No. 23109; Fernandez Hermanos vs. Director of Lands, supra; Heirs of Datu Pendatun vs. Director of Lands, supra; Director of Lands vs. Abarca and Enage, G. R. No. 38277, 58 Phil., 950; Director of Lands vs. Abdul, G. R. No. 36867, 58 Phil., 932; Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Agta, G. R. No. 86479, 57 Phil., 979) up to the date of the filing of
the application or at least up to July 1, 1919 when Act No. 2874 was
enacted (Ongsiaco vs. Magsilang, 50 Phil., 380; Government of Philippine Islands vs. Adelantar, 55 Phil., 703; Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abadejos, supra; Government of Philippine Islands vs.
Abad, 56 Phil., 75). If the possessory right has been enjoyed in the.
manner set forth in the foregoing cases, it ripens into one of
presumptive ownership. The appellants, to be sure, attempted to prove
the elements of the required possession. We find, however, the evidence
on this point unsatisfactory. Their witnesses Timoteo Velasco, Jose
Bantugay, Mariano Berba and Felix Bolayon testified that the original
owner of the land in question was one Juan Garay who, according to the
first witness, had possessed the land since 1874; that during the
period of the possession of Garay the land had been dedicated to the
planting and’ cultivation of abaca, coconuts, rice, corn, camotes and other plants, as well as to the pasture of cattle and carabaos, and that Garay employed encargados and day-laborers (jornaleros)
for the purpose. But their own testimony shows that the possession of
Juan Garay did not last long enough as he left the Philippines before
the revolution against Spain and died while away. And while the
possession of Garay might have passed to Ceferino Aramburo, father of
the appellant, Jose Aramburo, it does not appear when said Ceferino
Aramburo, who died in 1899, began to occupy the land in question or any
portion of it. The record is notably deftdent of proof both of the
exact commencement of possession and its continuity. As a matter of
fact, the appellant Jose Aramburo himself admits this lack of
continuity of possession when, upon cross-examination by counsel for
the Government, he testified that when his father died in 1899, the
time when he was supposed to have inherited the land in question, he
was then in Spain and came to the Philippines only in 1911 or 1912 (t.
s. n., p. 162) and actually saw and took possession of the land only in
1913 (t. s. n., p. 158). Upon the testimonial evidence presented we
cannot give weight to their alleged possession through their encargados. While Timoteo Velasco testified that Ceferino Aramburo had aa encargados
Petronilo Guevara, Mariano de las Llagas and Manuel Pelayo (t. s. n.,
pp. 5, 6), Mariano Berba who also testified for the appellants declared
that Petronilo Guevara was Garay’s encargado (t. s. n., p. 166).
Another of the appellants’ witnesses, Felix Bolayon, contradicted this
assertion of Mariano Berba that Petronilo Guevara served under Garay by
stating that Garay’s encargado was his uncle, Estanislao Gonos (t. s.
n., p. 173). Furthermore, the appellant Jose Aramburo who took
possession of the land only in 1913 declared that after the death of
Petronilo Guevara, he named Manuel Pelayo as encargado (t. s. n., p.
152), thus discounting the statement of Timoteo Velasco who, as stated,
expressly included one Mariano de las Llagas among the encargados
of Joee Aramburo. Again, the witness Timoteo Velasco admitted that he
lived near the land in question only up to 1902 (t. s. n., p. 4), and
we are at a loss to understand how he could affirm that he knew
Petronilo Guevara and Manuel Pelayo to be encargados of Jose Aramburo when by the testimony of the latter, Petronilo Guevara and Manuel Pelayo only became his encargados
in 1913. Manuel Pelayo who also took the witness stand for the
appellants positively declared that he only knew the land in question
in 1922 and remained therein for only two years up to 1924 (t. s. n.,
p. 130).

The appellants’ claim of ownership, therefore, fails for lack of
sufficient proof of continuity of possession on their part or on the
part of their predecessors in interest during the time required by
section 45, paragraph (6), of Act No. 2874. (Heirs of Luno vs. Marquez, 48 Phil., 855; Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil., S74, 380; Fernandez Hermanos vs. Director of Lands, supra.)

No competent or satisfactory evidence was presented by the
appellants to establish the privity of title or possession between
Garay, the alleged original owner, and Ceferino Aramburo, his alleged
successor in interest. Antonio Gaya and Leopoldo Terran testified that
in the year 1900, upon the arrival of the Americans in the Philippines,
the house of Ceferino Aramburo, deceased father of the appellant Jose
Aramburo, together with several other houses in the town of Daraga,
Albay, were set on fire by order of one General Pawa, a revolutionary
leader, thus reducing to ashes the said house of Ceferino Aramburo and
the safe therein kept by the latter to shelter the papers and documents
relating to his property. With respect to the testimony of these two
witnesses, however, the trial court observed:

“* * * Estos testigos Antonio Gaya y Leopoldo
Terran, tampoco han afirmado que habian visto y leido el documento o
titulo a nombre de Ceferino Aramburo del terreno en cuestion; si fuera
verdad haberse quemado el documento del terreno en cuestion, la
existencia del supuesto titulo que se alega haberse quemado en un
incendio que tuvo lugar el afio 1900 en el Municipio de Daraga, Albay,
era muy facil comprobarlo por los medios siguientes: 1.°—Por una copia
de la escritura que indudablemente se podria hallar en el protocolo del
notario publico que intervino en la redaccion y otorgamiento de dicho
documento; 2.°—La naturaleza y relation de los documentos de Ceferino
Aramburo que se alegan haber sido destrozados por el incendio; y
3.°—Por los testigos que intervinieron en la eesidn en pago de una
deuda de Juan Garay a favor de Ceferino Aramburo.” (B. E., pp. 16, 17.)

After rendition of judgment by the lower court, appellants filed a
motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the
evidence consisting of documents said to have been found in the
archives of the National Library. The nature and character of these
documents were not even mentioned to apprise the court of their
importance and value and the lower court denied the motion. On appeal
to this court, announcement is made by the appellants in their brief
that a motion for a new trial would be filed because of the discovery
of documentary evidence, but up to this time no such motion has been
received.

The trial court, in declining to accept the explanation of
witnesses for the oppositors regarding the alleged destruction of
papers and documents pertaining to the property in controversy,
contrary to the contention of counsel for the oppositors-appellants,
did not apply the statute of frauds (sec. 385, Code of Civil Procedure)
but followed the ruling of this court in the cases of Director of Lands
vs. Abarca and Enage, supra, and Director of Lands vs. Abdul, supra. In the first case, this court said:

“The claimant did not testify, but his attorney
presented two witnesses, Estanislao de la Cruz and Higino Enage, aged
50 and 56, respectively, to show that the lot in question formerly
belonged to Eleno de la Cruz, and that it was purchased from him by
Emeterio Enage, the father of the claimant, but it is dear from their
testimony that this land, or rather a part of it, was in the possession
of Emeterio Enage when they first knew it. No competent evidence was
offered to show that Emeterio Enage acquired this lot from Eleno de la
Cruz, nor does the evidence show with any certainty when Emeterio
Enage, who died in 1910, began to occupy a portion of the land in
question.” And in the second case, this court held:

“There
is aboslutely no documentary evidence that Gigling himself ever
obtained title to the property, and there is no proof that he had had
possession for a time sufficiently long to justify the court in
awarding ownership to him. There is no document crediting that the
interest of Gigling was ever conveyed to Conway. It results that the
action of the trial court in awarding the lots mentioned to James
Conway was erroneous. The mere fact, relied upon by the appellee, that
the Province of Lanao, through its division superintendent of
education, offered to buy the claim of Conway to these lots from his
administrator ia of no value as proof of title.”

Even the evidence respecting the alleged possessory acts exercised
by the appellants’ predecessors in interest and their agents is
conflicting. Whereas some of their witnesses testified that the
controverted parcel had been dedicated by the original owner thereof
and his alleged immediate successor in interest to the cultivation of
abaca, coconuts, rice, corn, camotes and other plants,
others, more particularly the appellant Jose Aramburo himself, declared
that the land had never been dedicated to anything else except cattle
grazing (t. s. n., p. 152), and that the earth dikes (pilapiles)
and irrigation canals did not really exist until after 1918 when the
Government Agricutural School of Camarines Sur actually took the
physical and material occupation and possession of the land, and began
to improve the same (t. s. n., pp. 10, 99, 106, 110, 111, 113-117,
142). “While grazing live stock over land is of course to be considered
with other acts of dominion to show a possession, the mere occupancy of
land by grazing live stock upon it, without substantial inclosures or
other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a plea of
limitations, and this is especially true where the claimant used no
means to restrain the live stock to any particular land, or where the
live stock of others was not excluded from the land. Such a use, it has
been said, is to be deemed merely permissive, whether the lands are
public or private, and may be terminated at any time.” (2 C. J., pp.
67, 68.) And in the case of Director of Lands vs. Absolo (46 Phil., 282), it was held:

“The more fact that during the Spanish regime one
had made on public land some inclosures for his cattle and cottages for
his shepherds and said cattle had been pasturing thereon for a number
of years, and said shepherds cultivated a small portion thereof-for a
like period, is not a possession under claim of title, when it appears
that he did not break up any ground, or bring the land to a state of
cultivation and the cattle of other people grazed thereon, just as his
cattle did, and the cultivation of the land by his shepherds was not
permanent but casual and stopped as soon as said shepherds ceased to
live on the land on account of all the cattle having perished.”
(Syllabus. See also Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Taal, 38 Phil., 367, 372.)

Counsel for the appellants vigorously assert in their brief that
the Province of Camarines Sur and the Insular Government had recognized
the ownership of the appellants of the land in question by the
assessment thereof three times by the provincial assessor of Camarines
Sur in the name of Jose Aramburo. Assessment alone, however, is of
little value as proof of title. Mere tax declaration does not vest
ownership of the property in the declarant (Evangelists vs. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil., 607; Casimiro vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil., 562; Elumbaring vs.
Elumbaring, 12 Phil., 384). Neither is the alleged offer (Exhibit 7, p.
37, rec.) made by the provincial governor to buy the claims of the
appellant Jose Aramburo any concession or evidence of ownership
(Director of Lands vs. Abdul, supra); nor does the
issuance of a certificate of repurchase by the provincial treasurer of
Camarines Sur in favor of Jose Aramburo upon the redemption payment of
the accrued taxes on the land up to 1929 vest in him any title or
operate as an estoppel against the Government. The repurchase
certificate was “issued with the understanding that it does not
acknowledge a better right to the properties being redeemed by said
Jose Aramburo than that had by their former owners prior to the
forfeiture thereof and without prejudice to the right of the Government
to contest the title thereto, if deemed necessary, in proper
proceedings.” (Exhibit 6, p. 36, rec.) Furthermore, the purchaser of
land forfeited by the Government for nonpayment of taxes only acquires
the interest held by the delinquent owner, and the Government is not
deemed to have included in the conveyance the title which it holds over
the land. (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Adriano, 41 Phil., 112.)

The decision of the trial court, being on the whole supported by
the evidence on record, is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellants. So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.