THE UNITED STATES, COMPLAINANT AND APPELLANT, VS. ENRIQUE RODRIGUEZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
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United States versus Rodriguez
The Case
This is a criminal case from the early years of the American regime in the Philippines. The United States, as complainant and appellant, prosecuted Enrique Rodriguez for the crime of abduction, on the theory that he had taken Marcosa Peñalosa, a virgin under twenty three years of age, away from her father's house with her consent. The case matters because the Supreme Court uses it to fix one essential element of abduction: the act must be committed with unchaste designs. Without that purpose, there is no abduction under the Penal Code, even if a young woman is in fact taken from her home. It is a compact lesson in how a penal provision is read together with the provisions around it.
Procedural History
The case began in the trial court, where Enrique Rodriguez was charged with abduction. The trial court acquitted the defendant, and the United States, as complainant, appealed the judgment of acquittal to the Supreme Court. The appeal thus reached the Supreme Court directly from the trial court, and the Court reviewed the evidence and the law before affirming the judgment below.
Facts
Enrique Rodriguez was on intimate terms with Marcosa Peñalosa, who was eighteen years of age and who lived in the house of her father, Gregorio Peñalosa. The father was the private prosecutor in the case and was opposed to the relations between his daughter and the defendant.
During the afternoon of May 2, 1901, Marcosa left her father's house of her own free will and went to the defendant's house. Her purpose was to demand from him the fulfilment of the promise of marriage which he had repeatedly made to her on previous occasions. Two witnesses were present in the defendant's house, dealing with him on business matters, when she arrived between one and two o'clock that afternoon. They were informed that very afternoon that Marcosa would be married to the defendant, and they were asked by him to act as witnesses to the marriage, which was celebrated the following day, May 3, as shown by the corresponding certificate made part of the record.
On these facts, the Court found that the departure of Marcosa from her house was not an abduction but a real elopement, carried out by her as a means of contracting marriage with the defendant against her father's opposition. She acted on her own initiative and was not seduced by the defendant. Whether the affair be called an elopement or an abduction, the act was not committed with unchaste designs but with matrimonial intentions, which were known to certain persons from the very beginning and which were realized the following day by the marriage of the accused to the woman alleged to have been abducted.
Issues
- Whether or not the taking of a virgin under twenty three years of age and over twelve years, committed with her consent, constitutes the crime of abduction when the act is not committed with unchaste designs.
- Whether or not the provisions on abduction must be read together with the provision requiring unchaste designs, so that such purpose is essential in every case of abduction.
Applicable Provisions
Article 445 of the Penal Code provides:
The abduction of a woman, whether committed with violence against her will or with her consent in case of her minority, must be understood as always carried out with unchaste designs.
This is the provision the Court treats as clearly and conclusively establishing that unchaste designs are necessary for the crime of abduction to exist.
Article 446 of the Penal Code, invoked by the complainant, provides:
The abduction of a virgin under the age of twenty three years and over twelve, committed with her consent, shall be punished with the penalty of prision correccional in its medium degree and minimum degree of prision mayor.
The Court holds that although this article does not expressly mention unchaste designs, it must be considered in connection with the preceding article, which requires that circumstance as indispensable and essential.
Paragraph 2 of Article 448 of the Penal Code provides:
If the abduction has been committed with unchaste designs, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum degree.
The Court notes that this paragraph speaks only of abduction committed with unchaste designs, which further confirms the interpretation that such purpose is required in all cases.
Article 449 of the Penal Code provides:
Those convicted of abduction shall be sentenced, by way of indemnity, to endow the complainant and acknowledge the offspring.
The Court reasons that this provision impliedly presupposes the idea of unchaste purpose in every case of abduction, since it applies to all cases of abduction as a common provision on crimes against chastity.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court holds that unchaste designs constitute one of the essential elements of the crime of abduction, both when committed with violence against the will of the woman and when carried out with her consent in case of her minority. This is precisely the point that distinguishes abduction from other crimes against personal liberty and security. If a woman is removed from her house, even a virgin under twenty three years of age, for the purpose of murdering her, demanding a ransom, or holding her prisoner, the act would undoubtedly be a crime, but it would not fall under the provisions defining and punishing abduction. It would fall under other and quite distinct provisions, even though the material fact of the stealing away of a woman is present. The Court adds that the crime is classified in the Code among the crimes against chastity, which confirms that the unchaste purpose is essential in all cases.
On the second issue, the Court holds that Article 446, although it does not expressly mention unchaste designs, must be read together with Article 445, which requires that circumstance as indispensable and essential. Article 445 is the complement of Article 446, the two forming part of one and the same chapter in the title the Code devotes to crimes against chastity. The Court also relies on paragraph 2 of Article 448, which speaks only of abduction committed with unchaste designs, and on Article 449, which presupposes unchaste purpose in all cases of abduction.
Applying these rules to the facts, the Court finds that the departure of Marcosa was a real elopement carried out by her on her own initiative, not an abduction, and that in any event the act was committed not with unchaste designs but with matrimonial intentions, which were realized the following day by the marriage of the accused to her.
Doctrine
Unchaste designs are an essential element of the crime of abduction, whether the taking is with violence against the will of the woman or with her consent in case of her minority. The provisions on abduction must be read together as parts of one chapter on crimes against chastity, so that the requirement of unchaste designs in Article 445 qualifies the consent-based abduction punished by Article 446. A taking of a woman for a purpose other than unchastity, such as murder, ransom, or imprisonment, is not abduction but some other crime against personal liberty and security. Where the taking is in fact an elopement for the purpose of marriage, and the marriage follows, the matrimonial intention negates the unchaste designs that the crime requires.
Disposition
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, with costs in that instance de oficio, and the defendant Enrique Rodriguez was acquitted.
Remember This
The one line to memorize is that unchaste designs are essential in every case of abduction, so that an elopement for marriage is not abduction. Examiners use this case to test whether a candidate will read Article 446 together with Article 445, and to distinguish abduction from other crimes against personal liberty and security.