JUAN BAGAYAS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PELAGIA GUILAO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal taken by the defendant
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac declaring
the plaintiff the owner of the portion of land in litigation, ordering
the segregation thereof from lot No, 5956 of the cadastre of said
province and ordering her to execute a deed of transfer of said portion
of land in favor of the plaintiff to enable him to apply for the
cancellation of certificate of title No. 11229 issued in the name of
the defendant and to obtain another for the portion adjudicated to him,
with costs.

The defendant and her brothers and sister, Ambrosio Guilao, Luis Guilao and Constancia Guilao were the pro-indiviso
owners of a parcel of land situated in Surgui, Gamiling, Tarlac,
surveyed in cadastral case No. 402 of Camiling as lot No. 5956 and
covered by certificate of title No. 11229. Upon the death of Maxima
Fernando, mother of the Guilao brothers and sisters, the latter needed
money to defray her funeral expenses and Ambrosio Guilao, with the
consent of his brother and sisters, sold to the plaintiff, their
cousin, for P90, a portion of said land 39 meters long and 21 meters
wide, bounded on the north by a country road, on the east by Ambrosio
Guilao, on the south by Alfonso A. Pablo and on the west by Juan
Bagayas and Juan Fernando, executing to that effect the deed of sale,
Exhibit A, dated June 22, 1922, signed by the defendant and her brother
Luis Guilao as witnesses. When the cadastre of Camiling was prepared,
the entire land, including the portion sold to the plaintiff, was
surveyed in the name of Ambrosio Guilao. As Ambrosio Guilao died, the
defendant agreed with the plaintiff to file an answer in the cadastral
case and to apply for the registration of the entire land in her name,
without prejudice to subdividing it later and transferring to the
plaintiff the portion already belonging to him. This agreement was made
orally and was carried out in order to avoid subdividing the land
before its registration and incurring double expenses for the survey
thereof. Furthermore, all of them then had not sufficient money. As a
result of the agreement, the entire land was finally decreed in the
exclusive name of the defendant and the aforesaid certificate of title
was issued to her. Two years after the plaintiff had purchased the
portion of land now claimed by him, he built thereon a house of mixed
materials valued at P700, and he and his family lived and are now
living therein for more than ten years. To carry out the subdivision
agreed upon, the defendant delivered her certificate of title to her
relative, Attorney Alfonso A. Pablo, who was the same person who had
prepared the deed of sale Exhibit A. Said attorney, however, was unable
to finish the task entrusted to him because he had been elected
assemblyman for the province and has to reside temporarily in the City
of Manila. Sometime later, misunderstanding arose between the plaintiff
and the defendant in connection with the partition of a certain
inheritance left by a relative of both and thereafter the defendant
refused to cede to the plaintiff the portion of land belonging to him
and to make the stipulated subdivision, thereby compelling the
plaintiff to bring this action.

The defendant assigns in the appealed judgment the following
alleged errors, to wit: “1, The lower court erred in not dismissing the
case as prayed in the demurrer for lack of jurisdiction, because the
plaintiff-appellee is basing his claim acquired before the cadastral
registration, and, therefore, affected by the order of general default;
2. The lower court erred in reopening the case and in acquiring
jurisdiction respecting the ownership of a parcel of land registered
and adjudicated on September 11, 1924, while the corresponding decree
of registration, issued on January 15, 1926, is long final and
conclusive, and, therefore, it exceeded its authority; 3. The lower
court erred in making a decision which is contrary to the positive
disposition of the Land Registration Act; 4. The lower court erred in
making a decision which is contrary to the established facts during the
trial; 5. The lower court erred in permitting oral evidence during the
trial respecting agreement on land contrary to section 335 of the Code
of Civil Procedure and against the objection of the appellant; 6. The
lower court erred in believing the testimony of a witness contrary to
the testimony of the parties to the case at bar; 7. The lower court
erred in depriving the defendant-appellant of her property without any
consideration, contrary to article 349 of the Civil Code; and 8. The
lower court erred in compelling the defendant-appellant to execute a
deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff-appellee against her will.”

The first four assignments of error refer to the effects of the
registration obtained by the defendant and of the certificate of title
issued exclusively in her name. The defendant contends that the
appealed judgment virtually reopens cadastral case No. 402 of Camiling,
with respect to lot No. 5956, and annuls the final decree as well as
the certificate of title issued in her favor. However, it does neither
the one nor the other. ‘The action brought by the plaintiff is
authorized by section 55 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No.
3322,’which permits the legitimate owner of a parcel of land to bring
an action against the person who, not being the rightful owner thereof,
has registered it, for the purpose of compelling him to execute a deed
of transfer or to pay him damages. It is well settled in this
jurisdiction that a person who has fraudulently registered a real
property belonging to another is obliged to execute a deed of transfer
thereof in favor of the true owner, provided said property has not
passed to an innocent purchaser, or to indemnify said owner for damages
(section 55, Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3322; Consunji vs. Tison, 15 Phil., 81; Macapinlac vs. Gutierrez Repide, 43 Phil., 770; Severino vs. Severino, .44 Phil., 348; Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres vs. Municipality of Tabaco, 46 Phil, 271; Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, 49 Phil., 433; Rodriguez vs. Llorente, 49 Phil., 823; Philippine. Land Improvement Co. vs. Bias, 55 Phil., 540; Palet vs. Tejedor, 55 Phil., 790). This court, therefore, concludes that the first four assignments of error are unfounded.

During the trial, the plaintiff and Attorney Alfonso A. Pablo
testified that said plaintiff and the defendant had agreed verbally
that the defendant would ask in the cadastral case for the registration
of the entire land, including the portion sold to the plaintiff; and
later apply for the subdivision thereof to segregate the portion
belonging to the plaintiff. The attorney for the defendant objected to
both testimonies alleging that the agreement must be in writing and
cannot be proven orally in accordance with; the provisions of section
335, paragraphs 1 and 5, of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court
overruled the objections and said attorney excepted in connection with
Pablo’s testimony. He failed, however, to except with respect to the
plaintiff’s testimony. In her fifth and sixth assignments of error, the
defendant contends that the court erred in admitting said oral evidence
and in giving more weight to the plaintiff’s testimony than to hers on
the same point. This court is of the opinion that the errors assigned
are without legal foundation. Paragraphs 1 and 5 of section 335 are not
applicable to the evidence objected to on the ground that the oral
agreement, by its terms, does not refer to a contract which could not
be performed within one year and does not involve the sale of an
interest in real property, but the registration of a parcel of land.
The evidence offered by the plaintiff to prove the transfer is the deed
Exhibit A. Even granting that the oral evidence were incompetent, the
defendant cannot now raise any question relative to the admission
thereof by the court because her attorney failed to except to the
resolution overruling his objection and admitting the testimony of the
plaintiff. With respect to the other point, this court holds that the
lower court correctly gave more weight to the plaintiff’s testimony in
view of the fact that it was corroborated by the deed of sale signed by
the defendant herself, the delivery by the defendant of her certificate
of title to Attorney Pablo, the construction by the plaintiff of his
house of mixed materials valued at P700 and, lastly, the indisputable
fact that the plaintiff is in the peaceful possession, under claim of
ownership, of the portion acquired by him more than ten years ago. If
the oral agreement in question had not existed, undoubtedly the
plaintiff, as owner and possessor, would have separately sought the
registration of the land on which he had his house already built.

It is not true that the defendant has) been deprived of her
property without compensation because it appears proven that Ambrosio
Guilao, acting in the name of his brother and sisters, received from
the plaintiff the sum of P90 as the price of the portion of land sold
by him. The defendant ceased to have an interest therein and succeeded
in registering it with the obligation to execute the deed of transfer
of said portion of land in favor of the plaintiff. Therefore, the
seventh assignment of error is untenable.

The eighth and last assignment of error is with less legal
foundation because, as already stated, the adequate remedy for the
plaintiff, in this case is to compel the defendant to execute in his
favor a deed of transfer of the portion of land acquired by him and of
which he has legally become the owner.

For the foregoing reasons, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with
the costs of this instance to the defendant-appellant. So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.