CO-TIONGCO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CO-GUIA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
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Co-Tiongco versus Co-Guia
The Case
This is an action of unlawful detainer brought by Co-Tiongco, the purchaser of a lot in Manila, against Co-Guia, the Chinaman who was occupying that lot and paying rent upon it. The purchaser claims that the occupant holds only from month to month and that the lease expired at the end of each month. The occupant answers that he holds under a recorded ten-year lease, and that the purchaser took the lot bound by that lease. The case matters because it fixes the reach of a recorded lease against a later buyer: a purchaser of leased property may generally end a pending lease, but not where the lease is recorded and the law makes it binding on third persons.
Procedural History
The action was commenced as an action of unlawful detainer. The trial court rendered judgment against Co-Guia, the defendant, evidently ordering his eviction, and Co-Guia appealed. The case came to the Supreme Court on that appeal, and the only question presented on appeal was whether the action of unlawful detainer could be maintained upon the facts on which it was founded. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment below in all its parts. Justice Torres dissented.
Facts
On the sixth of March, 1894, by a public instrument, Co-Quingco leased a lot from Pedro Sy-Quia, who owned it as purchaser subject to a vendor's right of redemption. The lease was to run for ten years, ending on an equal date in March, 1904, at a rental of fifty pesos per month. In the same instrument Eugenio Guidote, the vendor who had reserved the right to redeem, bound himself to respect the lease for the full ten years at that monthly rental. The contract, signed by Co-Quingco, Sy-Quia, and Guidote, was recorded in the property register of the North District of Manila on the twelfth of March, 1894.
On the twenty-third of January, 1901, Guidote sold the lot to Co-Tiongco by public instrument, declaring it free from all encumbrance, and that sale was also recorded. Co-Guia, describing himself as agent of Co-Quingco and manager of his lumber yard, then sought to pay the rent. Guidote having refused to receive it, Co-Guia consigned fifty pesos in the justice court of Binondo as payment under the contract. Later he tendered one hundred pesos for February and March by notarial act to Co-Tiongco, who refused, saying he had no contract with Co-Guia or with Co-Quingco, the owner of the lumber yard. The consignment was then made.
On the twenty-second of March, 1901, Co-Tiongco gave Co-Guia notice to vacate by the end of the month. The action of unlawful detainer followed, based solely on the contention that Co-Guia was a lessee from month to month because he had stated in the consignment document that the rental was fifty pesos per month. The defendant denied that fundamental fact and put in evidence the recorded ten-year lease.
Issues
- Whether or not the action of unlawful detainer can be maintained by Co-Tiongco against Co-Guia upon the facts on which the action is founded.
- Whether or not the purchaser of leased property is bound to respect a recorded lease of ten years entered into by his vendor.
Applicable Provisions
Article 1571 of the Civil Code provides:
The purchaser of a leased property is entitled to terminate a lease pending at the time of the sale, unless there has been a stipulation to the contrary or it has been forbidden by the provisions of the Mortgage Law.
This is the rule the purchaser invokes, and its exception is the rule that saves the occupant.
Article 2, paragraph 5, of the Mortgage Law provides:
Leases for more than six years' duration should be recorded in the register of property.
The ten-year lease falls squarely within this requirement, and it was in fact recorded.
Article 23 of the Mortgage Law provides:
Recorded acts and contracts shall be enforceable against third persons.
This is why the recorded lease binds Co-Tiongco as a third person.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the action of unlawful detainer will not lie. The complaint was based solely on the theory that Co-Guia was a monthly lessee, and that theory rested on a document in which Co-Guia merely described the rental as fifty pesos per month. The defendant met it with the recorded ten-year lease, and the Court held that the purchaser could not prevail against a stranger such as Co-Guia by alleging a cause for rescission of a bilateral contract made with Co-Quingco. Until Co-Quingco, the possessor of the right of use, has had his day in court and judgment has been rendered against him, no such allegation can be effective against Co-Guia. Co-Guia was not even a sublessee; he was the manager of the lumber yard on the lot.
On the second issue, the Court held that the purchaser is bound. A purchaser by singular title for value is not generally bound to respect the personal obligations of his vendor, and so the purchaser of leased property may terminate a pending lease. But that rule does not apply where the right arises from an express agreement or a real right affecting the property itself. The Court quoted the exception:
The same article 1571 denies the purchaser the right to end a pending lease in case there has been a stipulation to the contrary or if it has been forbidden by the provisions of the Mortgage Law.
Recordation, the Court said, is a species of promulgation of the private law of the contract, as indispensable to give it obligatory force as promulgation is to a law. The lease having been recorded, it is obligatory law for third persons such as Co-Tiongco. The vendor could not transmit to him any greater right than he himself had, and the right of use had already been alienated in March, 1894, until an equal date in 1904.
Doctrine
A purchaser of leased property may terminate a pending lease under Article 1571 of the Civil Code, because he is not bound by the merely personal obligations of his vendor. That right, however, is subject to the exception in the same article: where there is a stipulation to the contrary, or where the Mortgage Law forbids it, the purchaser must respect the lease. A lease for more than six years must be recorded under Article 2, paragraph 5, of the Mortgage Law, and under Article 23 recorded acts and contracts are enforceable against third persons. Recordation is the promulgation of the private law of the contract, and it binds a later purchaser who takes the property. The vendor cannot transmit to the purchaser a greater right than he himself had. A judgment against a mere occupant who is not a party to the lease, and who is not sued as the lessee's representative, cannot prejudice the absent lessee.
Disposition
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment below in all its parts and dismissed the complaint against Co-Guia, without special condemnation as to costs; Justice Torres dissented, voting to affirm.
Remember This
Memorize the line: a recorded lease is the private law of the contract, binding the later purchaser as though promulgated against him. Examiners use this case on Article 1571 of the Civil Code, on the recording of long leases under the Mortgage Law, and on the rule that a judgment cannot bind a lessee who was never made a party.