NICOLASA MACAM, AS TESTAMENTARY EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED LEONARDA MACAM, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JUANA GATMAITAN AND MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, DEFENDANTS AND APPEL…

This is an action brought by the plaintiff,
as executrix of the testate estate of the deceased Leonarda Macam, for
the recovery from the defendants Juana Gatmaitan and Magno S. Gatmaitan
of the ownership of the house described in paragraph 2 of the
complaint. The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the court
absolving the defendants.

On September 24, 1929, the deceased Leonarda Macam and the
defendant Juana Gatmaitan purchased the house in question for P3,000
from the spouses Generoso Inducil and Flora Hamos (Exhibit B). It is
stated in the deed of sale that the vendors received the purchase price
of the house from the vendees, both single. However, on June 12, 1932,
the deceased Leonarda Macam and the defendant Juana Gatmaitan
subscribed a document (Exhibit C) which reads as follows:

“Know all men by these presents:

“That we, Leonarda Macam and Juana Gatmaitan, both single, of age and
residents of the municipality of Calumpit, Province of Bulacan,
Philippine Islands, by means of this document, freely and voluntarily
state as follows:

“1. That during the time we lived together
as friends, we have purchased a house of strong materials built on a
lot belonging to the Diocese, situated in the municipality of Calumpit,
Province of Bulacan, and declared for taxation purposes under Tax No.
6977, one Buick automobile, and furniture necessary for the house.

“2. That I, Juana Gatmaitan, hereby declare that the house purchased by
us was paid with my friend Leonarda Macam’s own money in the sum of
three thousand pesos (P3,000) and therefore, said house truly belongs
to my said friend. The following furniture likewise truly belong to her:

“One (1) wardrobe with mirror and carved top.

“One (1) narra bed.

“One (1) small wooden wardrobe.

“One (1) small wooden table.

“One (1) narra chair.

“One (1) rattan sofa.

“One (1) dining room table.

“One (1) kitchen table.

“Two (2) dining room benches.

“Two (2) kitchen benches.

“One (1) ice box,

“3. I, Leonarda Macam also hereby declare that the Buick automobile and
most of the furniture in the house where we live, as the narra chairs,
wardrobe and bed, truly belong to my friend Juana Gatmaitan, said
automobile and most of said furniture having been bought with money
exclusively belonging to her; and she was also the one who had my house
painted.

“4. That in consideration of the friendship we
mutually profess, considering ourselves almost as sisters, we have
voluntarily agreed that whoever of us will die first shall leave to the
survivor, as the latter’s property, the house and all the furniture
therein together with the Buick automobile above-stated, excluding the
furniture belonging to Leonarda Macam stated in paragraph 2 of this
document, which may be taken by the heirs of said Leonarda Macam if she
will be the first to give up her soul to God, as a remembrance to her
surviving friend, and this agreement shall be equivalent to a transfer
of the rights of the one who dies first and shall be kept by the
survivor; and none of our heirs shall claim the property mentioned in
this document, left by any of us who dies first.

“In witness
whereof, we affix our signature at the foot of this document as a proof
of the acceptance by each of us of this agreement, this 12th day of
July, 1932, in the municipality of Calumpit, Province of Bulacan, P. I.”

It is inferred from the foregoing document that the deceased
Leonarda Macam and the defendant Juana Gatmaitan lived together as
friends, Leonarda having contributed the house and Juana the Buick
automobile and most of the furniture to such companionship, both having
thereby established between themselves a de facto joint ownership of
the properties respectively contributed by them, which, judging from
their nature and description/ are more or less of the same value. Such
must be the case, judging from the fact that, although the house was
purchased with money exclusively belonging to Leonarda, it was made to
appear that both were the purchasers.

The plaintiff contends that with respect to the house, Exhibit C,
on the part of Leonarda, constitutes a donation mortis causa in favor
of Juana, and that as it had not been executed with all the formalities
required by law for a will, it is entirely invalid and did not produce
the effect of conveying the ownership of the house to Juana.

The lower court, in absolving the defendants from the complaint,
considered the act of the deceased Leonarda as a transfer of the
ownership of the house in favor of Juana, but not in the concept of a
donation. This conclusion of the court below is supported by the
literal interpretation of Exhibit C, wherein the parties describe the
act performed by them as an agreement and a transfer.

This court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is an aleatory contract
whereby, according to article 1790 of the Civil Code, one of the
parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or do something as
an equivalent for that which the other party is to give or do in case
of the occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen at an
indeterminate time. As already stated, Leonarda was the owner of the
house and Juana of the Buick automobile and most of the furniture. By
virtue of Exhibit C, Juana would become the owner of the house in case
Leonarda died first, and Leonarda would become the owner of the
automobile and the furniture if Juana were to die first. In this manner
Leonarda and Juana reciprocally assigned their respective property to
one another conditioned upon who might die first, the time of death
determining the event upon which the acquisition of such right by the
one or the other depended. This contract, as any other contract, is
binding upon the parties thereto. Inasmuch as Leonarda had died before
Juana, the latter thereupon acquired the ownership of the house, in the
same manner as Leonarda would have acquired the ownership of the
automobile and of the furniture if Juana had died first.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs to the appellant. So ordered.

Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.