ANTONIO LARENA, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO TEVES, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal taken by the respondent,
Pedro Teves, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Oriental Negros, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

“For the foregoing considerations, the court
declares the election of the respondent, Pedro Teves, to the office of
municipal president of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros, null and void, and,
consequently, he is not entitled to assume said office, with costs
against said respondent. So ordered.”

In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the court a quo in its decision in question, to wit:

“1. The lower court erred in not holding that the
legal residence of the respondent-appellant, Pedro Teves, from 1904 at
least, up to the present, has always been, and still is, the
municipality of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros.

“2. The lower
court erred in holding that Pedro Teves changed his legal residence
from Dumaguete to the municipality of Bacong, Oriental Negros, in 1919,
when the respondent-appellant registered as an elector in the latter
municipality and ran for representative of the second district of
Oriental Negros.

“3. Even admitting, for the sake of
argument that Pedro Teves’ residence was changed from Dumaguete to
Bacong in 1919, the lower court erred in not holding that Pedro Teves
re-acquired his legal residence in the municipality of Dumaguete much
more than one year prior to June 5, 1934.

“4. The lower court erred in holding that the cases of Yra vs. Abano (52 Phil., 380), and Vivero vs. Murillo (52 Phil., 694) are not applicable to the case at bar.

“5. The lower court erred in holding that Pedro Teves is ineligible to
the office of municipal president of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros.

“6. The lower court erred in not granting respondent-appellant’s motion for a new trial.”

The principal question to be decided in this appeal is whether or
not the respondent-appellant, Pedro Teves, who was born in the
municipality of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros, and who, from the year 1904
up to the present, has had his own house in said municipality and lived
with his family in said house, may be considered a resident thereof for
the purposes of the Election Law, notwithstanding the fact that in the
year 1919 he registered in the list of voters of the municipality of
Bacong; ran for representative for the second district of Oriental
Negros to which said municipality of Bacong belongs; again ran for
reelection in the year 1922; and launched his candidacy for member of
the provincial board of Oriental Negros in 1925, stating under oath in
his certificates of candidacy that he was a resident of said
municipality of Bacong, Oriental Negros, without having ever registered
as elector in any of the precincts of the municipality of Dumaguete
from said year, 1919, up to the present, and having ordered the
cancellation of his name in the list of voters of said municipality of
Bacong only on April 5, 1934.

In the case of Nuval vs. Guray (52 Phil., 645), this court laid down the following doctrine:

“* * * “The term “residence” as so used, is
synonymous with “domicile” which imports not only intention to reside
in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention/ (People vs. Bender, 144 N. Y. S., 145.)”

In 20 Corpus Juris, page 68, paragraph 26, it is also stated as follows:

“* * * The term ‘residence’ as used in
constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the qualifications
of electors is synonymous with home or domicile, denoting a permanent
dwelling place, to which the party when absent intends to return. While
one cannot by intention’ alone fix his dwelling place, yet the fact of
residence for the purpose of voting depends largely on the intention of
the person offering to vote, and a sojourn in a place, however long,
without the intention of making it a permanent home, will not qualify
the sojourner as an elector, unless it is otherwise provided by
constitution or statute. Hence the right to vote in a certain precinct
requires the concurrence of two things—the act of residing coupled with
the intention to do so. * * *”

In the case of Vivero vs. Murillo (52 Phil., 694), this court laid down the following rule:

“ELECTIONS; RESIDENCE OF CANDIDATE.—A student
living with his parents in a certain barrio of a municipality, which
barrio is later separated to be organized as an independent
municipality, who for several years pursues hi3 studies in several
provinces of the archipelago, supported by his parents, returning to
the latter’s home during his vacations in the newly organized
municipality, does not lose his residence in said “muncipality, either
on account of having resided in different provinces as a student, or of
having registered as a voter in the former municipality, and is
eligible as municipal president of the new municipality even if his
registration as voter in the municipality to which the new one
originally belonged has not been cancelled.”

In the case of Yra vs. Abano (52 Phil., 380), this court laid down the following doctrine:

“2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The Election Law makes
use of the terms ‘qualified voter in his municipality’, and ‘qualified
elector therein/ To be a qualified voter, does not necessarily mean
that a person must be a registered voter. It is sufficient for the
candidate to possess all of the qualifications prescribed in section
431 and none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The
fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the
municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate
and to be voted for.”

In this case the
respondent-appellant, Pedro Teves, from the year 1904 has had his own
house in the municipality of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros, wherein he has
constantly been living with his family and he has never had any house
in which he lived either alone or with his family in the municipality
of Bacong of said province. Ail that he has done in the latter
municipality was to register as elector in 1919, through an affidavit
stating that he was a resident of said municipality; run for
representative for the second district of the province of Oriental
Negros and vote in said municipality in said year; run again for
reelection in the year 1922; launch his candidacy for member of the
provincial board of said province in 1925, stating under oath in all
his certificates of candidacy that he was a resident of said
municipality of Bacong.

The affidavit made by him upon registering as elector in the
municipality of Bacong in the year 1919, stating that he was a resident
of said municipality; his two certificates of candidacy for the office
of representantive for the second district of the Province of Oriental
Negros, which were filed, the former in the year 1919 and the latter in
the year 1922, and the certificate of candidacy for the office of
member of the provincial board filed by him in the year 1925, in every
one of which he stated that he was a resident of the municipality of
Bacong, are at most a prima facie evidence of the fact of his
residence in the municipality of Bacong, which is required by law in
order that the corresponding officials could register him as an elector
and candidate, and not conclusive, and may be attacked in a
corresponding judicial proceeding. If, according to the ruling laid
down in the case of Vivero vs. Murillo, cited above, mere
registration in a municipality in order to be an elector therein does
not make one a resident of said municipality; if, according to constant
rulings the word “residence” is synonymous with “home” or “domicile”,
and denotes a permanent dwelling place, to which an absent person
intends to return; if the right to vote in a municipality requires the
concurrence of two things, the act of residing coupled with the
intention to do so; and if the herein respondennt-appellant, Pedro
Tevea, has always lived with his family in the municipality of
Dumaguete and never in that of Bacong, he has never lost his residence
in Dumaguete. The fact that his registration as elector in the
municipality of Bacong was cancelled only on April 5, 1934, upon his
petition, did not disqualify him to be a candidate for the office of
municipal president of said municipality of Dumaguete on the ground
that, as has been stated in the case of Yra vs. Abano, cited
above, registration in the list of voters is not one of the conditions
prescribed by section 431 of the Election Law in order to be an
elector; neither does failure to register as such constitute one of the
disqualifications prescribed in section 432 of said law.

Inasmuch as the respondent-appellant, Pedro Teves has had his legal
residence in the municipality of Dumaguete from the year 1904 up to the
present, without having acquired another outside said municipality, and
as he has all the other qualifications prescribed by law in order to be
a qualified elector, his election to the office of a municipal
president is valid and in accordance with law.

For the foregoing considerations, this court is of the opinion and
so holds that a person, who has his own house wherein he lives with his
family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of
abandoning it and without having lived either alone or with his family
in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality,
notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other
municipality in question and having been a candidate for various
Insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a
resident of the latter municipality.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the election
of the respondent, Pedro Teves, to the office of municipal president of
Dumaguete, Oriental Negros, is declared lawful and valid, with the
right to assume said office, with costs against the appellee. So
ordered.

Malcolm, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard. JJ., concur.