VENANCIO P. WAGAN AND VENANCIO GARCIA, PETITIONERS, VS. CWSPULO SROSCO AND BENITO NATIVIDAD, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA, RESPONDENTS.

IMPERIAL, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by
the petitioners, for the purpose of setting aside the orders entered by
the respondent judge on November 29, 1933, and July 31, 1934, requiring
them, together with other persons, by means of the writ of preliminary
injunction issued therein, to refrain from interfering with the
possession and enjoyment of certain portions included within the Hacienda
del Progreso and from gathering therefrom the unharvested palay,
finding them and other individuals guilty of contempt for having
violated the terms of said writ of preliminary injunction, and ordering
them each to pay a fine of P50, with corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In land registration case No. 2727 of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, G. L. R. O. Record No. 47721, the
respondent Crispulo Sideco applied for the registration of his title to
the Hacienda del Progreso, together with the improvements
thereon, alleging that he iS the owner thereof. The herein petitioners
and many other persons who likewise alleged themselves to be the owners
of the portions and improvements of which they were in actual possession
and which are included within said hacienda, filed opposition to the
registration. While said application and the oppositions thereto were
pending hearing and while the title to said hacienda still remained
undetermined and unadjudicated, the respondent Sideco filed a motion
praying for the issuance against the petitioners and many other persons
of a writ of preliminary injunction for the purpose of restraining them
from interfering with the possession of the entire hacienda and from
gathering the unharvested palay. After objections thereto had been filed
by the petitioners, the court issued the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for. The petitioners and their co-oppositors vainly prayed for
the reconsideration and dissolution of the injunction, for, their
motions were denied. A commissioner was appointed to inspect the
hacienda and he reported that the petitioners and their co-oppositors
indicated the portions claimed by them together with the unharvested
crop and that they, as well as the respondent Sideco, claimed ownership
of the unharvested palay which was sown by various and different
tenants. Later, the same respondent Sideco filed another motion charging
the herein petitioners and other individuals with contempt, having
violated the terms of the injunction. After due hearing during which the
court made an ocular inspection, the petitioners and one Santiago
Garcia were found guilty of contempt and were each sentenced to pay a
fine of F50, with corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. The other co-defendants were acquitted. The petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration of the latter order but the same was
denied.

Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, the
respondent judge had jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary
injunction, the dissolution of which is one of the purposes of the
present petition. Section 17 of Act No. 496, as amended by section 3 of
Act No. 1680, grants him such authority. The latter Act has not been
entirely repealed by the final section (b) of Act No. 2711 and its
amendments (Revised Administrative Code), as the petitioners contend.
Only section 1 of said Act, which certainly has nothing to do with the
power to grant a writ of injunction, is repealed.

Finding that the respondent judge had authority to
issue the injunction, the only question left to be decided is whether or
not he acted in excess of such authority in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction, in holding the herein petitioners guilty of
contempt, and in sentencing them for such offense to pay the fine above
stated.

It is a well established doctrine in this
jurisdiction that an injunction is not the proper remedy for the
recovery of possession of real estate and the improvement’s thereon, as
well as for the ejectments therefrom of the actual occupants who claim
to have title to or material interest therein. The use of said remedy in
such cases has invariably been considered unjustified, in open
violation of the legal presumption that the bona fide possessor
of a certain piece of land and the improvements thereon, holds the same
under claim of ownership and with a just title, and as an advanced
concession of the remedy to which the claimant might be entitled.
(Asombra vs. Dorado and Gesmundo, 36 Phil., 883 ; Golding vs.
Balatbat, 36 Phil., 941; and Rustia vs. Franco, 41 Phil.,
280.) There is not the least doubt that the petitioners, by themselves
or their tenants, were in actual possession of the portions claimed by
them together with the improvements and crops thereon, inasmuch as such
fact is shown by the report of the commissioner and by the circumstance
that their tenants were likewise charged with contempt for disobedience
to the injunction. If, as claimed by respondent Sideco, they were his
tenants, or if they acted as his agents, it cannot be understood why
they were prohibited from entering the land and from harvesting the
palay sown by them and finally punished for contempt.

Wherefore, the remedy applied for is granted and,
with respect to the herein petitioners, the orders dated November 29,
1933 and July 31, 1934, are hereby set aside, and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by this court is declared final, with
costs against the respondent Sideco. So ordered.

Malcolm, Villa-Real, Butte, and
Goddard, JJ., concur.