BRIGIDO AFALLA AND MARTINA PINAROC, PETITIONERS, VS. MARIANO ROSAURO, LEONORA GALLARDO AND DOMINGO GALLARDO, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for a writ of
certiorari filed by the petitioners to set aside and annul the order
entered by the respondent judge on January 27, 1934, in cadastral case
No. 21, which likewise set aside the decision rendered in the same case
on May 31, 1932.

On said date of May 31, 1932, the court rendered a partial
decision in cadastral case No. 21 of the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, G.
L. R. O. Record No. 1115, adjudicating lots Nos. 460 and 469 to the
petitioner-spouses Brigido Afalla and Martina Pinaroc. No final decree
or certificate of title to said lots was issued. On January 24, 1934,
having been informed that the lots had been adjudicated by decision to
the petitioners, the respondents Domingo Gallardo and Leonora Gallardo
filed a motion praying the court to resolve their motion filed on May
18,1932. In said motion of May 18, 1932, the respondents alleged that
the lots, which were really contested lots, had been heard as
uncontested; that through inadvertence they had failed to file their
answers and that the respondents were the true owners thereof, having
inherited them from their grandmother Maria Mendaros, who, in turn, had
obtained homestead patent No. 2214 therefor, for which reason they
applied for a new trial praying that thereafter said lots be
adjudicated to them. The motion was impugned by the herein petitioners
who alleged that the motion of May 18, 1932 had never been filed nor
was it attached to the record. After the trial at which counsel for
both parties were heard, the court entered the order dated January 27,
1934, the annulment of which is sought in this petition, setting aside
the decision rendered on May 31, 1932, and again setting the case for
rehearing.

The order in question does not contain the reasons for granting the
rehearing but in his answer, the respondent judge states that he had
favorably acted upon the motion because the herein respondents had
proven that they had really filed the motion of May 18, 1932, but was
mislaid and later disappeared, which accounts for the fact that it is
not attached to the record. In passing, it is timely to state that the
court’s conviction was supported by the fact that the herein
respondents had presented a certified copy of the notarial register
proving that the affidavit in support of the motion of May 18, 1932,
had actually been sworn to on said date.

The petitioners contend that the court exceeded its jurisdiction
and sane discretion in entering the order of January 27, 1934, setting
aside or annulling the decision dated May 31, 1932, on the ground that
said decision, not having been appealed from and due to the lapse of
time, became final and irrevocable.

This court is of the opinion that the petitioner’s contention is
unfounded. The fact that said decision was rendered in a cadastral case
wherein the proceedings are exactly the same as those which are
followed in an ordinary registration case, should not be ignored. The
decision renrdered in cases of this nature is merely the commencement
of the final decree which confers an irrevocable title. As long as the
final decree is not issued by the Chief of the General Land
Registration” Office in accordance with the law, and the period of one
year fixed for the review thereof has not elapsed, the title is not
finally adjudicated and the decision therein rendered continues to be
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. Such
is the ruling laid down in the case of De los Reyes vs. De Villa (48 Phil., 227), which was later reiterated in that of Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs. Philippine Railway Co. and Reynes (49 Phil., 546). In the former case, this court held:

“The decision upon which the decree of registration
is based, is, under the present practice, nothing but a statement of
the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto, together with an
order for the eventual preparation, issuance and entry of the decree.
In other words, in relation to the land registration cases in which the
registration is granted, our trial courts now follow the old equity
practice in England and the United States, with the exception that the
decree is prepared by the chief clerk of land registration instead of
by counsel, and that it is signed by said chief clerk in the name of
the judge instead of by the judge himself. After its preparation and
signing, the decree is immediately entered by copy in volumes
eventually bound and kept in the General Land Registration Office.
Then, and not until then, does the final and complete decree of
registration becomes a matter of record.

* * * * * * *

“The decree of registration has its origin in the
decision ordering its issuance and entry, and inasmuch as it relates
back to the rendition of that decision, it may readily be conceded that
had section 38 provided that the petition for review might be presented
within a year from the rendition of the decree, the situation would perhaps have been different. But here we are only concerned with the date of the entry
and under the old equity practice, which is followed in land
registration cases, there is a wide difference between the rendition of
a decision or order directing the issuance of a decree and the entry of
such decree. The fact that most of the Courts of First Instance have
deviated from the old practice in ordinary civil cases, and that in
such cases the filing of the decision of the court is generally
considered equivalent to the entry of the judgment, has nothing to do
with cases such as the present; here both practical considerations and
the law compel a different procedure.

* * * * * * *

“Summarizing our conclusions hereinbefore stated,
we hold that in a land registration case where the application for
registration is granted, there can be only one decree of registration; that the petition for a review of such decree must be presented within one year from its entry; that
the final form and contents of the decree of registration is prescribed
by section 40 of the Land Registration Act and that it cannot be
formally entered until it has been prepared as therein provided; that
such a decree has its inception in the decision of the court ordering
its issuance and entry and is a judicial and not an administrative
decree; that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the date noted
on such decree as the date of its issuance and entry must be taken to
be the true date of such entry; and that the time for presenting a
petition of review begins to run from that date.”

Taking into consideration, therefore, that the decision of May 31,
1932, did not finally and irrevocably adjudicate the title to the lots
and that the herein respondents could still file a petition for a
review within one year from the issuance of the final decree, which has
not yet been issued, it is held that the respondent judge neither
lacked jurisdiction nor exceeded it in setting aside said decision and
in granting the reopening of the case, thereby giving the parties ample
opportunity to prove their alleged rights.

Furthermore, the case presents another legal aspect. It appears
that according to the documents recently presented at the oral argument
by the attorney for the petitioners, lots Nos. 460 and 469 were covered
by certificate of title No. R-1262 which had been issued in the name of
Maria Mendaros prior to the promulgation of the decision adjudicating
them to the herein petitioners. According to said decision, the herein
petitioners were declared owners of the lots through possession and
occupation thereof for many years, that is, by reason of having
acquired them through prescription. Such being the case, it is obvious
that the court lacked jurisdiction to render said decision on the
ground that referred to lots already covered by a certificate of title
issued in the name of another person; and neither could the herein
petitioners validly acquire them through prescription nor the court
annul or cancel the certificate of title thereto except upon petition
of the person to whom it had been issued or any of his legal
successors. (Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil., 558; and Government of the United States vs. Judge of First Instance of Pampanga and Manila Railroad Co., 49 Phil., 495.)

Wherefore, the relief prayed for is denied, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.

Malcolm, Villas-Real, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.