G. R. No. 42122. December 01, 1934
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. INOGENTES MOLDES, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
HULL, J.:
Appellant was convicted in the Court of First
Instance of Leyte of the crime of homicide. On the night of the 3d of
April in the barrio of Maya, municipality of Abuyog, Province of Leyte,
there was a dance in a private house, and the deceased was the master
of ceremonies at that dance. The appellant insisted on dancing out of
turn and was reproved by the deceased. Appellant then went to the porch
of the house and with his bolo began cutting down the decorations. He
descended into the yard of the house and challenged everyone to a
fight. Not attracting sufficient attention, he began chopping at the
bamboo trees and repeated his challenge for a fight.
The deceased, unarmed, started down the stairs, speaking to him
in a friendly manner, and as deceased had about reached the ground,
appellant struck at him with his bolo, inflicting a wound on his left
arm, which was described by the sanitary inspector on post mortem examination as follows:
“A long incised wound located on the lower portion
of the left arm directed inwards downwards and extending as low as the
anticubitai fossa and cutting the inferior part of the biceps muscle,
and the branches of the brachial artery. It measured 3 inches long,
21/2 inches wide and 1 1/2 inches deep.”
As deceased fell to the ground, appellant inflicted a slight wound in the back and ran away from the scene of action.
The wound was seen and treated the next morning by the sanitary
inspector of Abuyog, but the deceased remained in the care of a local
“curandero”. This treatment failed to stop the hemorrhage, and the
deceased died on the 15th of April, 1934.
The theory of the defense was that appellant was behaving at the
dance, that the deceased was the aggressor, that he struck him on the
dance floor with a cane, and that when appellant ran from the house,
deceased followed him about 200 yards until they came to a creek and
appellant could not retreat any further, and that when being attacked
by the deceased with a cane and a bolo, he succeeded in wrenching the
bolo from the hands of the deceased and in self-defense inflicted the
wound.
While there is testimony to the above effect, the witnesses for the
defense were not believed by the trial court, and the testimony to that
effect does not read as clear and convincing as does that of the
witnesses for the prosecution.
The attorney de oficio urges that appellant did not intend
to commit as serious a wound as was inflicted but struck only in the
dark and in self-defense.
It is clear that there is no element of self-defense in the case
and that appellant was the aggressor. When one resorts to the use of a
lethal weapon and strikes another with the force that must have been
used in this case, it must be presumed that he realizes the natural
consequences of his act.
It is also contended by the attorney for the appellant that if the
deceased had secured proper surgical treatment, the wound would not
have been fatal. In the outlying barrio in which this assault took
place, proper modern surgical service is not available.
The general rule is “* * * that he who inflicts the injury is not
relieved of responsibility if the wound inflicted is dangerous, that
is, calculated to destroy or endanger life, even though the immediate
cause of the death was erroneous or unskillful medical or surgical
treatment * * *.” (29 C. J., 1081, and the numerous cases there cited.)
Ruling Case Law is in strict accord with Corpus Juris.
“* * * The principle on which this rule is founded
is one of universal application, and lies at the foundation of all
criminal jurisprudence. It is, that every person is to be held to
contemplate and to be responsible for the natural consequences of his
own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such
manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence
of this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or
diminish its criminality to prove that other causes co-operated in
producing the fatal result. Indeed, it may be said that neglect of the
wound or its unskillful and improper treatment, which were of
themselves consequences of the criminal act, which might naturally
follow in any case, must in law be deemed to have been among those
which were in contemplation of the guilty party, and for which he is to
be held responsible. But, however this may be, the rule surely seems to
have its foundation in a wise and practical policy. A different
doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from
human life a salutary and essential safeguard. Amid the conflicting
theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant upon the
treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many
cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death,
and thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest
crime might escape conviction and punishment.* * * ” (13 R. C. L., 751,
762; 22 L. R. A., New Series, 841.)
This court in the case of United States vs. Escalona (12 Phil., 54), following a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, adopted the same rule.
Therefore this contention of appellant must be held to be without merit.
During the trial, counsel for the defense asked several questions
as to the character and habits of the deceased, but the court sustained
the objections of the fiscal as to the propriety of such questions.
Appellant urges that this was prejudicial error. That such questions
were relevant to the issue then in question is not obvious. It is not
necessary to pass upon the merits of this contention, as such questions
were not insisted upon at the trial, and no exception was taken to the
rulings of the court.
Fixing the period of confinement at six years and on day of prision mayor to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, the judgment appealed from as thus modified is affirmed. No expression as to costs. So ordered.
Avancena, C. J., Abad Santos, Vickers, and Diaz, JJ., concur.