ALEJANDRO D. ALMENDRAS, PETITIONER, VS. ROMULO V. RAMOS, RESPONDENT.

By resolution No. 290 dated November 15,
1947, the municipal council of Sta. Cruz, Davao, granted to Romulo V.
Ramos (herein respondent) an electric franchise covering the entire
municipality, the grant having been approved by the Provincial Board of
Davao by resolution No. 185, The respondent in due time filed with the
Public Service Commission an application (Case No. 31457) for the
approval of the franchise and the issuance of the corresponding
certificate of public convenience and necessity. In its decision of
September 25, 1948, the Commission approved the franchise and issued
the necessary certificate of public convenience and necessity,
authorizing the respondent to install, maintain and operate an electric
light, heat and power service in the municipality of Sta. Cruz. The
requisite approval of the President of the Philippines was obtained on
October 15, 1948. Pursuant to his certificate, the respondent was first
authorized by the Public Service Commission to operate only in the
barrio of Digos and in the poblacion of Sta. Cruz, as shown in the
plans of the distribution systems submitted by him and approved by the
Commission.

On June 25, 1949, the respondent filed with the Public Service
Commission an application (Case No. 50771) for authority to install an
electric plant in the barrio of Padada, municipality of Sta. Cruz. On
June 28, 1949, Alejandro D. Almendras (herein petitioner) filed with
the Commission an application (Case No. 50831) for the approval of an
electric franchise covering the barrio of Fadada granted to him by the
municipal council of Sta. Cruz by resolution No. 82 dated April 18,
1949, and approved by the Provincial Board of Davao by resolution No.
770 dated May 31, 1949. As the barrio of Padada became a municipality
by Executive Order No. 236 dated July 1, 1949, the petitioner, after
having been granted by the new municipality of Padada an electric
franchise which was later approved by the Provincial Board of Davao by
resolution No. 942 dated July 28, 1949, filed with the Public Service
Commission an amended application for the approval of said franchise
and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of public convenience
and necessity, to operate an electric light, heat and power service in
the newly created municipality of Padada. After hearing jointly the
application of the respondent (Case No. 50771) and the application of
the petitioner (Case No. 50831), the Public Service Commission rendered
a single decision granting respondent’s application and denying that of
the petitioner. The latter has filed the present petition for review.

Petitioner’s various arguments boil down to the main proposition
that respondent’s franchise covering the entire municipality of Sta.
Cruz (including the former barrio of Padada, now a municipality) is not
exclusive, and the denial by the Public Service Commission of
petitioner’s application is an infringement of the legislative function
of a municipal corporation. We may concede that a franchise cannot be
exclusive, because the Constitution (Article HV, Section 8) provides
that no francise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for
the operation of a public utility shall be exclusive in character or
shall be granted to any individual, firm or corporation, except under
the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or
repeal by the Congress when the public interest so requires. We may
also concede that, under Act No. 667, as amended by Act No. 1022, a
municipal council has the power to grant electric franchises, subject
to the approval of the provincial board and the President. However,
under section 16 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, the
Public Service Commission is empowered “to approve, subject to
constitutional limitations, any franchise or privilege granted under
the provisions of Act Numbered Six Hundred and Sixty-Seven, as amended
by Act Numbered One Thousand and Twenty-Two, by any political
subdivision of the Philippines when, in the judgment of the Commission,
such franchise or privilege will properly conserve the public
interests, and the Commission shall in so approving impose such
conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or
operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably
require, and to issue certificates of public convenience and necessity
when such is required, or provided oy any law or franchise.” The
efficacy of a municipal electric franchise arises, therefore, only
after the approval of the Public Service commission, and the latter, in
denying petitioner’s application, cannot be said to have infringed the
legislative prerogative of the municipal council of Padada, because the
Commission merely exercised a power granted by law.

In this case there is no reason for holding that the Public Service
Commission was arbitrary in its judgment. Respondent’s franchise, as
granted by the municipal .council of Sta. Cruz on November 15, 1947,
covers the entire territory of the municipality, including of course
the former barrio of Padada. The respondent, who has already made
considerable investment in supplying electric service in the barrio of
Digos and in the poblacion of Sta. Cruz, and who has complied with the
terms and conditions of his franchise and certificate, is not applying
for another franchise, but is merely seeking in effect to extend his
field of operation within the territory already covered by his present
franchise. The respondent is financially able, now an experienced
operator, and has so far rendered efficient and satisfactory service.

The petitioner contends that “since the municipal officials of Sta.
Cruz and later of Padada, deemed it necessary for the convenience of
their constituents that franchise should be issued to petitioner, all
that the Commission should have done was to respect such official
judgment by confirming the grant made to petitioner.” If this
contention were correct, the approval of the Public Service Commission
required by section 16 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended, would be an empty and useless formality. We cannot attribute
to the lawmakers an intention to lay down a rule which, though entirely
purposeless, results in waste of time and money.

The appealed decision will therefore be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the petitioner.

Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo and Baustista Angelo, JJ., concur.