THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SANTIAGO SY JUCO, DEFENDANT. TEOPISTO B. REMO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT.

Upon petition of the agent and representative of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, named Narciso Mendiola, who alleged
that, according to information given him by a person whom he considered
reliable, certain fraudulent books, letters and papers or records were
being kept in the building marked No. 482 on Juan Luna Street, Binondo,
Manila, occupied by Santiago Sy Juco, a warrant to search the building
in question was issued against said person on March 7, 1933, by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, through Judge Mariano A. Albert. In
said warrant, the peace officers to whom it was directed for execution
were required to seize the above-stated articles for the purpose of
delivering them to the court, for the proper action to be taken in due
time. After making the required search, the officers concerned seized,
among things, an art metal filing cabinet claimed by Attorney Teopisto
B. Remo to be his and to contain some letters, documents and papers
belonging to his clients. Inasmuch as said officers later refused to
return the filing cabinet in question to him, he filed a petition in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying that the Collector of
Internal Revenue and his agents be prohibited from opening said art
metal filing cabinet and that the sheriff of the City of Manila
likewise be ordered to take charge of said property in the meantime, on
the ground that the warrant by virtue of which the search was made is
null and void, being illegal and against the Constitution. (A similar
petition was later filed in the same case by the Salakam Lumber Co.,
Inc., the same agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue having also
seized some books belonging to it by virtue of the above-mentioned
search warrant.

After due hearing, the Court of First Instance through Judge
Delfin Jaranilla, decided to overrule both petitions, declaring that
the art metal filing cabinet and the books and papers claimed by the
Salakam Lumber Co., Inc., would be returned to Attorney Teopisto B.
Remo and to the company, respectively, as soon as it be proven, by
means of an examination thereof to be made in the presence of the
interested parties, that they contain nothing showing that they have
been used to commit fraud against the Government. Only Attorney
Teopisto B. Remo appealed from the decision of the court and he now
contends that it committed the nine errors assigned by him as follows:

“1. The lower court erred in not holding that the
search warrant, Exhibit B, issued in the case at bar is
unconstitutional and void ab initio and hence can confer no
legal right upon the Government to seize, much less to retain or open
the filing1 cabinet in question, Exhibit 3.

“2. The lower court erred in not holding that a search warrant which is void ab initio may not be legalized by evidence secured subsequent to the issuance, or in consequence, of said illegal search warrant.

“3. The lower court erred in not holding that the doctrine of the case of People vs. Rubio (G. R. No, 35500, 57 Phil., 384), is not applicable to the case at bar.

“4. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant,
Exhibit B, was procured in order to obtain evidence against the
defendant Santiago Sy Juco.

“5, The lower court erred in not
holding that the search warrant, Exhibit B, was issued solely against
the premises occupied by the defendant Santiago Sy Juco, and hence
cannot be used against the premises occupied by a stranger, or the
petitioner, Teopisto B, Remo.

“6. The lower court erred in
not holding that the filing cabinet, Exhibit 3, is the personal
property of the petitioner, Teopisto B. Remo, and not of the defendant
Santiago Sy Juco.

“7. The lower court erred in not upholding
the inviolability of the contents of the filing cabinet, Exhibit 3, the
same being confidential documents entrusted to the herein petitioner,
Attorney Teopisto B. Remo, by his clients, in his professional capacity
and in connection with cases: pending before the courts of justice and
administrative tribunals.

“8. The lower court erred in not
holding that the Internal Revenue agents have infringed the penal laws
not only by procuring the search warrant, Exhibit B, against the
premises of the defendant, Santiago Sy Juco, without just cause, but
also by exceeding their authority in enforcing said search warrant
against the premises of the petitioner, Teopisto B. Remo, who is a
stranger to said search warrant, which acts also constitute a violation
of the domicile of said petitioner; and in not endorsing the matter to
the city fiscal for proper action.

“9. The lower court erred
in not ordering the return of the filing cabinet, Exhibit 3, intact and
unopened, to its lawful owner, the petitioner Teopisto B. Remo.”

The pertinent part of the search warrant in question was couched in the following language:

“Proof by affidavit having this day been made
before me, Mariano Albert, Judge of the Court of First Instance of the
City of Manila, Philippine Islands, by the complainant on oath of
Narciso Mendiola, special investigator, Bureau of Internal Revenue,
Manila, that the defendant, Santiago Sy Juco, of No. 482 Juan Luna,
Manila, keeps illegally and feloniously fraudulent books,
correspondence, and records and that he verily believes upon probable
’cause that the said books, correspondence and records at No. 482 Juan
Luna, Manila, and the said (personal) property is now being used in the
commission of fraud of the revenue of the Government.

“You
are therefore commanded to take with you the necessary and proper
assistance and to enter, in the daytime, into the said premises and
there diligently search for fraudulent books, correspondence and
records and that you seize and bring them before the court to be
disposed of according to law.

“Given under my hands this 7th day of March, 1933, in the City of Manila.

[SEAL]	(Sgd.)	“MARIANO A. ALBERT
	“Judge of Court of First Instance of Manila”

The affidavit or deposition referred to in the warrant above-quoted contained the following questions and answers:

“TESTIMONY TAKEN BEFORE HON. JUDGE MARIANO A. Albert, Narciso Mendiola, being duly sworn, testifies as follows:

“Q.	What is your name, residence and occupation?	—	A.	Narciso Mendiola, special investigator, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Manila.
“Q.	Are you the applicant for this search warrant?	—	A.	Yes, sir.
“Q.	Do you know the premises situated at No. 482 Juan Luna, Manila?	—	A.	Yes, sir.
“Q.	Do you know who occupy said premises?	—	A.	According to the best of my information, the house is occupied by Santiago Sy Juco.
“Q.	What are your reasons for applying for the search warrant?	—	A.	It has been reported to us by a person whom I considered reliable that in said premises are fraudulent books, correspondence and records.

“I, Narciso Mendiola, being duly sworn, depose and
say that I have read the foregoing questions and answers and that I
found the same to be correct and true to the best of my knowledge and
belief.

(Sgd.)

“NARCISO MENDIOLA

“Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of March, 1933, in the City of Manila, P. I.

[SEAL]	(Sgd.)	“MARIANO A. ALBERT
	“Judge of Court of First Instance of Manila”

It appears clear to this court that the questions that the appellant
wishes to raise by means of the alleged errors attributed by him to the
lower court, may be reduced to the following:

1. Is the search warrant in question valid or not, taking
   into consideration the provisions of the law and of the Constitution
   relative thereto?

2. Does the art metal
   filing cabinet seized by the agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
   belong to Santiago Sy Juco or to Teopisto B. Remo?

3. Could the search warrant in question affect Attorney Teopisto B. Remo, not being the person against whom it was directed?
4. Had the court authority to order the opening of the cabinet in question
   for the purpose of determining, by an examination of the books,
   documents and records contained therein, whether or not the same were
   used to commit fraud against the Government?

1. A question which is very similar to the first one herein
   raised by the appellant, has been decided by this court in the negative
   in its judgment rendered in the case of Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and AntiUsury Board, p. 33, ante).
   According to -our laws in force on the date in question, which do not
   differ substantially from the provisions of the Constitution of the
   Commonwealth in matters regarding search, in order that a search
   warrant may be valid, the following requisites, among others, must be
   present: that the application upon which it is issued be supported by
   oath; that the search warrant particularly describes not only the place
   to be searched but also the person or thing to be seized, and that
   there be probable cause (sec. 97, General Orders, No. 58; sec. 3, Jones Law; Article III, sec. 1, paragraph 3, Constitution of the Commonwealth).

In the above-cited case of Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury Board, supra, and in that of United States vs.
Addison (28 Phil., 566), this court held that the oath required must be
such that it constitutes a guaranty that the person taking it has
personal knowledge of the facts of the case and that it convinces the
committing magistrate, not the individual seeking the issuance of the
warrant or the person making the averment by hearsay; of the existence
of the requisite of probable cause. It has likewise been held by this court that by probable cause
are meant such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of
the warrant, that are in themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man
to rely upon them and act in pursuance thereof. It has furthermore been
held that the true test of the sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant
issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a
manner that perjury could be charged thereon in case the allegations
contained therein prove false (State vs. Roosevelt, 244 Pac.,
280), and that the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes
relative to searches and seizures must be construed liberally in favor
of the individual who may be affected thereby, and strictly against the
State and against the person invoking them for the issuance of the
warrant ordering their execution (Elardo vs. State of Mississippi, 145 So., 615; Fowler vs. U. S., 62 Fed. [2d], 656; Saforik vs. U. S1., 62 Fed. [2d], 892; Boyd vs.
U. S., 116 U. S., 616; 29 Law. ed., 746), for the simple reason that
the proceedings of search and seizure are, by their very nature,
summary and drastic ones (Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury Board, supra, and the authorities cited therein).

By reading the affidavit which gave rise to the issuance of the
search warrant in question, it will be seen that the latter does not
fulfill the necessary conditions in support of its validity. In the
first place, it is not stated in said affidavit that the books,
documents or records referred to therein are being used or are intended
to be used in the commission of fraud against the Government and,
notwithstanding the lack of such allegation, the warrant avers that
they are actually being used for such purpose. In the second place, it
assumes that the entire building marked No. 482 on Juan Luna Street is
occupied by Santiago Sy Juco against whom the warrant was exclusively
issued, when the only ground upon which such assumption is based is
Narciso Mendiola’s statement which is mere hearsay and when in fact
part thereof was occupied by the appellant. In the ”third place, it
was not asked that the things belonging to the appellant and to others
also be searched. In other words, the warrant in question has gone
beyond what had been applied for by Narciso Mendiola, and the agents
who executed it performed acts not authorized by the warrant, and it is
for this and the above-stated reasons why it is unreasonable, it being
evident that the purpose thereof was solely to fish for evidence or
search for it by exploration, in case some could be found. It is of
common knowledge that search warrants have not been designed for such
purpose (Gouled vs. U. S., 255 U. S., 298, S. C. R.; 65 Law. ed., 647; Uy Kheytin vs.
Villareal, 42 Phil., 886), much less in a case as the one under
consideration where it has not even been alleged in the affidavit of
Narciso Mendiola what crime had been committed by Santiago Sy Juco or
what crime he was about to commit. On this point, said affidavit merely
contained the following allegation: “It has been reported to us by a
person whom I considered reliable that in said premises are fraudulent
book, correspondence and records.” Therefore, the first question raised
should be decided in the negative.

1. 2. The resolution of the second question
   depends entirely on the nature of the evidence presented and the
   relative preponderance thereof. The only witness who testified that the
   art metal filing cabinet belongs to the accused Santiago Sy Juco, is
   Macario Garcia. Against Garcia’s testimony, we certainly have that of
   the appellant himself and his witnesses Rufino C. Wenceslao, Vicente
   del Rosario, Jose Jeuqueco and Feliciano Belmonte, besides Exhibits E,
   F, G, H and L, which conclusively proves that the furniture in question
   was purchased by said appellant at the beginning of January, 1933, and
   that he had it precisely in a room on one of the upper floors of
   building No. 482 on Juan Luna Street, which he was then subleasing from
   Santiago Sy Juco, to keep his records and those of his clients. On the
   other hand, it is unimportant now to determine whether the furniture in
   question belongs to Santiago Sy Juco or to the appellant Attorney
   Teopisto B. Remo. It should have been alleged by Narciso Mendiola that
   it belongs to Santiago Sy Juco, at the time he applied for the issuance
   of the search warrant, to show with the other allegations, reasons and
   evidence that the issuance thereof was justified because of the
   existence of probable cause, the latter being a requisite
   without which the issuance of the judicial warrant authorizing such
   search -would be unwarranted. For these reasons, this court concludes
   that the second question raised calls for an answer in the negative.

2. After the considerations just made, the third question cannot be
   resolved except in the negative. The search warrant in question could
   not and should not in any way affect the appellant attorney on the
   ground that he is not the person against whom it had been sought. It is
   Santiago Sy Juco alone against whom the search warrant could be used,
   because it had been obtained precisely against him; so much so that
   Narciso Mendiola, who applied for it, mentioned him expressly in his
   affidavit and again did so in his report to his superior, that is, the
   Collector of Internal Revenue (Exhibit C); and at the trial of this
   case, it was insisted that there was necessity of making the search in
   the premises occupied by Santiago Sy Juco because an investigation was
   then pending against him, for having defrauded the Government in its
   public revenue. The doctrine laid down in the case of People vs.
   Rubio (57 Phil., 384), invoked against the appellant, is not applicable
   to the case at bar because, unlike in the above-cited case, neither
   books nor records indicating fraud were found in his possession, and it
   is not he against whom the warrant was issued.

3. It is clear that the court could not and can not order the opening of,
   the art metal filing cabinet in question because, it having been proven
   that it belongs to the appellant attorney and that in it he keeps the
   records and documents of his clients, to do so would be in violation of
   his rights as such attorney, since it would be tantamount to compelling
   him to disclose or divulge facts or things belonging to his clients,
   which should be kept secret, unless he is authorized by them to make
   such disclosure, it being a duty imposed by law upon an attorney to
   strictly preserve the secrets or communications made to him. Such an
   act would constitute a qualified violation of section 383, No. 4, and
   of section 31 of Act No. 190, which read as follows:

“An attorney can not, without the consent of his
client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him,
or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment;
nor can an attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of client and his employer, concerning any fact,
the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.” (Sec. 383,
No. 4, Act No. 190.)

“A lawyer must strictly maintain
inviolate the confidence and preserve the secrets of his client. He
shall not be permitted in any court, without the consent of his client,
given in open court, to testify to any facts imparted to him by his
client in professional consultation, or for the purpose of obtaining
advice upon legal matters.” (Sec. 31, Act No. 190.)

For all the foregoing reasons, and finding that the errors assigned
by the appellant are very well founded, the appealed judgment is
reversed, and it is ordered that the art metal filing cabinet, together
with the key thereof, seized by the internal revenue agents by virtue
of the judicial warrant in question, which is hereby declared null and
void, be immediately returned unopened to the appellant; and that a
copy of this decision be sent to the Solicitor-General for him to take
action, if he deems it justified, upon careful investigation of the
facts, against the internal revenue agent or agents who obtained and
executed1 the warrant in question, in accordance with the provisions of
article 129 of the Revised Penal Code, without special pronouncement as
to costs. So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.