G.R. No. 41903. June 10, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, BR. V, MAUBAN, QUEZON; RAMON S. REYES ALIAS “CAPING”, GUILLERMO UNTALAN, NATALIO ALVAREZ AND WI…
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to
set aside the order of the respondent court dated October 24, 1975 dismissing
the information for qualified theft against the private respondents in Criminal
Case No. 380 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch V,[1]
on the ground that it does not charge an offense for failure to allege the
proper offended party therein.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondents Ramon Reyes alias “Caping,”
Guillermo Untalan, Natalio Alvarez and Wilfredo Saliendra were charged in
Criminal Case No. 380 at the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch V, with
qualified theft, as defined and punished under Section 1, Presidential Decree
No. 330[2]
in an information filed by Special Counsel Hjalmar Quintana of the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon, on August 5, 1975, in the following manner:
“x x x x x x x x x
“That on or about the 16th day of April 1974, at Barrio San
Jose, in the Municipality of Mauban, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Ramon
Reyes alias “Caping”, Guillermo Untalan, Natalio Alvarez and Wilfredo
Saliendra, with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter a public forest zone under lease to the ALUK LOGGING
‘CORPORATION and once inside, illegally cut, take, steal and carry away two (2)
Lauan trees consisting of 1,200 board feet, without the consent of the latter,
valued at ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY (P1,920.00) PESOS, Philippine
currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Aluk Logging Corporation in the
aforesaid sum.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”[3]
On September 17, 1975, the private respondents were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty to the charge.[4]
After the arraignment, the private respondents moved to quash the aforestated
information based on the following grounds:
1. That the facts
charged do not constitute the crime of qualified theft, there being no offended
party, Aluk Logging Corporation being neither a timber lessee or licensee;
2. That the
pretended owner, Arsenio Lukang, has no timber license to operate in Mauban,
Quezon;
3. That the
information is defective as it does not describe the “situs” of the
offense with particularity, defendant Ramon S. Reyes being a timber licensee in
Mauban, Quezon.”[5]
On September 29, 1975, the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon filed an
opposition to private respondent’s quashal arguing that:
1) the information
is sufficient in form and substance and that there is a specific offended
party;
2) the place of the commission of the offense is sufficiently
described;
3) the allegation
that Ramon S. Reyes is a timber licensee over the forest zone in question is a
matter of defense and evidentiary in nature that should be proven during the
trial;
4) the motion to
quash was filed after the arraignment of the accused and, therefore, said
accused should be considered as having waived all objections which are grounds
for a motion to quash.[6]
The provincial fiscal of Quezon prayed that the prosecution be
allowed to amend the information by replacing the word “Corporation”
with the word “Operation,” being a typographical error committed by
oversight.[7]
On October 9, 1975, the private respondents filed their reply
reiterating the grounds stated in their motion to quash.[8]
The respondent court, in its assailed order dated October 24,
1975, quashed the information for failure to conform substantially to the
prescribed form[9]
under Sec. 3 (d) Rule 117, specifically the failure to state the name of the
offended party as embodied in Sec. 11, Rule 110 of the Old Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
In quashing the information, respondent judge reasoned that the
prosecuting fiscal’s categorical admission that the state and not Aluk Logging
Corp. was the offended party was fatal to the information. Such admission by the fiscal deviated from
the allegations of the information which affected not only its form but also its
substance. The court held that such a
defect in the designation of the name of the offended party could not be cured
by mere amendment in view of another claim by one of the accused, Ramon S.
Reyes, as the duly registered timber licensee.[10]
As an additional reason for the quashal, the trial court also
observed that Aluk Logging Corp. was not a duly registered partnership or
corporation and proceeded to conclude that, necessarily, it had no capacity to
become a lessee nor be a registered holder of any timber license.[11]
Hence, this petition.
Before us, petitioner assigns the following errors, to wit:
I
The respondent court erred in ruling that the information filed
against the private respondents in Criminal Case No. 380 of the Court of First Instance
of Quezon, Branch V, does not charge an offense for failure to cite the State
as offended party and complainant.
II
The respondent Court erred in quashing the information on the basis
of the said alleged defect.
The resolution of this case hinges on the determination of
whether or not the information for qualified theft properly charges an offense
due to its failure to allege the proper offended party therein.
As early as 1916, this Court in the case of U.S. v. Pablo,[12]
said:
“The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of
the attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power
instinctively charged by the common will of the members of society to look
after, guard and defend the interests of the community, the individual and
social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the
exercise of his rights.”
From this decision, we deduce that all criminal actions must be
commenced either by a “complaint or information in the name of the People
of the Philippines against all persons who appear to be responsible for the
offense involved.”[13]
Thus, while the offended party is authorized to initiate proceedings, the
prosecution is required to be in the name of the People of the Philippines
whose peace, in legal theory, has been breached.
In the present case, the above rule was complied with when the
criminal action for qualified theft under Presidential Decree No. 330 was
instituted by the provincial fiscal in the name of the People of the
Philippines.[14]
Despite such compliance with the rules, the lower court found the
information to be defective in form and substance because “nowhere in the
information is cited any damage or prejudice caused to the State.” The
lower court reasoned out that since the fiscal admitted that it is the State
which is the actual offended party and not Aluk Logging Corporation (or
Operation) as alleged in the information, the evidence of the prosecution would
be at variance with the allegations in the information.[15]
This reasoning cannot be sustained.
Again what is important, as required by the Rules, is that
“in criminal action the complaint or information shall be in writing in
the name of the People of the Philippines x x x.[16]
The rules do not require that the State be specifically mentioned in the body
of the information as an offended party. It is sufficient that the People of the Philippines appear in the
caption of the information to emphasize that penal laws of the State have been
violated. For indeed, a crime is an
offense against the State.
Proceeding now to the main issue, we rule that it was error for
the lower court to dismiss the information. The information was already sufficient in form and substance. The argument that it was fatal for the
prosecution not to have alleged the State as the offended party is without
merit for in the case of Sayson v. People,[17]
in construing Sec. 11 of Rule 110 (now Sec. 12, Rules of Court of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure), we have clearly held that in offenses against
property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely
indispensable as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or
information can be properly identified.[18]
Indeed, the crime of qualified theft under Presidential Decree
No. 330 was described with particularity in the information as to properly
identify the offense charged. Hence,
the erroneous allegation as to the person injured is deemed immaterial as the
same is a mere formal defect which does not tend to prejudice any substantial
right of the defendant.[19]
On the other hand, the amendment sought by herein petitioner
changing the word “Corporation” to “Operation” such that
“Aluk Logging Corporation” would read “Aluk Logging
Operation” is merely formal. Even
private respondents alternately used the words “corporation” and
“operation” in their pleadings.[20]
Thus, it was not surprising that this formal defect was glossed over by the
lower court.
WHEREFORE, the Order dated October 24, 1975 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the lower court for
immediate disposition on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Judge Delia P. Medina.
[2]
Entitled, “Penalizing Timber Smuggling or Illegal Cutting of Logs from
Public Forests and Forest Reserves as Qualified Theft.”
[3]
Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[4]
Ibid, p. 6.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 16-18.
[6]
Ibid, pp. 19-20.
[7]
Rollo, p. 20.
[8]
Ibid, pp. 21-23.
[9]
Ibid, pp. 24-28.
[10]
Ibid, pp. 25-28.
[11]
Rollo, pp. 25-28.
[12]
35 Phil. 94 at 100.
[13]
Sec. 2, Rule 110, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[14]
Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[15]
Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[16]
Sec. 2, Rule 110, 1985 Rules on Crim. Procedure.
[17]
G.R. No. L-51745, October 28, 1988, 166 SCRA 680.
[18]
“Section 12. Name of the
offended party. –
x x x x x x x x x
(a)
In cases of offenses against property, if the name of the
offended party is unknown, the property subject matter of the offense, must
be described with particularity as to properly identify the particular offense
charged.
(b)
If in the course of the trial, the true name of the person
against whom or against whose property the offense was committed is disclosed
or ascertained, the court must cause the true name to be inserted in the
complaint or information or record.
x x
x x x x x x x”
[19]
U.S. v. Kepner, 1 Phil. 519 (1902).
[20]
Brief of respondents, p. 9.