CONCEPCION J. VIUDA DE SYQUIA, AS JUDICIAL ADMINATRIX OF THE INTERSTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED GREGORIO SYQUIA, PETITIONER, VS. PEDRO CONCEPCION, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANI…

This
is an original petition for a writ of certiorari instituted by
Concepcion J. Vidua de SyQuia, as judicial administratrix of the
intestate estate of the deceased Gregorio SyQuia, wherein, for
the reasons alleged therein, it is prayed that judgment be entered
declaring the order of the respondent judge dated February 21, 1934,
having been issued beyond his jurisdiction, as well as the order
entered by him on March 10, 1934, declaring as improperly approved and
reapproving the bill of exceptions of the respondent Refael Palma, null
and void and of no effect.

The following pertinent facts are necessary for the solution of the question raised in this petition:

On
September 25, 1930, judgment was rendered in civil case No. 42600 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila wherein the herein petitioner
Concepcion J. Vidua de SyQuia, as judicial adminatrix of the deceased Gregorio Syquia, was plaintiff, and the respondent Rafael
Palma and Perfecto and Felipe Jacinto were defendants, ordering the
said defendants Perfecto and Felipe Jacinto, as principals, and the
said respondent Rafael Palma, as surety, to pay to the said plaintiff
the sum of P 13, 596.24, plus interest thereon at 9 per cent per annum
from April 18, 1925, until fully paid, with the costs of the suit.

After
the parties had been notified of said judgment, the respondent Rafael
Palma, within the reglementary period, excepted to the same and filed a
motion for a new trial. Said motion having been denied, the respondent,
within the reglementary period, presented for approval his
corresponding bill of exceptions, the court setting the date of the
hearing for its approval on December 12, 1933.

On January 22,
1933, the respondent judge issued an order transferring to December 16,
1933 at 8.30 o’clock a. m., the hearing of the motion of the therein
plaintiff and herein petitioner, dated December 6,
1933, as well as that the approval of the bill of exceptions filed by
the therein defendants. On the day of the hearing for the approval of
the motion for the execution of the
judgment or, in lieu thereof, the filling of a bond, the respondent
judge entered an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution of
said judgment against the defendant Rafael Palma, unless within ten
days from December 16, 1933, he should file a bond for P14,000.

On
January 4, 1934, counsel for the respondent Rafael Palma filed a motion
for reconsideration supported by an affidavit which was made an
integral part thereof. On January 10, 1934, while the motion for reconsideration filed on January 4, 1934, by the respondent Rafael
Palma was pending decision, the respondent judge issued an order
approving the bill of exceptions presented by the said respondent Rafael
Palma. Pursuant to said order, the deputy clerk of the second branch of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, on February 16, 1934, certified
the approval of said bill of exceptions.

On February 16,1934
, the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Manila notified the
parties that the bill of exceptions of the respondent Rafael Palma had
been transmitted to this court, and on February 19th of the same year
the clerk of court, in turn, notified the said parties of the receipt
of the said bill of exceptions and of the amount to be paid for
docketing fees and for printing said bill of exceptions.

After the said bill of
exceptions of the respondent Rafael Palma had been transmitted, and
while the same, together with all its exhibits, was before this court,
the respondent judge, On February 21, 1934, entered an order as follows:

“Upon
consideration of the motion for consideration filed on February 4th
last together with the affidavit of the defendant surety Rafael Palma,
and the court being of the opinion that, in view of the facts stated
under oath in the said affidavit, there exist sufficient grounds for
reconsideration filed on February 4th last together with the affidavit, there exist sufficient grounds for reconsidering the order issued on December 16th last; said order is hereby set aside and it is declared
that there is no legal justification for issuing a writ of execution of
the judgment against said defendant Mr. Palma. So ordered.

On
Fenruary 26, 1934, the clerk of this court sent to the parties the
required number of copies of the printed bill of exceptions, the case
having been docketed in this court as G. R. No. 41320.^[1]

On
March 6, 1934, the petitioner filed with the respondent judge a motion
for reconsideration seeking to set aside his order dated February 21,
1934, the same having been issued beyond his jurisdiction, and the case
being on appeal being on appeal before this court and the bill of
exceptions already printed. After the hearing of said motion, the
respondent judge, on March 10, 1934, issued an order as follows:

“Upon
consideration of the motion filed on the 6th instant by counsel for the
plaintiff, praying this court to set aside its order of February 21st
last, whereby the order dated December 16, 1933, was reconsidered and the
defendant Rafael Palma relieved from complying with the terms of said
order of December 16th; considering that the bill of exceptions
presented by said defendant Rafael Palma was improperly approved on
January 10th, inasmuch as on that date the motion filed by the said defendant on January 4th, praying that this court set aside the order issued on December 16th last, wherein he was required to file a bond for P14,000
in order that execution of the judgment might be suspended, was still
pending resolution, of which motion, to be heard on the 13th of the
same month, counsel for the plaintiff was notified on January 4th;
considering that, when the bill of exceptions was approved on January
10th, said motion of the defendant Rafael Palma had not

yet been acted
upon and therefore the bill of exceptions should not have been approved
until after said motion had been decided; the motion fro
reconsideration filed on January 17th by counsel for the plaintiff is
hereby denied and the bill of exceptions presented by the defendant
Rafael Palma is hereby approved. So ordered.

In
view of the facts above stated, the question arises whether or not the
respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in setting aside
order of December 6, 1933, requiring the respondent Rafael Palma to
file a bond for P14,000 for the suspension of the execution of the
judgment rendered against him, and otherwise ordering its execution,
after having approved the bill of exceptions presented by the said
respondent, after the bill of exceptions had been certified to this
court by the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and after
the clerk of this court had notified the parties of the receipt of said
bill of exceptions and of the amount to be paid for docketing fees and
for printing said bill of exceptions.

The continuation or
loss of the jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance to take
cognizance of a civil action in case of appeal depends upon the
perfecting of the bill of exceptions, in accordance with the statutory
provisions on the subject. As soon as the appeal is perfected, the
court trying in a case loses its jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the appeal, and said jurisdiction is acquired by the appellate court
(3 Corpus Juris, page 1252, sec. 1366), and the trial court cannot
enter any further decree or order affecting the rights of the parties,
for the reason that the appellate court has acquired jurisdiction over
all questions trial pertaining to the subject matter on appeal. Neither
can the trial court in any manner execute an act which will affect the
jurisdiction acquired by the appellate court, except such as my be
necessary for the protection and preservation of the subject matter of
the appeal, and which do not impair or destroy the same (3 Corpus
Juris, page 1255, sec. 1369).

Section 143 of Act No. 190, as
amended by section 2 of Act No. 1123, prescribes the procedure to be
followed in perfecting an appeal in ordinary actions, the last judicial
proceeding being the allowance by the judge of the bill of exceptions
and its transmission of the Supreme Court which will take cognizance of
the case upon said bill of exceptions duly certified by the clerk of
the Court of First Instance a quo.

In the case, the
bill of exceptions had already been approved by the respondent judge,
transmitted to this court by the clerk of the Court of First Instance
of Manila and docketed in the office of the clerk of this clerk of this
court, the latter having notified the parties of the receipt thereof
and of the amount to be paid for docketing fees and printing, when on
February 21, 1934, the said respondent judge reconsidered and set aside
his order for the execution of the judgment dated December 16, 1933. In
the case of Rustia vs. Judge of First Instance of Batangas (44 Phil.,
62), this court laid down the following doctrine:

“3.
CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF BILL OF EXCEMPTIONS;
DISMISSAL.—Upon the approval of the bill of exceptions, the trial court
loses its jurisdiction over all contentious matters connected with the
issues in the case, but the parties may by agreement, and with the
consent of the trial court, withdraw the bill of exceptions before its
transmission to the appellate court and resubmit the case to the
jurisdiction of the trial court.”

According
to the American jurisprudence and the doctrine of this court above
cited, the respondent judge had already lost his jurisdiction to
proceed with the trial of the contentious matter, which was the subject
of the appeal, when he reconsidered and revoked his order of execution
of the judgment. The execution of a judgment is a proceeding affecting
the rights of the parties, which are the subject of the matter thereof,
and from which appeal is taken, and its purpose is not to protect and
preserve the subject matter of the litigation. Therefore, the
perfecting of an appeal taken from said judgment deprives the trial
court cannot modify or revoke any order of execution of the said
judgment after the appeal taken therefrom is perfected (3 Corpus Juris,
page 1313, sec. 1442).

The respondent judge therefore acted
without jurisdiction in reconsidering and setting aside by a decree of
February 21, 1934, his order of execution of the judgment dated
December 16, 1933, inasmuch as at that time the appeal had already been
perfected by the approval of the bill of exceptions and its
transmission thereof to this court.

In view of the foregoing
considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that, as soon as an
appeal is perfected by means of the approval of the bill of exceptions
and the transmission thereof to the appellate court, the court a quo
has no jurisdiction to reconsider an order entered by it directing the
issuance of a writ of execution of its judgment, although the motion
for reconsideration has been filed before the appeal was perfected.

Wherefore,
the writ of certiorari applied for is hereby granted and the orders
entered by the respondent judge dated February 21 and March 10, 1934,
are declared null and void of no effect, with cost against the
respondent Rafael Palma. So ordered.

Malcolm, Hull, Imperial, and Goddard, JJ., concur.