LAO HIAN, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

By virtue of administrative warrant of
arrest No. 4461 issued on January 30, 1934, by the Insular Collector of
Customs, under the authority conferred upon him by the provisions of
the Act of Congress of February 5, 1917, the petitioner was arrested
and brought before a board of special inquiry of the Bureau of Customs,
in accordance with said warrant, so as to enable her to show cause, if
any, why she should not be deported to China, her native land, for
being a prostitute.

After the necessary investigation wherein she was afforded an
opportunity to defend herself, the board found that she was really a
prostitute and that she had furthermore succeeded in gaining admission
to the Philippines through fraudulent means.

Concurring entirely in the points of view of said board, the
respondent ordered the deportation of the petitioner and the latter,
not agreeing with said order, instituted habeas corpus proceedings in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, which is now under consideration.

After reviewing the evidence presented at the investigation, said
court affirmed the decision of the respondent and the petitioner, again
not agreeing with the decision of said court, she appealed therefrom
assigning in her brief the following alleged errors, to wit:

“1. That the lower court erred in sustaining the
decision of the respondent Collector of Customs and in not granting the
writ of habeas corpus prayed for by the petitioner-appellant for her
liberty, and in not finding that the respondent abused his authority.

“2. That the lower court erred in revoking its order of March 19, 1934,
admitting the petitioner-appellant to bail pending the decision of this
appeal.”

Tan Kim, the Chinese woman who claimed to have lived with the
petitioner and Yap Ah Huan in house No. 331, Gotamco Street, Pasay,
testified that she and the petitioner, who is also a Chinese woman, had
been engaged in prostitution and that furthermore the latter was known
by the name of Kim Chu. On this testimony of said witness, the board
based its conclusion that the petitioner was a prostitute. Said
petitioner contends that the testimony of said woman is insufficient to
support and prove the charge against her, particularly when she herself
denied said charge.

As was noted, the petitioner’s argument tends only to question the
sufficiency of the evidence presented against her; but it is a
well-established doctrine in this jurisdiction that courts cannot pass
upon questions relative to the admissibility or sufficiency of the
evidence adduced in an investigation conducted by the board of special
inquiry of the Bureau of Customs in cases for the exclusion of aliens,
after said board had admitted it (Cheng Tao Liap Collector of Customs, 55 Phil., 894; Guevara Collector of Customs, 34 Phil., 394; Molden Collector of Customs, 34 Phil., 493; Ty Buan
Collector of Customs, 34 Phil., 937); and that neither should they
alter the conclusions arrived at by said board in an investigation of
said nature, if the same are approved by the Collector of Customs and
are, furthermore, supported by some evidence. This is so because then
there could have been no abuse of discretion (Tan Beko Collector of Customs, 26 Phil., 254; Que Quay
Collector of Customs, 33 Phil., 128,. 135), which is the only question
left for the courts to determine in cases of this nature. (Rafferty Judge of First Instance of Cebu, 7 Phil., 164; Chattamal Collector of Customs, 42 Phil., 916.)

On the other hand, the mere fact that the Collector of Customs
refuses to believe the witnesses presented by an alien who is under
investigation by him for the purpose of determining whether or not he
is entitled to enter the country, does not, as was held in the case of
Gnilo Collector of Customs (32 Phil., 100), constitute an abuse of authority or discretion.

Furthermore, in the case of Lim Cheng Collector of Customs (42 Phil., 876), and in that of Chattamal
Collector of Customs, above cited, this court likewise held that the
Insular Collector of Customs is not required to accept, as true,
statements made by alien immigrants under investigation.

Therefore, this court holds that the board of special inquiry of
the Bureau of Customs and the respondent have not abused their
discretion or authority in declaring that the petitioner was a
prostitute, because it was so proven by the testimony of Tan Kim.

Neither have the board of special inquiry of the Bureau of Customs
and the respondent abused their discretion in declaring that the
petitioner had succeeded in gaining admission to the Philippine Islands
through fraudulent means, on the ground that according to the appealed
order, when on May 19, 1926, the petitioner, who was then 8 years of
age, entered these Islands for the first time, she testified that she
was a daughter of Lao Pong, and that both her father and mother whose
name she said she could not remember, were already dead. However,
testifying in this case, she stated that her father’s name was Lao Chu
and that she arrived in the Philippines together with Tan Tut. The
board of special inquiry of the Bureau of Customs as well as the
respondent had a perfect right to take into consideration, together
with other evidence presented before them, facts appearing in the
records of their office although they have not been presented as
evidence to that effect, because, as was held in the case of Chieng Ah
Sui Collector of Customs (22 Phil., 361, 364), the board of
special inquiry of the Bureau of Customs is a board connected with that
branch of the Government and it had a perfect right to take judicial
notice of relevant facts found in their records. Therefore, the
petitioner’s contention that the board and the respondent abused their
discretion in taking into consideration certain documents which were
not presented as evidence at the investigation, is of no moment.

On the other hand, inasmuch as deportation proceedings are not
criminal proceedings according to the provisions of General Orders, No.
58, wherein the right of the accused to be confronted by the witnesses
against him and to examine the evidence presented by the prosecution is
recognized (U. S. Yap Kin Co, 22 Phil, 340; U. S. vs. De los
Santos, 33 Phil., 397; Chua Go Collector of Customs, 59 Phil., 523),
the petitioner had no right to examine or demand that she be shown her
former testimony relative to her application for admission to these
Islands, upon her arrival here for the first time on May 19, 1926.

Wherefore, this court being convinced that the appealed order is
supported by the evidence and is in accordance with law, the same is
hereby affirmed, thereby denying the petitioner’s petition and further
ordering that she again be placed in the custody of the respondent for
the purposes required by law, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.

Street, Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.