THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. EMILIO H. DOMONDON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Emilio H. Domondon who was a postmaster and
aspirant to the post of municipal treasurer assigned to the municipal
district of Kabugao, subprovince of Apayao, Mountain Province, was
charged with the crime of robbery, convicted and sentenced by the Court
of First Instance of said province to an indeterminate penalty of from
four years, two months and one day of prision correccional to ten years and one day of prision mayor with
the corresponding accessories of the law, and to indemnify the
Government of the Philippine Island’s in the sum of P1,889.67, with
costs. Notwithstanding the fact that he had not presented any evidence
favorable to himself at the trial, because the affidavit (Exhibit 1)
which he attempted to present as such was rejected by the court,
declaring it to be incompetent, and the testimony of the person who
made it proved to be more damaging to him than anything else, he
appealed from the sentence imposed upon him, seeking the review of his
case, and assigns the four alleged errors relied upon in his brief as
committed by the lower court.

The facts proven without dispute at the trial may be summarized
as follows: After office hours on the afternoon of October 31, 1933,
that is, at 5.05 p. m., in spite of the objections of William Uliwac,
the chief clerk in the treasurer’s office in said municipal district,
who told him that it was already after office hours, the appellant
insisted upon delivering to him for deposit some funds which he had in
his office as postmaster and which amounted to P2,062,70, consisting of
checks in the amount of P187.15, several bundles of bills of various
denominations from P1 to P20, amounting to P1,774, and silver and other
fractional coins amounting to P101.55. The reason then given by the
appellant which induced said clerk Uliwac to accede to his wishes was
that, as it was the last day of the month and he was expecting the mail
that night or on the following day, he would have no time to deliver
said funds to the municipal treasury. After attending to two igorots
who had gone to his office that afternoon for the purpose of legalizing
the transfer of certain large cattle, giving as a pretext that they
were in a hurry to return to their barrio, Uliwac went to the
appellant’s office to receive and take charge of the money which the
latter was going to deliver to him. The municipal treasurer’s office
and the post office under the appellant’s charge occupied two adjoining
rooms on the ground floor of the municipal building of Kabugao and were
separated only by a wall with a door the key to which was in the
possession of the appellant. Said door could be opened only from inside
the post office. While the money which the appellant delivered to
Uliwac and which consisted, as above stated, of checks, bills and
coins, was being counted, it was arranged in bundles or rolls according
to its nature and value, and Uliwac noted on each bundle the amount
thereof. As he had no available paper for said purpose, he made his
notations on the back of one of the paper bills of each bundle, and
among the notations made by him on one of said bills was one reading:
“39 X 20 = 780” which meant that the bundle to which said bill belonged
was composed of 39 twenty-peso bills amounting to P780.

After all the money had been counted and Uliwac had issued the
corresponding receipt to the appellant, the former took it to his
office, passing through the main door thereof, and then put the money
in a wooden box which he later placed in a brass box 12 inches long, 8
inches wide and 4 inches deep. In addition to the money which he
received from the appellant, Uliwac kept in the said brass box some
collections for that afternoon amounting to P15 plus P3 road tax which
a policeman delivered to him for safekeeping. He afterwards locked said
brass box with a key which he had in his possession and policeman
Gawang, who was then present, carried said box thus locked to the
storeroom inside the same room occupied by the municipal treasury, the
door of which he later closed with a padlock ordinarily used for that
purpose in the presence of Uliwac. The two immediately left the
municipal treasury, Uliwac locking the main door thereof with the key
in his possession. Said main door could only be opened by municipal
treasurer Enciso, who was then in another town, and by clerk Florentino
A. Tapiru who was charged jointly with the appellant in this case but
was later released from the information by dropping the case against
him for lack of evidence before the trial actually began.

It
was likewise proven at the trial that when policeman Gawang took the
brass box containing the money in question and the other sums above
stated to the storeroom and placed it on top of the safe therein, the
appellant had already left the municipal building, and that the brass
box where said money was kept could not be placed in the safe because
as night had already fallen, it was naturally dark in the storeroom and
the numbers on the dial of the combination safe could not be seen.

After Uliwac had closed the main door of the municipal treasury, he
went home leaving policeman Gawang, who was later joined by the chief
of police Vicente Daoang, in the municipal building.

At about 6 o’clock on that same evening, the appellant returned to
the municipal building with no other apparent purpose than to request
the chief of police to buy him two packages of a certain brand of
cigarettes from the store of one Marques. As soon as the chief of
police was gone, he requested policeman Gawang, who was the only one
left to guard the building, to buy him a package of another kind of
cigarettes at the store of one Guzman. When Gawang stated that he could
not leave because the municipal building would then be left unguarded,
the appellant told him not to worry as he would take care of it while
he was away. Both policemen were out on said errand for about 30 or 40
minutes and upon their return and after they had delivered to the
appellant the cigarettes which he had requested them to buy for him, he
left them. On the following day, the first to arrive at the municipal
building long before office hours was the appellant, but then the boy
Benigno Gorio, who was under detention at the municipal building, had
already cleaned the employees’ toilet which is situated behind said
building, and, on that occasion he had neither seen nor noticed any
brass box or any other object that might have attracted his attention
inside or around said toilet. However, at about 7.30 o’clock on that
same morning when Florentino A. Tapiru went to the toilet, he found
there the same brass box where the money which the appellant had
delivered to Uliwac the afternoon before had been kept, which evidently
had been forced open, containing then only the checks for said amount
of P187.15 together with the envelope which contained P3 and some stubs
of certain Bureau of Internal Revenue forms. Notwithstanding the fact
that the appellant was the first to arrive at the municipal building
that morning, he was not seen in his office on that occasion. When
Uliwac became aware of the disappearance of the money which he received
for safekeeping, he immediately informed Enciso, who had already
returned, and” the latter official reported the matter to the proper
authorities for investigation. Lieutenant W. A. Johnson of the
Constabulary was the first to reach Kabugao to conduct the necessary
investigation and among the first to be questioned by him was Uliwac,
from whose testimony he learned the fact that he (Uliwac) had made some
notations on each of the several bundles of bills representing the
money which the appellant delivered to him for safekeeping, showing the
amount of money in each bundle.

After Uliwac, Lieutenant Johnson questioned the appellant in the
latter’s office where the former, accompanied by municipal treasurer
Enciso, went to examine the appellant’s accounts and books and at the
same time to find out how much money he actually had in his possession.
In one of the drawers in said appellant’s office, the two found the
twenty-peso bill (Exhibit D), with the following numbers: “39 X 20 =
780”, in Uliwac’s handwriting written thereon. Uliwac, who was called
by the municipal treasurer and Lieutenant Johnson while they were
investigating the appellant, recognized and identified said bill
(Exhibit D) as one of those which the appellant had delivered’ to him
on the afternoon in question by means of the notation in his own
handwriting appearing thereon, saying that it formed part of the bundle
of 39 twenty-peso bills. Considering his suspicion still unfounded,
Lieutenant Johnson requested the appellant in an almost commanding tone
to keep said bill in his safe. After two days however, it was found
that the bill in question had disappeared from the appellant’s
possession and upon being asked to explain the matter, he merely gave
the excuse that he did not know what had happened to it. Luckily
enough, said bill was later discovered in the municipal treasury,
having been found among the bills received in said office. Lieutenant
Johnson’s explanation thereof, in the absence of another, seems
reasonable to this court. In answer to one of the questions asked him
for the purpose of learning from him how the marked bill came into the
possession of the municipal treasury, said officer said:

“He might have paid any voucher to somebody
outsider and paid him this twenty-peso bill and because the town of
Kabugao is very small and hard to make some change, especially a
twenty-peso bill, and he might have exchanged it in the office of the
treasurer. That is the only possibility why this bill was found in the
safe of the treasurer.”

The proven facts constitute a real complete chain of circumstances
that necessarily lead us to the conclusion that the appellant was the
author of the crime charged in the information; and the force thereof
is all the more insuperable because the appellant dared not even
testify in order to explain said facts or some of them, at least. Said
circumstances are: the appellant’s insistence in leaving the lost money
in Uliwac’s possession after office hours on the afternoon in question,
which he had never done before, when he could have made delivery
thereof during office hours; his returning to the municipal building at
6 o’clock in the evening of the same day for no other than the childish
purpose of requesting the chief of police Daoang and policeman Gawang
to buy him three packages of cigarettes at two different stores, as
there was no necessity of sending both of them, one after another, for
the same purpose; his offer to policeman Gawang to take care of the
municipal building while the latter was away when said policeman told
him that he could not go out and leave the municipal building
unguarded; his failure to explain why he did not personally go to buy
said cigarettes inasmuch as he himself could have done so; he alone had
the key to the door connecting his office with that of the municipal
treasury, it being a fact that said door could be open only from the
inside of his office; his presence in the municipal building long
before the opening hour for his office situated therein on the morning
of November 1, 1933, the day after he delivered his funds to clerk
Uliwac; the unexplained finding in his possession of one of the
twenty-peso bills belonging to the bundle of bills of said denomination
which formed part of the money which he delivered to clerk Uliwac for
safekeeping on the afternoon of October 31, 1933; and finally his
having disposed of the bill (Exhibit D) against Lieutenant Johnson’s
express request to keep it in his safe. Considered together, these
circumstances lead whomsoever considers them to the same conclusion
arrived at by this court.

There is no doubt but that the crime committed is robbery on the
ground that it took place under the circumstances provided in article
299 (subsection 2), of the Revised Penal Code.

It is true that the evidence shows that when policeman Gawang took
the brass box containing the lost money to the storeroom of the
municipal treasury, and placed it on top of the safe therein, the
appellant was already out of the municipal building; but it is also
true that the appellant’s unexplained presence in the building at the
time he requested the chief of police and policeman Gawang to buy him
some cigarettes, gives rise to the belief that it was during the
absence of said two policemen that he entered has office and opened the
door connecting it with the municipal treasury with the key in his
possession in order to find out in the latter office where Uliwac kept
the money which he had just delivered to him a few moments ago. He
neither denied that he had the key to said door nor that he had opened
it. Therefore, it must be taken for granted that he opened it

It is likewise true that the evidence fails to show that when the
appellant left the chief of police and policeman Gawang on the
afternoon in question, after the two had delivered the cigarettes which
he had requested them to buy for him, he carried something which might
have attracted their attention; but it is a fact proven by the
testimony of the boy Benigno Gorio, who had slept in the municipal
building that night and who was presented as a witness by the same
appellant, that at about 8 o’clock on that same night he saw a man,
whom he said he could not recognize due to the darkness of the night,
arrive at the municipal building. Said man must have been the accused
who went there to take away the brass box with the contents in order to
open it in the manner shown by its condition when it was presented as
evidence, that is, by means of force. The appellant failed to explain
where he was on that night or to state that he could not have been the
individual who had visited the municipal building at the hour stated by
said boy. It could not have been policeman Gawang and his companion
because they were asleep then.

Under the circumstances in which the appellant was found, after the
evidence for the prosecution had been taken, he should have given some
explanation of his acts or omissions on the night in question, and
having failed to do so, this court cannot consider in his favor any
fact more or less probable, which cannot be logically inferred from the
proven facts. Although the evidence against an accused may be
circumstantial in nature, it is sufficient to warrant a judgment of
conviction if the circumstances of which it consists are complete and
convincing and lead to no other rational conclusion than that he is the
author of the crime with which he is charged; and this is all the more
true in the case of the appellant because the proven facts and his very
conduct both prior to and immediately after the commission of the crime
are incompatible with his innocence. (U. S. vs, him Sip, 10 Phil., 627;
U. S. vs. Monteli, 15 Phil, 452; U. S. vs. Levente, 18 Phil., 439; U. S. vs. Rivera, 23 Phil., 383; U. S. vs. Aquino, 27 Phil., 462.)

For the foregoing reasons and considerations, it is clear that the
appellant is guilty of the crime with which he is charged, although his
civil liability should be understood to be reduced to that of paying an
indemnity of only P1,389.67, on the ground that of the amount taken
from it this is the only sum which the Government did not recover.

As to the penalty which should be imposed, it should be stated that the lower court committed an error. The same should be prision correccional in its medium period to prision mayor in
its minimum period, that is, from two years, four months and one day to
eight years, because this is the penalty next lower in degree to that
prescribed for the first case of robbery provided in article 299 of the
Revised Penal Code, it being clear that the crime committed by the
appellant is of the nature of that provided in the second case of said
article.

The lower court failed to consider two aggravating circumstances
which had been clearly proven at the trial, to wit: nocturnity and the
appellant taking advantage of his public position as postmaster. The
reason given by said court was that said circumstances were not alleged
in the information. Said requisite is not essential. In the case of
United States vs. Campo (23 Phil., 368), and in that of People vs.
Collado (p. 610, ante), this court stated, and reiterates herein, that
although it is not stated in a complaint or information that generic
aggravating circumstances of any kind have been present in the
commission of the crime, said circumstances may be proven at the trial
and, if proven, must necessarily be taken into consideration in
imposing the corresponding penalty. Therefore, said two circumstances
(subsections 1 and 6 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code), which
are not qualifying circumstances but merely generic, should be taken
into consideration.

The appealed judgment is hereby modified by sentencing the appellant to six years and one day of prision mayor, and
in conformity with the provisions of Act No. 4103, the minimum of said
penalty is fixed at two years, affirming said judgment in all other
respects, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.