THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. TOMAS LAYOS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Shortly after midday on September 22,1933,
Daniel Constantino, married to Bernardina Guino, left his house
situated at Sirab within the municipality of Albuera of the Province of
Leyte, for that of Filomeno Tan, a resident of the municipality of
Ormoc, of said province, for the purpose of borrowing some money. He
failed to return home and his wife had been waiting vainly for him
until the 27th of said month and year. On the latter date, the
municipal authorities of Ormoc and the president of the sanitary
division to which said municipality belongs, found near the Panilahan
River some human bones (a cranium and hip-bones which were the only
ones left by the dogs) that proved to be those of a man who died about
5 or 7 days before, and a man’s clothing. On that same date said
clothing was identified as that of Daniel Constantino by his wife
Bernardina Guino, who was brought to the place at the instance of some
constabulary soldiers. At that time, the herein accused Tomas Layos was
already under detention and, furthermore, had confessed to the justice
of the peace of Ormoc that on the afternoon of said date, September 22,
1933, he had killed two persons, an old woman and a girl, named Andrea
Paril and Bruna Caguyong, respectively (Exhibit B),

It should be stated in passing that according to the evidence
said accused had already been charged with homicide for the death of
the two women above stated with the result that he was convicted and
sentenced in each case to the indeterminate penalty of from seven years
of prision mayor to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, and to indemnify the heirs of each of said deceased in the sum of P1,000 (G. R. No. 41358 ^[1] of this court, and criminal case No. 4068 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte).

Having been subjected to a more extensive investigation after the
discovery of the bones which could be no other than those of Daniel
Constantino, the accused Tomas Layos had to admit, as shown by Exhibit
C, that with a bolo, which he had left near the river, he wounded said
deceased on the abdomen and on one side, felling him, because while he
was taking a bath in the river, said deceased attacked him first,
striking him twice with a bolo. He then testified that said Daniel
Constantino had so acted because of resentment against him due to his
alleged failure for a long time to pay the price of one thousand pieces
of rattan which, with no reason whatsoever, Constantino alleged he owed
him.

After the necessary charges for homicide for the death of said
Daniel Constantino had been filed against the accused, the lower court,
giving absolute credit to said Exhibit C, except with regard to the
plea of legitimate self-defense alleged therein by said accused, found
him guilty of said crime and, without stating whether or not any
modifying circumstance had been proven at the trial, sentenced him to
the indeterminate penalty of from twelve years and one day to twenty
years of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Daniel Constantino in the sum of P1,000. The accused appealed
therefrom and his attorney de oficio, upon the five
assignments of error relied upon in his brief, now contends that said
court erred in imposing said sentence upon him.

In discussing the errors allegedly committed by the lower court,
counsel for the appellant contends that said appellant’s guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt, alleging that Exhibit C, which has
served as a basis for his conviction, is not a voluntary confession,
having been obtained through torture and violence.

The entire evidence, however, shows that the appellant was not
maltreated by the constabulary soldiers or by anybody else because, on
September 28, 1933, when he claims he was maltreated by the soldiers in
their quarters and made his admission appearing in Exhibit C, he was
not in their custody, either directly or indirectly, having been turned
over to the chief of police of Ormoc, Leyte, on the 23d of said month
and year, in order to be in the letter’s custody and at the disposal of
the courts of justice (Exhibit F).

Furthermore, the appellant made said declaration, Exhibit C, before
the justice of the peace of Ormoc, in the presence of several persons,
and he then failed to state that he had been maltreated by anybody in
order to induce or force him to make it. Had somebody maltreated him,
nothing could have prevented him from informing the justice of the
peace or any other government official thereof, as said justice of the
peace could afford him all kinds of protection and furthermore he was
entirely free from the influence of the constabulary soldiers. On the
other hand, it is unbelievable that the constabulary soldiers or
corporal Miralles or any other agent or member of the constabulary
would have dared to torture or somehow maltreat him in order to compel
him to confess a crime which he did not commit, in the presence of many
strangers, as he attempted to prove by his testimony and that of
Pascual Villares, because, inasmuch as the commission of an act or acts
of maltreatment constitutes an offense, said soldiers would have been
more careful not to do so in public but secretly, for in so doing
publicly they ran the risk of being denounced and, certainly, the
evidence does not show that they have ever been denounced.

The testimony of the appellant’s witnesses Bruno Gonzalez and
Pascual Villares with whom he claimed he had been working during the
whole day of September 23, 1933, and part of the following morning,
serves him to no purpose because said witnesses referred to a date
different from the one under consideration and stated that they were
not certain as to the day on which they worked in the appellant’s field
inasmuch as, according to their own testimony, they were not familiar
with dates, and furthermore because they had contradicted themselves on
a certain detail of great importance, to wit: that Bruno Gonzalez
claimed that he and Pascual Villares arrived together to work in the
appellant’s field, while the latter emphatically stated that when Bruno
Gonzalez arrived, he and the appellant were already at work.

The next question to be decided is whether the appellant’s plea of
legitimate self-defense contained in Exhibit C should necessarily be
taken into consideration inasmuch as said evidence is relied upon to
show that he is the author of Daniel Constantino’s death.

In the case of United States vs. Alano (32 Phil., 381),
this court, citing favorably a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain,
dated May 8,1875, stated as follows:

“The free and frank confession made of a crime by
the defendant, containing certain statements of the motive and
circumstances which impelled him to commit it, must in strict justice
be admitted and considered in its entirety, for the circumstance of
immediate provocation alleged in his confession is intimately connected
therewith in such wise that the circumstance and the confession form
but one complex fact, so that the crime confessed is essentially
conditioned by the circumstance alleged, and for this reason the
defendant’s confession is qualificative, individual and indivisible,
when it does not appear that his confession and defense were disproved
or invalidated by any contradictory evidence, even circumstantial.”

It should be noted that there is no similarity between this case
and that of Alano. Alano testified in his case that he killed his wife
because he had surprised her in the act of having sexual intercourse
with Martin Gonzalez. No other evidence, than his own testimony, was
presented against him to prove the motive which impelled him to commit
the crime, and this was not contradicted in the least by anybody, much
less, by himself. In this case the accused made his declaration,
Exhibit C, wherein he admits having killed Daniel Constantino, stating
at the same time that he acted in self-defense, long before the opening
of the trial. However, upon testifying in his behalf at the trial which
took place four months later, he entirely changed his defense by
abandoning that of having acted in legitimate self-defense. On that
occasion, he pleaded an alibi which he failed to prove, and made
efforts to show that his declaration, Exhibit C, had been obtained
through torture and violence.

The rule that a confession should be admitted and considered in its
entirety, whether a part thereof be favorable or unfavorable to the
accused, stated in general terms in the above cited case of Alano,
should not be taken as absolute in all cases as there may be instances,
and in fact there are some instances, where only a part of confessions
or admissions of the nature of Exhibit C herein is admissible,
rejecting the rest by reason of the improbability of the facts or
statements therein contained, or because there are other reasons or
facts showing that said portion is false or making it unworthy of
credit. This seems to be clear because it is the natural tendency of
every transgressor, with perhaps very rare exceptions, to acquit
himself, while he can do so, from all liability that might arise from
his act, or at least mitigate it in the eyes of the law and of those of
his fellow men.

The same rule exists in American jurisprudence but it does not
require that when a confession, which, at the same time contains a
defense, is presented in evidence, said defense must necessarily be
taken into consideration.

In the various cases cited in the American Law Reports Annotated,
originating from the various States therein enumerated, the following
has been said:

“General Rule.

“In the proof of
confessions, the whole of what the accused said on the subject, at the
time of making the confession, should be taken together. The
prosecution is entitled to show the whole statement, or, if any part is
omitted, the accused is entitled to supply it.” (2 A. L. R., 1017.)

“It is well settled that, if a confession is made under such
circumstances as to authorize its admission in evidence, the accused is
entitled to have the entire conversation, including any exculpatory or
self-serving declarations connected therewith, also admitted. However,
it is for the jury to say what weight shall be given to the several
parts of the statement, as they may believe that part which charges the
prisoner, and reject that which tends to exculpate him.” (2 A. L. R.,
1022.)

In the case of Mortimore vs. State (24 Wyo., 452; 161
Pac., 766), it was stated that “* * * when a confession is offered and
admitted, the defendant is entitled to have all that was said at the
time introduced in evidence, including exculpatory statements, and that
a statement directly involving guilt does not lose its character as a
confession from the fact that it was accompanied by statements of an
exculpatory nature seems to be conceded or recognized in the many cases
applying the rule as to confessions to such statements, without
referring to the distinction between a mere admission and a confession.
The jury may believe the inculpatory statement and disbelieve what the
defendant said on the same occasion in his own favor. * * *.”

In the case of Brown vs. Commonwealth (9 Leigh [Va.], 633; 33 Am. Dec., 263), the following was held;

“When the confession of a party, either in a civil
or criminal case (for the rule is the same in both), is given in
evidence, the whole, as well that part which makes for him as that
which is against him, must be taken together and go to the jury as
evidence in the case. But, like other evidence, it must be weighed, and
believed or disbelieved, in whole or in part, as reason may decide. The
jury can not, by a mere arbitrary exercise of the will, take a part to
be true, and reject the residue. If, therefore, there be nothing In the
case warranting such a discrimination, the whole must be taken to be
true.”

In the case of State vs. Curtis (70 Mo., 594), the following was likewise stated:

“In considering what the defendant said after the
fatal stabbing, the jury must consider it all together. The defendant
is entitled to the benefit of what he said for himself, if true, as the
State is anything he said against himself in any conversation proved by
the State. What he said against himself in any conversation the law
presumes to be true, because against himself; but what he said for
himself the jury are not bound to believe because said in a
conversation proved by the State; they may believe or disbelieve it as
it is shown to be true or false by all the evidence in the case.”

And in that of Griswold vs. State (24 Wis., 144), it was held:

“Where one part of a statement inculpates the
defendant, and another would excuse him, the whole statement must be
considered by the jury; but they are not bound to give equal credit to
both branches of the statement, but, if the other evidence requires it,
the jury may believe the confession of guilt, and reject that part of
the statement exculpating the accused.”

This court has adopted the same criterion in the cases of United States vs. Gavarlan (18 Phil., 510), and People vs. Diaz (59 Phil., 768), stating in the former, as follows:

“As a general rule, part of a confession can not be
admitted and the rest rejected, unless there are proofs in the record
that would justify such a course.”

In order that the appellant’s plea of having acted merely in
legitimate self-defense, which is alleged by him in Exhibit C, may now
be taken into consideration, it was necessary for him to prove it at
the trial but he failed to do so. On the contrary he himself abandoned
it by setting up an entirely new defense undoubtedly because he knew
that his former defense was not true. When an accused retracts by
repudiating his declaration wherein he admitted having committed the
crime with which he is charged and pleaded an apparently good defense,
and later sets up another entirely different defense which he fails to
prove, the former defense is necessarily rendered useless thereby
leaving valid only his admission of having committed the crime. The
reason for this is that a criminal ordinarily resorts to falsehood and
to lies in order to defend himself, while, on the contrary the innocent
relies absolutely upon the support and backing afforded by pure truth.
One who considers himself innocent has nothing to fear by telling the
naked truth because this is his most effective weapon of defense.

If the appellant truly acted in self-defense, there was no reason
for him not to have stated said fact upon testifying at the trial, much
less to have resorted, as he did, to falsehood, by attempting to prove
a useless alibi, and furthermore, unjustly charging those who heard the
confession, Exhibit C, with having annoyed, maltreated and tortured him.

The question should therefore be decided in the affirmative, that
is, in the appellant’s case, only that part of his confession, Exhibit
C, wherein he admits having killed Daniel Constantino should be
accepted, rejecting that part wherein he alleges having committed said
act in self-defense. This court cannot give credit to said defense of
the appellant because if it were true that he was attacked by the
deceased Daniel Constantino while he, then in the water, was at a very
much greater disadvantage with respect to the deceased, he should have
been able to show some wound or injury or any other trace thereof, and
furthermore, he would have been able to produce the bolo with which, he
claims, the deceased had attacked him. On the other hand, the fact that
he had abandoned said defense at the trial clearly proves that he was
convinced that such thing never took place.

In the case of People vs. Conroy (97 N. Y., 62), wherein those of United States vs. Randall (Deady, 524); State vs. Reed (62 Me., 129); and Commonwealth vs. Goodwin (14 Gray, 65), have been cited, the following was held :

“The resort to falsehood and evasion by one accused
of a crime affords of itself a presumption of evil intentions, and has
always been considered proper evidence to present to a jury upon the
question of the guilt or innocence of the person accused.”

In view of the proven facts and of the foregoing considerations,
this court arrives at the conclusion that the appellant is guilty of
the crime with which he was charged and, it appearing from the record
that he lacks instruction, this mitigating circumstance should he taken
into consideration in his favor, all the more so because it is
compensated by no aggravating circumstance, for which reason the
penalty which should be imposed upon him is the minimum of that
prescribed by the law, that is, twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is modified by sentencing the
appellant to twelve years and one day of reclwsi6n temporal; and
pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 4103, the minimum of said penalty
is fixed at seven years, affirming said appealed judgment in all other
respects, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Avancena, C. /., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial, and Goddard, JJ., concur.

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^[1] P. 224, ante.

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BUTTE, J.,

I fully concur in the foregoing decision. The defendant has been
convicted in accordance with law. However, there is one circumstance
that I think should be mentioned Though his counsel de oficio
made no plea of insanity, the defendant’s irrational acts and fantastic
testimony indicate the possibility that he is a paranoiac. The record
also indicates that he has a local reputation of being “loco” If he is,
he will be a menace to his prison guards and his fellow prisoners.
Prudence and humanity seem to require that he should be given a prompt
psychiatric examination by the proper authorities.