THE PEOPLE OP THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. TOMAS LAYOS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DIAZ, J.:

Convicted of the crime of double homicide and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of from ten years of prision mayor
to seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusi6n temporal with
the corresponding accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Andrea Paril and Bruna Caguyong in the sum of P1,000, and to
pay the costs, the defendant herein Tomas Layos appealed from said
judgment. In his brief he enumerates the alleged errors as committed by
the trial court in its judgment.

Sa:d appellant contends that the lower court erred:
(1) In declaring that he killed the two women above-mentioned; (2) in
not holding that the confessions made by were the result of brutal
treatment of him; and (3) in exaggerating, as he claims, the
contradictions of his witnesses Pascual Villares and Bruno Gonzalez.

Without being contradicted by the appellant, the
evidence of record shows that at about 5 o’clock on the afternoon of
September 22, 1933, while Bruna and Bonifacia Caguyong, each of whom
was riding a carabao and followed on foot by Andrea Paril, grandmother
of the former and mother of the latter, and Paula Caguyong, were
returning home from a certain mountain where they had gathered some
corn, a man, whom they met on the way, attacked said Bruna Caguyong
with a bolo, causing her to fall from her carabao, after which he
continued to hack her until she died. When Andrea Paril, the
grandmother of the deceased, went to the said Bruna Caguyong’s
assistance and asked the aggressor what he had done, said individual,
without a word, turned upon and attacked her with his bolo, inflicting
upon her five wounds which caused her death a few moments later.

Who was the aggressor and what was the motive of the aggression? This is the question to be decided in this case.

The eyewitnesses of the crime, Paula and Bonifacia
Caguyong, identified the appellant as the aggressor, saying that they
saw him commit the crime from beginning to end. In said appellant’s
sworn declarations which are attached to the record as Exhibits B and
C, he stated that the cause of the aggression was due to the fact that
the deceased Bruna Caguyong had called him a lunatic.

The defense questions the credibility of the
aforesaid two witnesses for the prosecution and cites some portions of
their testimony wherein, it is claimed, they have seriously
contradicted themselves and which makes them unworthy of credit. In the
case of Paula Caguyong, for instance, the defense considers it strange
how said witness could remember that the appellant wore a white shirt
but was unable to recall the color of his pants. There is nothing
strange in this because the witness gave a satisfactory explanation
when she said: “I do not remember it any more because I was very much
frightened.” Furthermore, as the lower court has very well stated,
referring undoubtedly to the suddenness of the aggression, said witness
could not have noticed everything due to the rapidity of the attack and
the circumstances surrounding it. Furthermore, in crimes of similar
nature, where the blows are struck faster and in less time than it
takes to think, the question relative to the clothing worn by the
aggressor constitutes a very insignificant detail to the eyewitness for
the reason that his attention is focused on the attack. This1 is
particularly true when his degree of mentality is similar to that of
the witness in question who is a country woman and so illiterate that
she had to use her thumb mark in certifying her affidavit Exhibit 1.
Furthermore, she was completely overcome by fright. Human intelligence,
unlike a photographic film, cannot take in everything at a single
glance, much less reproduce it afterwards.

In the case of the witness Bonifacia Caguyong, who
is a mere child 12 years of age and likewise illiterate, the attorney
for the defense cannot understand why the lower court should give
credit to her when, according to him, she had grossly contradicted
herself in answering the various questions propounded to her during the
cross-examination. In support of his contention, he cites the following
portions of the testimony of said witness, to wit:

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

With respect to the reply of the witness wherein
she said “dangas, bald”, the word “bald” must be the interpreter’s
translation of the word “dangas” used by her. However, whatever it may
be, said word or reply should be construed in connection with the
suggestive question asked by the defense counsel in the lower court, as
follows: “And he seemed to be bald?” to which she answered: “Yes, sir”.
Therefore, there is no reason to attribute to said witness the
categorical affirmation that the aggressor, who killed the two
deceased, was bald. On the other hand, the defense has not proven and
there is nothing of record from which to infer that although the
appellant has hair, “he does not seem to be bald”.

However, the fact is” that both before and after
the defense counsel had asked the question from the answer to which the
present counsel now infers that the witness could not identify the
aggressor of the deceased, said witness stated several times that the
appellant was the aggressor. Perhaps the defense counsel has not seen
the other portions of the testimony of said witness on that occasion
when she gave the testimony hereinbefore cited, which portions are as
follows:

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

If the appellant’s sworn declarations (Exhibits B
and C) are taken into consideration in addition to the aforesaid
testimony of the witnesses Paula and Bonifacia Caguyong, there would be
no reason to doubt but that the appellant killed the deceased Andrea
Paril and Bruna Caguyong. In the aforesaid two documents, said
appellant admits that he killed them because the latter called him a
lunatic. He could not have made this admission in a more formal manner
because he made it before the justice of the peace who conducted the
preliminary investigation in this case.

It is true that the appellant tried to prove during the trial that the
aforesaid confessions were not voluntarily made by him, alleging that
they had been obtained from him by means of force and maltreament. He
then declared that the constabulary soldier Miralles had slapped him
twice and struck him with his fist on the stomach, on the side and on
the breast, and twisted his upper lip. His witness Pascual Villares
likewise testified that he actually saw how the appellant had been
maltreated by a certain constabulary soldiers in the barrio of Mabini
when he was confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution Paula and
Bonifacia Caguyong. However, it is no less certain that the testimony
of said appellant relative to the injuries, which he claimed to have
had on his face and to have been due to such maltreatment, was
contradicted by the justice of the peace before whom said confessions
(Exhibits B and C) were made, saying that although he had looked well
and long at the appellant’s face when he was brought to his house and
to his office for the purpose of making said confessions, he could not
find any trace nor sign of maltreatment. On the other hand, on the
occasion that the appellant claimed he had been maltreated by the
constabulary soldiers at their quarters on September 28, 1933, and
several days prior thereto, he had already been removed from their
custody either directly or indirectly, inasmuch as he had been turned
over to the chief of police of the municipality of Ormoc of the
Province of Leyte, on the 25th of said month and year, in order to be
under the custody of said chief of police at the disposal of the courts
of justice. (Exhibit F.)

If it were true that the appellant had been
maltreated by the constabulary soldiers or by any of them, nothing
could have prevented him from informing the justice of the peace
thereof or that the confession he had made under Exhibit B, to the
effect that he killed the two women, was the result of said
maltreatment, inasmuch as he was not under their custody at the time he
made the statement Exhibit C. The fact that he had not done so proves
that he had not been maltreated at all except on September 20,1933,
that is, two days before the commission of the crime, when, according
to the testimony of corporal Miralles of the Constabulary, he was
struck several times by reason of his refusal to cooperate in the
extermination of locusts’, but certainly not for the purpose of
compelling him to sign any document nor to make any confession.
Furthermore, it is unbelievable that the constabulary soldiers or
corporal Miralles or any other member of the constabulary would have
dared to maltreat him or to do violence to him in order to compel him
to confess a crime in the presence of many persons, as the appellant
claimed they did, because inasmuch as such act constitutes an offense,
it is absurd that said soldiers would commit it in the presence of many
people who might denounce it later. Furthermore, had such a thing
happened, there would at least be somebody to corroborate the
appellant’s testimony, but no one did.

Even disregarding Exhibits B and C, which might be
done arbitrarily in view of the fact that this court does not believe
that said confessions were obtained by means of force or threats, the
testimony of Paula and Bonifacia Caguyong and the finding of the
homicidal bolo, still with bloodstains, in the appellant’s house, are
in themselves sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that the
appellant is, in fact, the one who killed the said deceased Andrea
Paril and Bruna Caguyong.

It is likewise true that the two witnesses for the
defense, Bruno Gonzalez and Pascual Villares, testified that during the
whole day of September 23, 1933, and part of the following morning,
they were engaged with the appellant cleaning the latter’s corn field
and that they began working before breakfast on the first day, the
three not having separated from each other until after sunset. However,
it is also true that a certain detail therein destroys the probatory
force of the testimony of said two witnesses, which is that, aside from
the fact that they were not certain as to the exact day on which they
worked together on the appellant’s field inasmuch as they are not
familiar with dates, Bruno Gonzalez said that he and Pascual Villares
arrived together on said appellant’s field on the day in question,
while the latter stated that when Bruno Gonzalez arrived there, he and
the appellant were already at work. This shows his lack of credibility.
On the other hand, oral evidence of alibi is so easily manufactured and
usually so unreliable that it can rarely be given credence, at least in
this case, for the reasons stated. (People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718.)

In view of the aforestated contradiction, which the
trial court must have taken into consideration in connection vith the
other findings of the case, and inasmuch as the tesimony of the two
witnesses for the prosecution Paula and tonifacia Caguyong is
convincing, this court is of the opinion that the trial court did not
commit any of the errors attributed to it by the appellant.

It is noted, however, that the trial court did not
consider such findings strictly in conformity with the law inasmuch as
it considered the act committed by the appellant as merely constituting
the complex crime of double homicide when such is not the case, taking
into consideration the spirit and the text of article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. According to said article, in order the crime may be
considered double homicide, it is necessary that it be the result of a
single act, as in the case of killing two persons at the same moment
with a single stroke of the bolo or with a single shot. The homicide
perpetrated by the herein defendant on Bruna Caguyong and that on
Andrea Paril do not constitute a single act but two distinct acts
committed at different times. The former’s death was the result of
sixteen wounds inflicted upon her by the appellant and that of the
latter was likewise the result of the five wounds which he inflicted
upon her immediately afterward. The only mitigating circumstance which
may be taken into consideration in favor of the appellant is his lack
of instruction because the record shows that he can neither read nor
write.

Wherefore, inasmuch as the record contains no
aggravating circumstance to compensate said mitigating circumstance,
and taking into consideration the provisions of Act No. 4103, the
appealed judgment should be, as it is hereby, modified by sentencing
said appellant to the indeterminate penalty of seven years of prision mayor to twelve years and one day of recluswn temporal for the death of Andrea Paril and to another seven years of prision mayor to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal
for the death of Bruna Caguyong, and to indemnify the heirs of each of
the deceased in the sum of P1,000. The appealed judgment is hereby
affirmed in all other respects, with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.

Street, Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.