G. R. No. 41205. August 29, 1934
SATURNINO AGUILAR AND MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, APPLICANTS AND APPELLEES, VS. PASAY TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.
GODDARD, J.:
1922, granted Tomas Mata a certificate of public convenience whereby he
was authorized to operate one passenger truck between the City of Manila
and the municipality of Salinas, Cavite Province. On or about January
25, 1924, Tomas Mata sold this truck and his certificate of public
convenience to S’aturnino Aguilar subject to the approval of the Public
Service Commission. Upon due application this sale was approved and the
corresponding certificate of public convenience was issued in favor of
Saturnino Aguilar, the second paragraph of which reads as follows:
“2.ª Que el auto-truck del aqui cesionario al
pasar por los sitios donde hay estaciones del ferrocarril de la Manila
Railroad Company, no hara paradas cerca de dichas estaciones para
recoger pasajeros o carga y permitira que los agentes de tales
estaciones o los inspectores de trafico de dicha compania puedan hacerle
parar para averiguar de una manera adecuada y conveniente la hora de
salida del punto de origen de su viaje, la cual hora de salida se hara
constar en los recibos de pasaje o carga que se expidan, asi como
tambien la hora de llegada al punto terminal del mismo viaje.”
While Aguilar was the owner of this certificate it
was modified in only one respect and that modification consisted in a
change of the hours of departure from and arrival at Manila and Salinas.
On June 14, 1933, Aguilar sold the above-mentioned
transportation business and his certificate of public convenience to the
Manila Railroad Company. An application for the approval of this sale
was filed on that same day. By an order of the commission dated June 30,
1933, this application was set for hearing on July 13, 1933, and the
applicants were directed to have that order published once, ten days
prior to the date of hearing, either in The Tribune or La
Vanguardia.
The Toledo Transportation Company filed an
opposition which was later withdrawn. An attorney appeared for the Pasay
Transportation Company, but after examining the application he did not
file an opposition to the approval of the sale.
Paragraph 4 of this application for approval of the
sale reads:
“That the sale and transfer of said business will not be
detrimental to the public interests, in as much as the purchaser and
transferee will continue the operation of same in the same manner and
over the same route as heretofore.”
In the decision of the Public Service Commission, approving the sale
in favor of the Manila Railroad Company, paragraph 2 of Aguilar’s
certificate, copied above, was eliminated.
When the Pasay Transportation Company noticed that
the Manila Railroad Company was not operating the Aguilar truck in “the
same manner” as the former owner had been operating it and, after an
examination of the record in the office of the commission, it discovered
that paragraph 2 of Aguilar’s certificate had been eliminated, its
attorney immediately filed a motion praying that a new hearing be
granted; that the decision of the commission be reconsidered and amended
by including therein the restriction imposed upon Aguilar by virtue of
that paragraph.
This motion alleges in part:
“1. Que la compareciente es una corporacidn debidamente
constituida de acuerdo con las leyes de las Islas Filipinas, y es una
operadora regular de servicio de autobuses, entre otras, entre Cavite y
Manila y puntos intermedios y viceversa ; y entre Cavite e Imus y puntos
intermedios y viceversa ;
* * * * * * *
“3. Que dicho certificado de Saturnino Aguilar contenia
prohibition desde y entre Noveleta y Manila y puntos intermedios y
viceversa;
* * * * * * *
“7. Que existiendo como existe actualmente desde mucho
antes del traspaso a la Manila Railroad Company del referido certificado
de Saturnino Aguilar, un servicio local entre Cavite y Manila y puntos
intermedios y viceversa, que es el que se presta por la aqui
peticionaria, cuyo servicio es mas que suficiente para acomodar el
trafico, no solamente no procede autorizar ninguna nueva solicitud a lo
largo de la linea de esta compania sino, que no procede el levantamiento
de ninguna prohibicion de certificados, pues uno y otro caso, afectaran
seriamente los intereses de la compareciente y no tendra otro efecto
inmediato que el de entablar una competencia ruinosa en perjuicio de
esta y del publico;
“8. Que Saturnino Aguilar nunca ha solicitado ni
el levantamiento de su restriccion ni ninguna otra solicitud para que
pudiera tomar y dejar pasajeros en los puntos intermedios,
particularmente en la ruta o parte de la ruta servida por la aqui
compareciente;“9. Que en la decisidn recaida en el expediente
arriba titulado no aparece inserta la prohibicidn que anteriormente
existia, que f ue mas expresamente definida en el Expediente No. 8039
que arriba copiamos, y la no insertion de dicha restriccion o
prohibicion se habia debido segtin entendemos a un error involuntario,
pero, que la misma (la no insercidn de la restriccion o prohibicidn) en
la decision de autos, pudiera dar lugar a que la Manila Railroad Company
tomara y dejara pasajeros, como en efecto, de hecho ha estado y esta
actualmente tomando y dejando pasajeros y carga en y entre Noveleta y
Manila y puntos intermedios y viceversa en las horas prescritas en el
certificado a ella traspasado por Saturnino Aguilar.“10. Que la compareciente no habiendo recibido
copia de la decision de la Honorable Comision recaida en este expediente
hasta la fecha, y habiendo tan solo tenido la oportunidad de enterarse
de las condiciones prescritas en dicha decision ultimamente y por
haberse enterado de que dicho operador esta recogiendo pasajeros en los
puntos intermedios, no obstante que dicho operador en su certificado
tiene las mismas restricciones que tenia en el certificado adquirido del
vendedor Saturnino Aguilar, la aqui opositora no pudo presentar la
presente motion de reconsideration a su debido tiempo para la enmienda
de la decision recaida en este expediente.”
The Public Service Commission denied this motion in
an order, dated January 12, 1934, without giving the Pasay
Transportation Company an opportunity to present proofs in support of
the above allegations. An exception was noted and a petition for a
review of the above order was filed in this court on January 30, 1934.
The Manila Railroad Company appeared and filed a
written motion in which it prayed that the petition for review be
dismissed on the sole ground that it was filed out of time. Section 35
of Act No. 3108, which is cited in support of this motion, reads:
“Any order made by the Commission may be reviewed on the
application of any person or public utility affected thereby, by
certiorari in appropriate cases, or by petition, to the Supreme Court,
within thirty days from the date upon which such order becomes
effective, as herein provided; * * *”
The attention of this court is directed to the fact that the
questioned decision is dated July 28, 1933, and that the motion of
reconsideration was not filed until December 12, 1933.
This motion was denied by this court in a minute
order, dated March 6, 1934. However, the same question is again raised
in the brief of the Manila Railroad Company. This contention is not well
founded. Section 28 of Act No. 3108 provides that the commission may at
any time order a rehearing to extend, revoke or modify any order made
by it. Section 35, quoted above, and the decisions of this court, cited
in the motion for dismissal, are not applicable to the facts in this
case. That section and the decisions cited apply to the immediate
parties in a case before the Public Service Commission.
The Pasay Transportation Company was not a party to
the case now under consideration and as soon as it learned that the
Public Service Commission had not only approved the Aguilar-Manila
Railroad Company sale, but that it had also amended, motu proprio,
the certificate of public con^ venience, one of the objects of that
sale, in a way that it considered prejudicial to its interests, as an
operator over the same line, it rightly appeared and filed a motion for
reconsideration.
Section 29 of the Public Service Commission Act
provides that,
“Every order made by the Commission shall be served upon
the person or public service, as herein defined, affected thereby,
within ten days from the time said order is filed, by personal delivery
or by mailing a certified copy thereof to any one of the principal
officers or agents of the public service at his usual place of business,
and, in case such certified copy is sent by registered mail, the
registry mail receipt shall be prima facie evidence of the
receipt of such order by the public service in due course of mail. All
orders of the Commission to continue service or rates in effect at the
time said order is made shall be immediately operative; all other orders
shall become effective upon the date specified therein.” (As amended by
sec. 1, Act No. 3316.)
Parties affected by an order amending a certificate
of public convenience are entitled to notice. Anyone who believes that
such an order affects him has a right to intervene in the case in which
that order is issued, within a reasonable time and without unnecessary
delay, after he receives notice thereof, or, as in this case, after
learning that such an order has been issued by the commission. The right
to be heard and present evidence in support of the allegations,
contained in his motion of intervention, naturally follows, provided the
motion of intervention or reconsideration states facts sufficient to
justify a reconsideration of the questioned order and the granting of a
new hearing. The facts alleged in the motion of the Pasay Transportation
Company are sufficient for that purpose.
In the case of Soriano and Santos vs. Del
Rosario and Rural Transit Co. (55 Phil., 934), a motion to amend a
certificate of public convenience was submitted to one of the associate
public service commissioners, who announced his conclusion with respect
thereto. Instead, however, of entering the corresponding order, said
commissioner, after the lapse of nearly a year, indorsed the matter for
action to another commissioner, who, thereupon, without setting the
cause for hearing, entered an order in which he announced a conclusion
entirely different from that reached by the associate commissioner who
heard the motion. This court said:
“* * * After this stage of the proceedings had been reached, we
are of the opinion that it was improper for Commissioner Del Rosario to
decide the motion differently without at least conceding to the parties
interested an opportunity to be heard. And if there cannot properly be
said to have been an absolute want of jurisdiction on the part of the
respondent commissioner to enter the order which is the subject of this
application, there was at least an irregular exercise of judicial power
by him, in excess of his lawful jurisdiction, such as supplies a basis
for the writ of certiorari.”
In view of all the foregoing this court holds that the Public Service
Commission erred in denying the motion of reconsideration filed by the
Pasay Transportation Company without giving it an opportunity to present
evidence in support of the allegations set forth therein and that, by
reason of its failure to grant the said motion for reconsideration and
new trial, there “was at least an irregular exercise of judicial power,
in excess of its lawful jurisdiction.”
The order denying the motion for reconsideration and
new trial is hereby set aside and the record in this case is remanded
to the Public Service Commission for further proceedings in conformity
with this decision, without costs.
Malcolm, Villa-Real, Imperial, and Butte,
JJ., concur.