G. R. No. 41131. August 09, 1934
THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL, PROVINCE OP LEYTE, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF LEYTE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALANGALANG, PROVINCE OF LEYTE, RESPONDENTS…
GODDARD, J.:
Sometime before the year 1909 the municipalities of
San Miguel and Alangalang of the Province of Leyte were consolidated. In
1909 the Governor-General by executive order No. 81 ordered the
separation of these two municipalities. That order provided that the
municipality of Alangalang should be composed of its actual territory
less the territory of the former municipality of San Miguel and that the
municipality of San Miguel should be reestablished with its former
territory. A dispute arose as to the jurisdiction over four barrios,
Cabadsan, Lucay, Garang (now Borseth) and Gibucawan. The municipality of
San Miguel claimed that these barrios were within its former
jurisdiction and the municipality of Alangalang claimed that they
belonged to the jurisdiction of that municipality. On November 23, 1914,
the provincial board of Leyte settled this dispute by adjudicating the
abovementioned barrios to the municipality of Alangalang by its
resolution No. 928. This action of the board was taken by virtue of Act
No. 82, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 344. Neither of these acts
provided for an appeal from the decision of the provincial board in such
cases.
On August 31, 1932, the municipality of San Miguel
filed this certiorari proceeding against the provincial board of Leyte
and the municipality of Alangalang before the Court of First Instance of
that province and prayed:
“1. Que decrete la expedicion de un mandamiento de certiorari
ordenando a la Junta Provincial recurrida para que eleve a este
Juzgado testimonio del expediente del asunto ante dicha Junta en 1914
por el recurrente contra el municipio recurrido sobre los barrios en
cuestion, para su revision por este Juzgado.
“2. Que se ordene al Municipio de Alangalang,
Leyte, sus funcionarios, agentes y abogados para que pendiente la
resolution de este juicio se abstengan en absoluto de ejercer
jurisdiccion sobre dichos barrios.“3. Que previa la tramitacion correspondiente se
dicte sentencia declarando nula y sin ningun valor ni efecto la
resolucion No. 928, serie de 1914, de la Junta Provincial recurrida
dictada en dicho asunto y prohibiendo al propio tiempo a perpetuidad al
municipio recurrido a que continuara ejerciendo jurisdiccion sobre los
referidos1 barrios, con las costas de este juicio a cargo de los
recurridos.”
The provincial fiscal of that province in
representation of the respondent province and municipality filed a
demurrer in which fie alleged:
“1. Que el tribunal no tiene jurisdiccion sobre la materia
litigiosa;
“2. Que los hechos alegados en la demanda no son
constitutivos de derecho de accion; y“3. Que el remedio solicitado es improcedente.”
The trial court sustained this demurrer and allowed
the petitioner ten days within which to amend its petition. As the
petition was not amended within that time, the trial court dismissed
this case and the municipality of San Miguel appealed from that order.
It will be noted that this certiorari proceeding was
filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte eighteen years after
the provincial board of that province adjudicated the barrios in
question to the municipality of Alangalang. In view of this, it is not
necessary to go into the merits of this case.
Eighteen years after the provincial board of Leyte
adjudicated the barrios in question to the municipality of Alangalang
is1 certainly not a reasonable time within which to file an application
for a writ of certiorari.
In the case of Cortes vs. Court of
First Instance of Capiz (52 Phil, 214, 215), in which a writ of
mandamus was applied for nearly two years after the decision in question
in that case was handed down by the trial court, this court dismissed
the petition and held:
“* * * Without deciding what would constitute an
application within a reasonable time after the refusal of a trial judge
to sign the bill of exceptions, it is apparent that the delay in
ordinary cases should not be more than the longest period allowed in the
lower court for the party to take action, which is thirty days. It isr
well settled that laches in making an application for the writ of
mandamus affords sufficient cause for its denial. * * *”
In the case of Po Sun Tun vs. Mapa (59 Phil., 459), this
court held:
“Furthermore, we find that said petitioner had incurred in
an unreasonable delay by his failure to file this petition sooner and
to take any step to that effect more than four months from the issuance
of the latter order and more than eight months from the promulgation of
the former, without any justifiable cause whatsoever.”
In that case the petition for a writ of certiorari was dismissed.
“In the absence of special statutory provisions it is well
settled that before the court will grant the writ it must appear not
only that the inferior tribunal has committed some error of law, but
also that the error has caused substantial harm, and that the petitioner
has been guilty of no laches in seeking his remedy.” (5 R. C. L.f 255.)
The order of the trial court denying the writ of certiorari is
affirmed without costs.
Malcolm, Villa-Real, Imperial, and Butte,
JJ., concur.