THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JUAN MORENO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The appellant was tried in the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan for the crime of homicide through reckless
negligence, committed as follows:

“Que en o hacia el 17 de agosto de 1933, en
el Municipio de Meycauayan, Provincia de Bulacan, Islas Filipinas, y
dentro de la jurisdiccion de este Honorable Juzgado, el acusado arriba
referido siendo chauffeur del automdvil No. 1-9925-Manila
voluntariamente guio y manejo dicho automovil en una carretera
provincial y que por su imprudencia, negligencia, falta de cuidado y
sin observar las debidas precauciones para evitar que se causen dafios
contra las personas choco dicho automovil manejado por el acusado
contra Una barandilla del puente del Barrio de Saluysoy del Municipio
de Meycauayan, causando a uno de los pasajeros ilamado Eulogio Pabalan
de dicho automovil heridas en diferentes partes del cuerpo que
determinaron la muerte de dicho Eulogio Pabalan horas despues.”

The trial judge found the defendant guilty as charged and sentenced him to suffer one year and one day of prision correccional,
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Eulogio Pabalan, in the sum of
P1,000, with the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.

The accused appealed to this court, and his attorney now makes the following assignments of error :

“I. The lower court erred in holding that the
collision of the automobile driven by the accused with the foot of the
bridge was due to the negligent driving of the said accused.

“II. The lower court erred in not finding that the collision was due to
the efforts of the accused in trying to prevent the automobile from
falling into the river, thus endangering not only his life but also the
lives of the other passengers.

“III. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence.”

It appears from the evidence that on August 17, 1933 the defendant
and Aurelio Lee came to Manila from San Pedro Makati in the defendant’s
automobile. On the way they stopped at a Chinese store in Tejeron
Street to drink some gin. From there they went to the San Lazaro Jockey
Club, and then to the house of the Pabalan brothers, where Fabian
Pabalan joined them, and the three went to the Bureau of Labor to get
Eulogio Pabalan. While they were waiting for the latter, the defendant
remained in the automobile and Went to sleep. As the defendant was
still asleep when they were ready to start, Aurelio Lee drove the
automobile until they reached Sangandaan, Caloocan, when he was
relieved by the defendant. Eulogio Pabalan was seated on the left side
of the automobile and Aurelio Lee between him and the defendant. Fabian
Pabalan was in the rumble seat. As soon as the defendant took the
wheel, he began to drive very fast, and the course of the automobile
was crooked. The companions of the accused protested and told him to
stop the automobile and let them go out, but he did not heed their
request. The defendant continued to drive in a reckless manner, and in
going around a curve leading to a concrete bridge in Meycauayan he
violently struck the railing of the bridge and crushed the left side of
the automobile. Eulogio Pabalan received injuries from which he died
the same day. Fabian Pabalan and Aurelio Lee were also injured.

We entirely agree with the finding of the lower court that the
accident resulted from defendant’s reckless negligence in approaching
the bridge at high speed on a curve.

The principal contention of appellant’s attorney is that when the
defendant and his companions were approaching the bridge they saw a
truck coming towards them, and the deceased became frightened and
pulled defendant’s left sleeve, causing the automobile to swerve to the
left, and that it would have gone into the river if the defendant had
not suddenly swerved to the right; that in executing this maneuver he
struck the bridge.

This effort to place the blame for the accident on the deceased is not sustained by the evidence.

In a statement subscribed and sworn to before the justice of the peace of Meycauayan the defendant said:

“That at about 9 a. m., August 17, 1933, I with
Aurelio Lee left Makati for Manila. While on the way, we stopped at
Tejeron Street to drink gin in a Chinese store proceeding to San Lazaro
Jockey Club. There we stopped a couple of minutes and then proceeded to
Tondo. I was the one managing the car when we proceeded to Tondo. In
Tondo, I slept inside the car. When I woke up together with Eulogio and
one Fabian Pabalan, we were already in Saloysoy, Meycauayan, Bulacan. I
then told Aurelio Lee who was then managing the car that I should be
the one to manage the car. I took the wheel from him and managed it and
I asked where we were and he answered that we were on our way to
Manila. I continued driving and accidentally I saw a car that was also
entering a bridge where I was about also to get in. I placed my car on
the left side and when I turned my car to the left side of the bridge,
the back of my car struck the bridge. It resulted that the body of my
car became completely wrecked on the left side and my companions got
physical injuries. A policeman on duty at the place came to us and gave
us help. I was brought by the policeman to the Municipal Building and
my other companions were brought to the Provincial Hospital for medical
treatment. I suffered only a slight wound on the right of the lower lip
and a slight bruise on the left forehead.”

At the trial the defendant described the accident as follows :

“Al volver yo a manejar la manivela, el andar de
nuestro auto era en linea recta; al llegar nosotros al sitio de
Saloysoy venia un truck en direccion contraria a la nuestra
cuya distancia de nuestro coche era de 15 metros despues de una curva
cerrada. Nuestro coche continuaba andando hasta que Ilegd a la
distancia de 5 metros del otro coche que venia en direccidn contraria.
Como quiera que aquel auto estaba en medio de la calle y como quiera
tambien que a esa distancia de 5 metros, de continuar andando nuestro
coche, iba a caerse al rio o un precipicio, entonces para evitar esa
caida, lo que hice es virar hacia la derecha nuestro auto. En vista de
ese hecho, la parte delantera de nuestro coche donde esta la maquina
paso uno de los postes del puente, asi que la parte izquierda de
nuestro coche chocd contra ese poste.”

The defendant did not claim that the accident was caused by Eulogio
Pabalan’s pulling his sleeve until it was suggested to him by leading
questions at the trial.

It is true that Aurelio Lee defendant’s compadre, testified that
when they saw the truck coming from the opposite direction Eulogio
Pabalan touched the accused with his left hand; that at that moment the
accused swerved the automobile towards the left, but as he saw that the
automobile was going to fall into the river he then swerved to the
right. The statement that the deceased touched the defendant with his
left hand seems very improbable, in view of the fact that the deceased
was sitting on the left side of the car, and Aurelio Lee was sitting
between the deceased and the defendant. The same witness testified
further as follows:

“P. Si es cierto que su compadre corria una velocidad de 12 a 15 millas por hora antes de llegar a aauel puente, ipor que habia necesidad de tener miedo solamente porque vio un coche en medio de aquel puente?

“Sr. RAMOS.	Objecion por ser vaga.
“JUZGADO.	Puede contestar.

“R. Yo me espante porque e1 seguia entrando por ese puente con una velocidad bastante.

“P.

Y por aquella actitud de su compadre, ousted se asusto y usted dijo: ‘Jesus Maria y Jose?

—

R.

Si, senor.”

Section 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, Act No. 3992,
effective January 1, 1933, provides that no person shall operate a
motor vehicle on any highway in these Islands recklessly or without
reasonable caution considering the width, traffic, grades, crossings,
curvatures, visibility and other conditions of the highway and to the
conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger the
property or the safety or rights of any person or so as to cause
excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway.

Section 67 (d) of the same Act provides that if, as the
result of negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving any
accident occurs resulting in death or serious bodily injury to any
person, the motor vehicle driver or operator at fault shall, upon
conviction be punished by imprisonment for not less than fifteen days
nor more than six years in the discretion of the court.

It is clear therefore that the acts of the defendant as alleged and
proved constitute a violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, and
that he should have been sentenced in accordance with section 67 (d)
thereof, because it supersedes the corresponding provision of the
Revised Penal Code with respect to the penalty in cases of accidents
resulting in death or serious bodily injury to any person as a
consequence of negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving.

The penalty of one year and one day imposed by the lower court is
not in accordance with article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides that when the death of a person shall be caused by imprudence
or negligence and with a violation of the Automobile Law, the defendant
shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum period, or from two years, four months, and one day to six years.

The next question is whether the defendant can be sentenced to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased and to suffer the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, in view of the fact that
the Revised Motor Vehicle Law contains no provision to that effect and
repeals “all other acts, or parts of acts1, contrary to the provisions
of this Act.”

Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, effective January 1, 1932, is as follows:

“Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this
Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary.”

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, and article 39
provides that if the convict has no property with which to meet the
reparation of the damage caused, he shall be subject to a subsidiary
personal liability at the rate of one day for each two pesos and fifty
centavos, subject to the rules given in said article for the imposition
of subsidiary imprisonment.

We are of the opinion therefore that although the Revised Motor
Vehicle Law, Act No. 3992, is a special law, the provisions of article
100 and article 39 of the Revised Penal Code are applicable to a person
found guilty of a violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, because
of the provision of article 10 of the Revised Penal Code that the Code
shall be supplementary to special laws under which offenses are
punishable, unless the latter shall specially provide the contrary, and
there is nothing to the contrary in the Revised Motor Vehicle Law.

A further reason for applying to the present case the general
provisions of the Revised Penal Code respecting indemnity and
subsidiary imprisonment for the non-payment thereof is that said
provisions were not affected by the approval of the Revised Motor
Vehicle Law.

In the case of the United States vs. Velazquez (33 Phil.,
368), promulgated February 1, 1916, it was contended that Act No. 1740,
under which the accused was convicted, did not authorize an indemnity
by way of restoration of the sum misappropriated. The Supreme Court
held that Act No. 1740, providing for the punishment of public officers
and employees who fail or refuse to account for public funds or
property or who make personal use of such funds or property, which
expressly repealed articles 390, 391, and 392 of the Penal Code in so
far as they might be in conflict with said Act, did not affect the
general principles embodied in articles 119, 120, and 121 of the Penal
Code. The right to indemnification in such cases was reaffirmed in the
United States vs. Lafuente (37 Phil., 671). In the case of the United
States vs. Ondaro (39 Phil., 70), the accused was found
guilty of embezzlement and, in addition to a prison sentence and a fine
was ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P34.90, or to
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

For the foregoing reasons, the appellant is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of not less than two years and not more than
four years of imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Eulogio Pabalan in the sum of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency which shall not exceed one-third of the principal
penalty, and to pay the costs. As thus modified, the decision appealed
from is affirmed.

Avancena, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Hull, Butte, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

---

IMPERIAL, J., :

I adhere to the conclusion reached by the majority opinion that the defendant is guilty of a violation of section 67 (d)
of Act No. 3992, known as Revised Motor Vehicle Law. I also concur in
the imprisonment penalty imposed upon the defendant. But I disagree as
to the additional imposition of the accessory penalty of
indemnification of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

The information was drafted and filed under the
provision of article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The facts, as
proven by the evidence, fall under the definitions and terms of both
the said article and section 67 (d) of the Revised Motor
Vehicle Law. The reason for applying the last named provision was
undoubtedly because the penalty so fixed is more favorable to the
defendant. The indemnity and the subsidiary imprisonment which are
imposed as additional accessory penalties are not authorized by the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law. Nevertheless, in applying them the provision
of article 10 of the Revised Penal Code is invoked. If the application
of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law was inspired by acts of benevolence
and because the penalty therein prescribed is more favorable to the
defendant, I am at a loss to understand why additional penalties
provided for in another Code should be imposed upon the defendant.

Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:

“ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code.—Offenses
which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide
the contrary.”

It is argued that under the terms of this article the additional
accessory penalties should be imposed. But, the undeniable fact that
the whole article refers only to special laws, is
disregarded. The Revised Motor Vehicle Law is not a special law; it is
a general law. A special law is one that relates to particular persons
or things of a class, as distinguished from a general law which applies
to all persons or things of a class. It could not be said that the
provisions of section 67 (d) of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law do not apply equally to all persons of a class who violate its terms. In State vs. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. (77 AJ;1. Rep., 433), the following was said:

“* * * A special law is one that relates to
particular persons or things of a class, as distinguished from a
general law which applies to all persons or things of a class. In
Baltimore City vs. AHegany County (99 Md., 1; 57 Atl, 632),
Judge Pearce said: In Cooley’g Constitutional Limitations, 165 note, it
is said: “The term ‘general’, when used in antithesis to ‘special/
means relating to ‘all’ of a class, instead of to persons only, of that
class.”‘ In the case of Schmalz vs. Wooley (56 N. J. Eq.,
649; 39 Atl., 539), the court said that where a statute ‘does not
relate to persons or things of a class, but to particular persons or
things of a class, it is a special, as contradistinguished from a
general law.’ And in 7 Words & Phrases, 6578, it is said: ‘Special
laws are those made for individual cases, or for less than a class
requiring laws to its peculiar conditions and circumstances. * * *'”

When the Philippine Legislature enacted the Revised Motor Vehicle
Law, which took effect on January 1, 1938, the Revised Penal Code was
already in force and if its intention was to apply accessory penalties
common to crimes defined by the latter Code express provision to that
effect should have been made. But, on the contrary, section 74 of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law expressly repealed all other acts or parts of
acts contrary to its provisions.

For the foregoing1 reasons, I believe that the aforesaid additional penalties should not have been imposed.

---

ABAD SANTOS, J.,

I agree with Justice Imperial that there is no legal warrant for
sentencing the appellant to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Eulogio
Pabalan in the sum of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. The imposition of such accessory penalty is not authorized
by Act No. 3992 under which the appellant has been sentenced. Neither
can it be justified, in my opinion, under article 10 of the Revised
Penal Code. The last sentence of said article which says, “This Code
shall be supplementary to such laws (special laws), unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary,” is too general and vague to
justify the imposition of additional penalty under article 39, in
relation with article 100, of the Code.

It is a well-settled rule of law that penal statutes should be
construed strictly in favor of the accused, and that any doubt arising
therefrom should be resolved in favor of the liberty of the citizen. In
the interpretation of article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, resort must
be had to the Spanish text thereof because it was the text finally
approved by the Legislature. The Spanish text uses the word
“supletorio”, which has been translated into English as
“supplementary”. “Supletorio” is defined in a standard Spanish
dictionary, Nuuevo Diccionario de la Lengua Castellxma, as follows:
“Supletorio. DIcese de lo que suple la falta de otra cosa.” Now, Act
No. 3992 is complete in itself. As far as the present case is
concerned, it has no “falta” or defect to be supplied. The effect of
the majority decision is not to supply any defect in Act No. 3992, but
to add something to it. This, I believe, is unjustified, especially
when it results in deprivation of the liberty of a citizen.