INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED ANTONIO ESCOBAR. THE BANK OP THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, ADMINISTRATOR. ESTATE OF THE DECEASED LUCIANA DE LOS SANTOS, REPRESENTED BY THE EXECUTOR JO…

VILLA-REAL J.:

This is an appeal taken by the claimant Maria
Luciano from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:

“Wherefore, the court declares that the only heir
of the deceased Antonio Escobar was his wife Luciana de los Santos, now
deceased, whom her heirs succeeded and whose testamentary proceedings
are likewise pending in this court, as above stated, and that neither
Maria Luciano nor Petrona Esguerra is entitled to participate in the
estate of the deceased Antonio Escobar.

“After this judgment becomes final, the entire
estate of the deceased Antonio Escobar shall, by operation of law, pass
to the testamentary estate of the deceased Luciana de los Santos. Let a
copy of this resolution be attached to the record of the testamentary
proceedings of the deceased Luciana de los Santos, civil case No. 43599.
So ordered.”

In support of her appeal, the appellant assigns the
following sole alleged error as committed by the court a quo in
its order to wit:

“The lower court erred in not recognizing and
declaring Maria Luciano as the sole legal heir of the deceased Antonio
Escobar and therefore entitled to the entire intestate estate of the
latter.”

The following facts proven at the trial, some by
stipulation of the parties and others by a preponderance of the
evidence, are necessary and pertinent to the resolution of the questions
raised in this appeal, to wit:

On January 1, 1837, a girl four days old, alleged to
be a natural daughter of Leon Escobar and Josefa Esguerra, was baptized
in the Ermita church and given the name of Tomasa Escobar (Exhibit
1-Maria Luciano).

Leon Escobar and Josefa Esguerra were married on
August 2, 1838 (Exhibit 1), and subsequently had legitimate children
named Antonio and Fortunato Escobar. With said spouses and their two
legitimate children lived Tomasa, Guia and Nicolas Escobar. All of them
called said spouses “tatay” (father) and “nanay” (mother), respectively.
Tomasa was called by the other children “manang” (a term accorded in
certain regions to the elder sister). Tomasa Escobar grew up and lived
under the care of the spouses Leon and Josefa Escobar until she married.
Said spouses supported her, treated and presented her as their
daughter, and she was publicly known as such. When Tomasa Escobar became
a widow, she went back to live with said spouses, together with her
only daughter, the herein claimant-appellant Maria Luciano who was born
on December 17, 1864 (Exhibit 4). Leon Escobar built a house for Tomasa
Escobar and her daughter and the two lived there. Leon Escobar visited
them in said house almost every day and sent his sons Antonio and
Fortunato to keep them company at night. Upon Tomasa Escobar’s death,
Leon Escobar took said Maria Luciano into his home until she married and
was taken by her husband to the province. Leon Escobar died on February
12, 1887 (Exhibit 2-Luciana de los Santos). When Fortunato Escobar
became ill, his brother Antonio Escobar asked Maria Luciano to come to
Manila to nurse him, sending her money for passage. Upon Fortunato
Escobar’s death, Antonio Escobar took Maria Luciano into his home where
she lived until Antonio’s death.

The claimant-appellant Maria Luciano claims to be
the legitimate niece of the deceased Antonio Escobar, alleging that she
is the legitimate daughter of Tomasa Escobar, a legitimated sister of
said deceased Antonio Escobar by the subsequent marriage of their
parents, and therefore the only heir to the estate of her said uncle.

First of all, it is necessary to determine whether
or not Tomasa Escobar was a natural daughter of the spouses Leon Escobar
and Josefa Esguerra, legitimated by subsequent marriage of the latter.

We have seen that Tomasa Escobar was born on
December 29, 1836, and her alleged parents Leon Escobar and Josefa
Esguerra were married on August 2, 1838, that is under the prior
legislation which is Law I, Title XIII* Partida IV. Her status as a
legitimated daughter should therefore be determined by said law which
reads as follows:

“Law I, Title XIII, Partida IV.—Moreover,
the children which a man has by a woman whom he keeps as a concubine
will be legitimate, if he marries her afterwards; for although children
of this kind are not legitimate when they are born, marriage has such
force that, as soon as the father and mother are married, the children
become for that reason, legitimate. This same rule applies where a man
has a child by his female slave and afterwards marries her; for marriage
has such extraordinary power that, as soon as this is done, the mother
becomes free, and the children legitimate, for this reason.”

It is a well-established doctrine, both in Spain and
iN the Philippines, interpreting Law 11 of Toro, that a child is
considered natural when at the time of its conception or birth its
parents could have married without dispensation and when the father has
expressly or tacitly acknowledged it. (Mijares vs.
Nery, 3 Phil., 195; Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 3 Phil., 697;
Capistrano vs. Estate of Gabino, 8 Phil., 135; De Gala vs.
De Gala, 42 Phil., 771; Larena and Larena vs. Rubio, 43 Phil.,
1017; Donado vs. Menendez Donado, 55 Phil., 861.)

The fact that before and after their marriage the
spouses Leon. Escobar and Josefa Esguerra had Tomasa Escobar with them
and their legitimate children; the fact that they supported her, took
care of her, and treated and presented her to society as their daughter,
and the fact that they built a house for her and her daughter, all show
that said spouses Leon Escobar and Josefa Esguerra acknowledged her as
their daughter. Pursuant to the provisions of Law 11 of Toro, cited
above, such acknowledgment, in addition to the freedom of her parents to
marry without dispensation at the time of her conception or birth, gave
Tomasa Escobar the status of a natural child of Leon Escobar and Josefa
Esguerra (Requejo vs. Rabalo, 34 Phil., 14), and according to
Law I, Title XIII, Partida IV, quoted abov$, the subsequent marriage of
the latter legitimated her(Cosio vs. Pili, 10 Phil., 72;
Requejo vs. Rabalo, supra.)

The question now arises whether or not the
claimantappellant Maria Luciano, as legitimate daughter, born under the
prior legislation, of Tomasa Escobar, a child legitimated by subsequent
marriage, is entitled to inherit from the intestate estate of a brother
of her mother who is a legits imate son of said Tomasa Escobar’s
parents, and who died on July 21, 1932, under the present law.

The twelfth transitory provision of the Civil Code
reads as follows:

“12. Rights to the inheritance of a person who may
have died, with or without a will, before this Code was in force, shall
be governed by the prior legislation. The inheritance Of those who died
after that time, with or without a will, shall be allotted and divided
in accordance with this Code, but in harmony, in so far as the latter
permits it, with the testamentary dispositions, therefore the legitimes,
betterments, and legacies shall be respected; but their amounts shall
be reduced when it is not possible in any other manner to give to each
participant in the inheritance the share pertaining to him, according to
this Code.”

According to the above quoted transitory provision,
inasmuch as Antonio Escobar died after the Civil Code took effect, his
inheritance should be allotted and divided in accordance with said Code.

Article 953 of the Civil Code provides that should
children of brothers or sisters exist, the surviving spouse shall,
concurrently with said children, be entitled to receive the part of the
inheritance in usufruct assigned him or her in article 837, that is,
one-half of the estate in usufruct. When Antonio Escobar died intestate
on July 21, 1932, his niece, the herein claimant-appellant Maria
Luciano, daughter of his sister legitimated by subsequent marriage of
their, parents, was entitled to inherit the full ownership of onehalf of
his estate and the naked ownership of the other half, the usufruct of
which belonged to the surviving spouse. However, the usufructuary right
of the widow Luciana de los Santos was extinguished upon her death which
took place on December 27, 1932 (article 513 of the Civil Code),
thereby consolidating the naked ownership with the usufruct of the other
half in the herein claimant-appellant Maria Luciano.

The court a quo, in rejecting the claim of
the claimantappellant Maria Luciano to the estate of her uncle Antonio
Escobar, based its opinion on article 943 of the Civil Code which
provides that “a natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab
intestate the legitimate children £nd relatives of the father or
mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so
inherit from the natural or legitimated child,” interpreting the word
“legitimated” to mean a child legitimated by royal concession as well as
one legitimated by subsequent marriage. Such interpretation could not
have been the intention of the legislator, inasmuch as article 122 of
said Code considers a child legitimated by subsequent marriage to be in
parity with a legitimate child and grants the former the same rights as
those of the latter, while article 127 of the same Code grants a child
legitimated by royal concession only those rights conferred upon
acknowledged natural children by article 134. If children legitimated by
subsequent marriage have the same rights as legitimate children, and
those legitimated by royal concession only have the same rights as
acknowledged natural children, the word “legitimated” employed in
article 943 et seq. of Section III, Chapter IV of Book Three of
the Civil Code, alternately with the word “natural”, with reference to
the hereditary portion to which the child of one class or another is
entitled, refers only to a child legitimated by royal concession and not
to one legitimated by subsequent marriage. Therefore, the provisions of
the above cited article 943 of the Civil Code are not applicable to the
herein claimant-appellant Maria Luciano, and the provisions of article,
953 of the same Code are the ones applicable to her.

In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of
the opinion and so hold: (1) That the continuous possession of the
status of a natural child, justified by direct acts of its parents and
their family under the legislation prior to the Civil Code, constitutes
tacit recognition of paternity (Law 11 of Toro); (2) that a child, who
has enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of natural child,
justified by direct acts of its parents and their family both before and
after their marriage which was celebrated under the prior legislation,
is considered as legitimated by subsequent marriage (Law I, Title XIII,
Partida IV); (3) that the legitimate daughter of a daughter legitimated
by subsequent marriage, now deceased, is entitled to inherit from a
brother of her mother who is a legitimate son of the same parents who
legitimated her mother by subsequent marriage, and who died after the
Civil Code took effect; and (4) that the word “legitimated” employed in
Section III, Chapter IV of Book Three of the Civil Code, refers to
children legitimated by royal concession and not to those legitimated by
subsequent marriage.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed and
the claimant-appellant Maria Luciano is declared to be the sole heir to
the intestate estate of Antonio Escobar, with the costs against the
appellee. So ordered.

Malcolm, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard,
JJ., concur.