G. R. No. 40945. August 15, 1934
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO ASTUDILLO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
VICKERS, J.:
“Antonio Astudillo is charged with estafa through falsification of commercial documents’ alleged to have been committed as follows:
” ‘That on or about the 27th day of May, 1933, in the City of Baguio,
Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the
above named accused did with intent to defraud and through
misrepresentation, voluntarily, maliciously and feloniously falsify,
issue and use Phil. National Bank Check No. 637030 by making it appear
in said check as if same had been properly drawn and issued by the
Manager and Treasurer of the Pangasinan Transportation Co. and indorsed
by Jose Ramos, when in truth and in fact said accused Antonio Astudillo
well knew that said manager and Treasurer of the Pangasinan
Transportation Co. and Jose Ramos did not issue or participate in the
making, issuing, signing and indorsing said check and by virtue of said
falsification, deceit and misrepresentation, said accused Antonio
Astudillo was able to cash, obtain and receive the amount of P250.75
which is the value of the check from one Ka Satoh of Baguio. The said
amount of P250.75 which is the face value put on the check was
appropriated by said accused Antonio Astudillo for his own use and
benefit to the prejudice of said Ka Satoh in the said amount of P250.75” ‘All contrary to law.’
“When this case was tried on October 24, 1933, the accused was assisted
by counsel. The trial was discontinued for the reason that some of the
important witnesses for the prosecution were absent. When the trial was
resumed today, the accused appeared alone and expressed his willingness
to plead guilty provided the minimum penalty be imposed on him. He
afterwards said that his attorney had told him to plead guilty if he
were found guilty by this court in another case (closely related to
this one) for malicious mischief.“It appears from the
evidence that the defendant came to Baguio from Manila on or about the
24th day of April, 1033, with Felix Valencia on a car belonging to the
latter ‘a father. Shortly after arriving here, the accused, thru the
driver of the car named Simeon Zamora, bought two tires from K. Satoh,
agent in Baguio for the Firestone Rubber Company, for P51 and gave a
check drawn on the Philippine National Bank for the sum of P250.75. The
check was accepted and the accused, through Zamora, received not only
the two tires but also the change in cash in the sum of P199.75. It
later turned out that the check was falsified.“This check
purported to have been issued by one Jose L. Klar as manager of the
Pangasinan Transportation Company in favor of one Jose Ramos and to
have been indorsed by the latter. Klar denied that he had issued that
check or that the signature appearing thereon was his. Ramos did not
testify as no return of the subpæna with respect to him had
been made up to the date of the trial. The testimony of Ramos was not
deemed necessary as the falsity of the check was admitted.“The only question presented for the consideration of the court is
whether Zamora received the check from Astudillo, the accused, and gave
the change to the latter. Upon this point there is the positive and
convincing testimony of both Simeon Zamora and Felix Valencia, which
tile defendant barely made any attempt to deny. Aside from this
testimony there is the fact that while Astudillo was under detention in
the city jail of Baguio for this offense, he detached from the record
of the case in the justice of the peace court the cheek which he was
accused of falsifying and concealed or destroyed it. Astudillo has been
charged with malicious mischief for this act and found guilty by this
court. The statements of the accused in the course of the trial
regarding his desire to plead guilty upon certain conditions is another
proof of his guilt. The accused, it may be noted, is an educated man
and according to his testimony, was formerly the publisher and editor
of the ‘Philippine Motor Review’.“The court therefore finds the defendant guilty of the complex crime of estafa
committed through the falsification of a commercial document and, in
accordance with article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, he is sentenced
to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11)-days of prision correccional,
with the accessories provided by law, to pay Ka Satoh the sum of
P250.75 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.”
Appellant’s attorney de oficio alleges that the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of estafa
by means of the falsification of a mercantile document, although not
all the facts constituting the crime alleged in the information were
proved.
It is the contention of the attorney for the defendant that the
automobile tires in question were, not used on the automobile of Felix
Valencia, jr., until he and the defendant had returned to Manila, and
that the testimony of Simeon Zamora and Felix Valencia, jr., is
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
delivered the check in question to Zamora to be cashed when he bought
the tires, or that the difference between the amount of the check and
the price of the tires was delivered to the defendant.
In our opinion the testimony of Zamora and Valencia duly proves
that the defendant ordered Simeon Zamora to buy two tires and gave him
the check in question to be cashed, and left him in front of the store
of Iwama; that Iwama did not have the tires, and suggested that Zamora
go to the store of Ka Satoh, the offended party; that Zamora bought the
tires in question for P51 from Satoh, delivered to him the check for
P250.75, and received in cash the difference between the amount of the
check and the cost of the tires, or P199.75; that the tires were
delivered to Zamora at the Vallejo Hotel, where the defendant and
Valencia were staying; that Valencia returned to the hotel ahead of the
defendant, and Zamora handed the P199.75 to Valencia, who delivered it
in turn to the defendant when he returned to the hotel.
The testimony of these witnesses is corroborated by the offer of
the defendant prior to and during the trial to plead guilty to a charge
of simple estafa.
The only difficulty which the case presents is whether or not the
evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction of the defendant for
the falsification of the check in question. We are constrained to think
that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain that finding. The check
in question, No. 637030 of the Philippine National Bank, purported to
be issued by Jose L. Klar as manager of the Pangasinan Transportation
Company in favor of Jose Ramos. Jose L. Klar testified that no such
check had been issued by him, and that his company was not using checks
of that series. Jose Ramos, in whose favor the check was drawn, and by
whom the check purported to be indorsed, was not presented as a witness.
No evidence was presented to prove that the check in question was
in the handwriting of the defendant. The check could not be exhibited
at the trial, because it disappeared from the record while the case was
pending in the justice of the peace court.
The Solicitor-General states in his brief that according to the
testimony of Jose L. Klar the defendant obtained the check book, from
which the check in question was taken, from the Philippine National
Bank by falsifying the signature of Klar and by ordering a seal similar
to that of the Pangasinan Transportation Co., and argues that this
testimony, coupled with the fact that the defendant cashed the forged
check, is sufficient proof of his guilt of the forgery. An examination
of the record, however, does not seem to bear out this statement. It
appears that the check in question was not included among the checks to
which Klar was referring. His testimony related to certain forged
checks amounting to a little more than P800 which were charged to the
current account of the Pangasinan Transportation Company with the
Philippine National Bank. It was then found that said checks had not
been issued by the Pangasinan Transportation Company. When the check in
question was described to the witness, he stated that he had never seen
it; that the amount thereof had not been deducted from the current
account of the Pangasinan Transportation Company; and ‘that he had
never heard of the check in question until he was subpoenaed as a
witness in this case (pp. 7 and 8, steno. record).
The Solicitor-General cites in support of his contention People vs. De Lara (45 Phil., 754) and People vs.
Domingo (49 Phil., 28). The facts of those two cases are materially
different from the facts of the present case, and the decisions in
those cases are not controlling in the case at bar.
In the De Lara case a forged check, dated April 5, 1923 and drawn
to the order of J. U. Lim for P8,750, and another on April 6 for
P5,600, and a third on April 12 for P9,800, were presented to the bank
by the defendant on the respective dates of issue, and the amount
thereof paid by the bank to the defendant on the purported indorsements
of the checks by J. U. Lim to the defendant. The defendant admitted the
receipt of all the money evidenced by the forged checks, and as a
defense said that he was in the employ of J. U. Lim, who indorsed and
gave the checks to him personally, with the instructions to cash them
at the bank, and that he either delivered the money to Lim personally
or to one Suaco upon the written order of Lim.
Rejecting defendant’s explanation as unworthy of credit, this court
held that the facts brought the case within the rule laid down in the
case of the United States vs. Castillo (6 Phil., 453, 455), where it was said:
“For the purposes of this case it is not necessary
to hold, and we do not hold, that the mere fact that the accused
uttered the check in question is proof of the fact that he also forged
it or caused it to be forged, but we do hold that the utterance of such
an instrument, when unexplained, is strong evidence tending to
establish the fact that the uttered either himself forged the
instrument or caused it to be forged, and that this evidence, taken
together with the further evidence set out above and brought out on the
trial of the case, establishes the guilt of the accused of the crime
with which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The evidence in the Castillo case showed that the blank upon which
the forged check was written was stolen from a book of blank checks
between the hours of 12 noon on the 1st of December, 1903 and 11 a. m.
of the 2d of December, 1903 when the check was presented for payment;
that this blank check book was kept in a drawer in the office of James
J. Watkins, by whom the check was purported to be drawn, and that the
defendant was one of three clerks employed by Watkins in his office;
that the defendant was in the office on the evening of December 1st,
and that he locked the office after all the other clerks had gone. The
defendant testified that he had never seen the forged check prior to
the trial; that he was not at the business place of Lim Ponso, who
cashed the check on December 2, 1903; and that he never received the
proceeds of the check. The trial court found, however, that defendant’s
statements were false, and convicted him of knowingly using with intent
to gain a falsified mercantile document, but this court reversed the
judgment and convicted the appellant of the crime of falsification of a
mercantile instrument.
In the Domingo case it appears that under the pretext of trying to
find a purchaser for a fishpond belonging to the estates of two
deceased sisters, the defendant obtained from the administrator the
possession of the certificate of title on the condition that she should
return it the next day. She failed to return the certificate, and
shortly afterwards a deed of sale of the fishpond was executed by two
women that represented themselves to be the registered owners. The
forged deed and the certificate of title were presented to the register
of deeds, who cancelled the original certificate of title and issued a
new certificate in the name of the vendee. At the trial the defendant
denied having received the original certificate of title from the
administrator and offered no further explanation. This court held that
the evidence was conclusive that the defendant had obtained possession
of the certificate as alleged in the information; that the crime could
not have been committed if the perpetrators had not been in possession
of the certificate of title; that not having offered any explanation as
to what she did with the certificate, the position of the appellant was
analogous to that of a person who immediately after a larceny has been
committed is found in possession of the stolen goods and offers no
explanation; and that the possession of the certificate of title being
one of the necessary means of committing the crime in question, she was
guilty as principal.
In the present case the defendant denied having the forged check in
his possession, and as the testimony of Jose L. Klar does not refer to
the check in question, there is nothing in the record to show how the
defendant obtained possession of the check.
The defendant undoubtedly knew the check in question to be false.
If he had believed it to be authentic, he would not have destroyed it
after the complaint was filed, as the evidence shows he did, or denied
ever having it in his possession.
Is the fact that the accused uttered the check in question, knowing
it to be false, proof that he forged it or caused it to be forged? We
think it is not. The decisions cited do not go that far, and this is
the answer given in Wharton’s Criminal Law (vol. 1, par. 726), where it
is said:
“Does the uttering of a forged instrument by a
particular person justify a jury in convicting such a person of
forgeryP This question, if nakedly put, must, like the kindred one as
to the proof of larceny by evidence of possession of stolen goods, be
answered in the negative. The defendant is presumed to be innocent
until otherwise proved. In larceny this presumption is overcome by
proof that the possession is so recent that it becomes difficult to
conceive how the defendant could have got the property without being in
some way concerned in the stealing. So it is with the uttering. The
uttering may be so closely connected in time with the forging, the
utterer may be proved to have such capacity for forging, or such close
connection with the forgers that it becomes, when so accomplished,
probable proof of complicity in the forgery.”
In the Castillo case the uttering was so closely connected in time
with the forging, and the utterer was proved to have such capacity for
forging as to constitute probable proof of complicity in the forgery.
The forgery in the Domingo case could not have been accomplished
without making use of the certificate of title that was in the
possession of the defendant.
In the De Lara case, although some of the language used might lead
one to believe that the writer of the opinion regarded the mere
uttering of the forged checks as proof of their falsification, the
conviction of the defendant does not rest upon that fact alone, because
at least one of the circumstances mentioned by Wharton as constituting
probable proof of the utterer’s complicity in the forgery was present.
The uttering was closely connected in time with the forging. The
application for the check book was received by the Philippine National
Bank on April 3d. The checks, which were issued on April 5th, 6th, and
12th, and purported to be indorsed by the payee to the defendant, were
promptly cashed by the defendant at the bank. This court found that the
defendant had confederates, and that one of them was an employee of the
bank.
The defendant claimed that he was employed by J. U. Lim, the person
in whose favor the checks were drawn; that Lim, who was staying at the
Hotel de France in Manila, delivered the checks to him, with
instructions to cash them and bring back the money. If that be true, it
shows that the defendant had a close connection with the forger of the
checks, if not an opportunity of forging them himself.
In the case at bar none of the circumstances mentioned by Wharton
as showing the utterer’s complicity in the forgery is present. As
already pointed out, the evidence does not show how or when the
defendant came into the possession of the check in question, the date
of which was not alleged in the information or proved at the trial.
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:
“Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents.—The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
“1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications
enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official
document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial
document; and“2. Any person who, to the damage of a third
party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private
document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next
preceding article.“Any person who shall knowingly introduce
in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or
who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false
documents embraced in the next preceding article or in any of the
foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the
penalty next lower in degree.”
The acts of the defendant constitute a violation of the second
paragraph under No. 2 of the foregoing article, because the defendant
knowingly made use of the false document in question to the damage of
the offended party. The penalty applicable to the offense committed by
the defendant is arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correccional
in its minimum degree, and there being present no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance the defendant is sentenced to suffer one year
and 8 months of prision correccional, and to indemnify the
offended party in the sum of P250.75, with the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and in accordance with Act No. 4103
the minimum sentence of the defendant is fixed at four months of arresto mayor.
As thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.
Avancena, C. J., Street, Abad Santos, and Diaz, JJ., concur.