THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ANDRES SANTOS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The appellant was charged in the justice
of the peace court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, with the crime’ of rape upon
the person of Rosa Liwanag, a girl about thirteen years old. The
complaint was subscribed and sworn to by Maria Calma, the mother of the
offended girl. After making the corresponding preliminary
investigation, the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the Court
of First Instance, where the provincial fiscal filed an information
charging the appellant with rape through forcible abduction, committed
as follows:

“That on or about the 13th day of August,
1932, in the municipality of Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine
Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the abovenamed
accused Andres Santos did by means of force and intimidation and with
lewd designs take Rosa Liwanag against her will, a virgin of good
reputation, from the control of her parents, and did, by means of force
and intimidation and with intent to have sexual intercourse,
voluntarily, maliciously, illegally and criminally embrace, kiss and
drag down on the floor said Rosa Liwanag, put himself on her top and
introduce his penis into her genital organ against her will.”

When he was arraigned, the appellant pleaded not guilty.

After reviewing the evidence, the trial judge said:

“No obstante lo que antecede, el Juzgado no esta
del todo convencido de que sin su consentimiento Rosa Liwanag fuo
llevada en automovil por el acusado a la casa de Benita PeYez. Es
posible que al principio el acusado haya tenido que valerse de fuerza y
amenaza para conseguir llevarla en automovil a la casa de Benita Perez.
Pero, si ella en todo tiempo jamas consintio, ipor que, habiendo pasado
por las calles principales de numerosa concurrencia y de trailed
continuo, ella no gritd o dio senates para atraer la atencion de los
transeuntes? El miedo no era obstaculo para ello. La gente hubiera
impedido al acusado hacer dafio a Rosa Liwanag. Igualmente, el Juzgado
se resiste a creer que Rosa Liwanag fue violada, porque, de ser cierto
este hecho, no se comprende por quo ella, en las veces en que el
acusado la dejo en la casa de Benita Perez, no se quejd del ultraje de
que habia sido objeto. Si bien es verdad que ella declaro que el
acusado habia amenazado con matarla, si reVelaba a Benita Perez lo que
el la habia hecho en la cabana deshabitada en Santo Cristo, es, sin
embargo, bastante extraordinario el que tal ultraje hubiese ocurrido
sin la menor queja de su parte por espacio de tres o cuatro dias en que
estuvo en la casa de Benita Perez. Se la examino el 19 de agosto de
1932, y lo que se hallo en la vagina demuestra la penetracion no
violenta de un pene.

“El conjunto de las pruebas convence al
Juzgado de que el acusado cometio el delito de rapto con anuencia
envuelto en la querella y no el delito complejo de rapto con violacion,
pues, el Juzgado es de opinion que, si bien hubo fuerza o intimidacion
al comienzo del rapto, la ofendida consintio despues a ello (E. U. contra
Yumul, 34 Jur. Fil., 180), asi como a los accesos carnales que tuvo en
la cabana deshabitada a donde ella fue llevada por el acusado.

“La denuncia presentada por la madre de la ofendida (Exhibit B) es por
violacion. Despues de la investigacion preliminar, el Juzgado de Paz
del Municipio de Gapan, Nueva Ecija, hallo causa probable de que el
delito cometido por el acusado era rapto con violacion. El Fiscal
Provincial de Nueva JScija presento querella por rapto con violacion.

“El Juzgado es de opinidn que la denuncia (Exhibit B) confirio
competencia al Juzgado para conocer de la querella y condenar al
acusado, de acuerdo con las pruebas, por el delito querellado o
cualquier delito envuelto en la mencionada querella. El hecho de que no
hubo denuncia por el delito de rapto ya con violencia ya con anuencia
no es obice para que el Juzgado pueda condenar al acusado por el delito
resultante, siempre que este estuviese envuelto en la querella. La
competencia que la denuncia (Exhibit B) confirid al Tribunal desde su
presentation era completa.”

The lower court found the appellant guilty of abduction with
consent and sentenced him to suffer one year, eight months, arid
twenty-one days of prision correccional, to indemnify the
offended party in the sum of P500 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, to support the offspring, if any, and to pay the costs.

The attorney for the appellant makes the following assignments of error:

“I. El Juzgado incurrid en error al apreciar y
conceder valor probatorio a las declaraciones de la supuesta ofendida
Rosa Liwanag y de su testigo Benita Perez, no obstante las
inverosimilitudes que contienen y las graves contradicciones que se
notan en ellas.

“II. Incurrid tambien en error al declarar
al acusado culpable del delito de rapto con anuencia, basandose en las
mismas pruebas de la acusacidn que, en opinidn del mismo Juzgado, no
eran dignas de credito para sostener la acusacidn por rapto con
violacidn, por sus inverosimilitudes e incongruencias.

“III.
El Juzgado incurrid tambien en error al no apreciar como ciertos y
verdaderos los hechos declarados por los testigos de la defensa.

“IV. Incurrid asimismo en error al no declarar que el procesamiento.de!
aqui acusado se debid simplemente a una trama urdida contra 61 por
sentimientos de venganza.

“V. Incurrid tambien en error al condenar al acusado por el delito de
rapto con anuencia no obstante la ausencia completa de toda prueba
sobre la honradez o buena reputation de la ofendida Rosa Liwanag.

“Incurrio, por ultimo, en error al no absolver libremente al acusado de la querella contra el presentada.”

In our view of the case we do not find it necessary to discuss the
different assignments of error or to review the evidence in detail. In
his brief the Solicitor-General expresses the opinion that although it
clearly appears from the evidence that Rosa Liwanag was forcibly
abducted by the defendant, who through force and intimidation had
carnal knowledge of her, he cannot be held guilty of and sentenced for
the crime of abduction with or without her consent, because under the
provisions of paragraph 3 of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness cannot
be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or
her parents; that in the case at bar the complaint filed by Maria
Calma, the mother of the offended girl, describes only the offense of
simple rape; that there is nothing in the allegations contained therein
from which it may be deduced that abduction is also charged; that the
information filed by the provincial fiscal charging the defendant with
forcible abduction with rape did not confer jurisdiction upon the court
of the offense of abduction. The Solicitor-General vigorously contends,
however, that the evidence shows the defendant to be guilty of rape,
and recommends that he be sentenced accordingly.

We entirely agree with the Solicitor-General that the filing of the
complaint for rape against the defendant in the justice of the peace
court did not confer any jurisdiction upon the court to try and
sentence the appellant for abduction. The trial judge was of the
opinion that the complaint filed by the mother of the offended girl
conferred jurisdiction upon the lower court to try and to sentence the
defendant, in accordance with the evidence, for the crime charged in
the information or any crime included therein; that the fact that
abduction was not charged in the complaint did not prevent the trial
court from condemning the defendant for that crime, provided said crime
was included in the information; that the jurisdiction conferred upon
the court by the complaint was full and complete. No authority is cited
in support of this opinion of the trial judge, and it is manifestly
contrary to the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code.

The complaint, from which the jurisdiction of the lower court was derived, reads as follows:

“DENUNCIA

“Maria Calma, habiendo prestado el debido juramento
que exige la Ley, declara: Que acusa a Andres Santos del delito de
violacion cometido como sigue:

“Que en o hacia el dia 13 de
agosto de 1932 en el Municipio de Gapan, Provincia de Nueva ficija, y
dentro de la jurisdiccidn de este Juzgado, el referido acusado,
voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente y usando f uerza, violencia e
intimidacion, yacio a Rosa Liwanag nina de 13 anos de edad contra la
voluntad de la misma.

“Hecho cometido con infraccion de la Ley.

	“MARIA (Thumb mark) CALMA
		“Denunciante

“Suscrita y jurada ante mi hoy 20 de agosto de ‘1932.

(Firmado)	“PANFILO B. MORALES
		“Juez de Paz”

It is clear that abduction is not included therein. As the
Solicitor-General well says, there is nothing in the allegations
thereof from which it may be deduced that abduction was also charged.
Our conclusion is that the lower court had no jurisdiction to try and
sentence the appellant for the crime of abduction with consent. We
might add, however, that in our opinion the offense committed was
correctly found by the lower court to be abduction with consent.

With respect to the contention of the Solicitor-General that the
appellant is guilty of rape, we are agreed that the evidence falls far
short of proving the appellant guilty of that charge. As already
indicated, we agree with the trial judge that it was with the consent
of the offended girl that she was taken to the house of Benita Perez,
where she remained for five days. We think she remained there
voluntarily. We cannot believe that the alleged threats of the
appellant were sufficient to prevent her from making any attempt to
escape, taking into consideration the location of this house, not far
from a public school, and the fact that the offended girl was not
prevented by Benita Perez or any one else during the day, when the
appellant was absent, from leaving that house and going home. When the
appellant took the offended girl away from the house of Benita Perez
each evening for the purpose of having carnal intercourse with her, it
does not appear that the offended party refused to go with the
appellant or offered any resistance, or invoked the help of Benita
Perez or the latter’s daughter.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the lower court, finding
the appellant guilty of abduction with consent, is set aside and the
case is dismissed, with the costs de oficio, without
prejudice to the filing by the offended party or her mother of a
complaint for abduction with consent, because the appellant has not
been placed in jeopardy for that offense on a valid complaint.

Street, Abad Santos, Hull, and Diaz, JJ., concur.