THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CELERINO COLOCAR, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the following decision of Judge Serviliano Platon in the Court of First Instance of Mindoro:

“Esta acusado Celerino Colocar del delito de incendio cometido, segun la querella enmendada, como sigue:

” ‘The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Celerino Colocar of the crime of arson, committed as follows:

” ‘That on or about the 2d day of May, 1933, in the municipality of
Calapan, Province of Mindoro, Philippine Islands, and within the
jurisdiction of this court, the said accused, did wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously set fire to a fish-net and a banca, belonging to
Mauricio Ahorro, thereby destroying the said fish-net, valued at three
hundred fifty pesos (P350), and partially damaging the banca to the
amount of thirty pesos (P30).

” ‘Contrary to article 322,
paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, and with the aggravating
circumstance No. 10 of article 14 of said Code, because the defendant
has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches a
greater penalty.’

“Son hechos probados por la acusacion que,
a eso de la una de la madrugada del 2 de mayo de 1933, Pacifico Inato
desde la playa vio que se estaba quemando un chinchorro colocado en una
banca que estaba en el mar cerca de la playa, inmediatamente con un flashlight alumbrf enfocando a la persona que se hallaba en dicha banca quien, asustada por la luz del flashlight,
dio media vuelta, miro en direccion a 61 y reconocio que aquella
persona era el acusado, el cual por el susto se echo a correr, pasando
por la proa de la banca. Pacifico, creyendo que el chinchorro y la
banca que se quemaban eran de su comadre se hacia dicha banca y al ver
que no son de su comadre, y temiendo que se le imputara que fue 41
quien los quemo, se retird a su casa. En la misma hora de la una,
Estanislao Acha y Francisco Avenilla, remeros y Pescadores de Mauricio
Ahorro quienes, por orden de este, durmieron en la playa, se
despertaron y vieron que se estaba quemando el chinchorro y, al
dirigirse ambos a la banca para apagar el fuego, encontraron al acusado
que caminaba apresuradamente, prooedente de la banca. Acha y Avenilla,
despues de haber apagado el fuego, avisaron a Mauricio Ahorro, dueno de
dichos chinchorro y banca que se habian quemado.

“No es
objeto de discusion ni controversia que la banca fue parcialmente
destrufda por el fuego como el chinchorro, y el valor de los danos
causados a dicha banca y chinchorro ge han estimado en P880.

“El acusado niega haber quemado el chinchorro y la banca; que desde las
9.30 de la noche se puso a dormir y no bajo de su casa en toda la
noche; que no es cierto que Francisco Avenilla habia dormido en la
playa, pues este, en la noche de autos estaba tan borracho que quedo
dormido al lado de la casa de Meliton y desde alli fue llevado a su
casa a las 10, y a eso de las 5 de la manana segufa durmiendo aun; que
Pacifico Inato en la noche de autos estaba enfermo, pues estaba
imposibilitado a caminar por tener bus pies hinchados.

“Esta
defensa de coartada interpuesta por el acusado no desvirtua ni enerva
las declaraciones terminantes de loa testigos de la acusacion que
vieron al acusado salir casi corriendo de la banca donde estaba el
chinchorro que, coma se ha dicho, se habia quemado. El movil que indujo
al acusado a quemar el chinchorro como la banca se debe a que Mauricio
Ahorro dijo a Eulogio Mendoza que dicho acusado dejaba de ser encargado
del chinchorro, hecho que le disgusto tanto que dicho acusado dijo
ademas que hasta bub hijos dejarian de ser Pescadores de dicho Ahorro.

“El hecho enjuiciado es constitutivo del delito de incendio previsto y
penado en el parrafo 3.° del artfculo 322 del Codigo Penal Revisado.

“Por tanto, el Juzgado declara al acusado Celerino Colocar culpable
fuera de toda duda racional del delito de que se le acusa y le condena
a dos (2) anos, once (11) meses y once (11) dias de prision
correctional, a indemnizar al ofendido en la cantidad de P380,
sufriendo en caso de insolvencia la prision subsidiaria
correspondiente, a las accesorias de ley y al pago de las costas
procesales.”

Appellant’s attorney makes the following assignments of error:

“I. The trial court erred in giving full credit to
the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, particularly
those of Pacifico Inato and Estanislao Acha.

“II. The trial
court erred in finding that ft has been proven that the appellant was
the one who set fire to the fish-net and the banca of Mauricio Ahorro.

“III. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the
crime charged against him in the complaint, and in sentencing him to
suffer two years, eleven months, and eleven days of prision correccional.”

The errors assigned raise only questions of fact depending on the
credibility of the witnesses, and after reading their testimony, we
find no reason for disturbing the findings of the trial judge.

The offense committed by the defendant is punished by article 322, No. 3, of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional
in its minimum and medium periods, the damage being more than P200 but
not more than Pl,000. The penalty imposed by the trial judge was the
minimum of the maximum degree, but it does not appear from the decision
what aggravating circumstance was taken into account. The evidence
shows that the defendant took advantage of the nighttime to set fire to
the fish-net and banca.

It was alleged in the amended information that the crime was
committed with the aggravating circumstance No. 10 of article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code, because the defendant had been previously punished
for an offense to which the law attaches a greater penalty. It was
proved at the trial that the defendant was convicted of robbery on
November 28,1916, and was sentenced to suffer three years, six months,
and twenty-one days of presidio correccional and to indemnify
the offended party in the sum of P100, and that on appeal to this court
he was sentenced on October 6, 1917 to suffer three years, six months,
and twenty days of presidio correccional and to indemnify the
offended party in the sum of P100. Robbery and arson are both included
in Title X of the Revised Penal Code, and they were included in the
same title in the Penal Code, both being crimes against property. The
accused was therefore a recidivist, because at the time of his trial in
the present case he had been previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code.

The Solicitor-General states in his brief that the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism must be considered, and although the penalty
imposed by the lower court is justified by reason of the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, we deem it advisable to consider the
question of whether or not the recidivism of the appellant should be
taken into account, in view of the fact that his conviction for robbery
took place sixteen years prior to the trial of the present case.

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal
liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict, the
service of the sentence, amnesty, absolute pardon, prescription of the
crime, prescription of the penalty, and by the marriage of the offended
woman, as provided in article 344 of the Code.

Article 90 provides that crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall
prescribe in twenty years; those punishable by other afflictive
penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years; those punishable by a
correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years, with the exception
of those punishable by arresto rnayor, which shall prescribe
in five years; that the crime of libel or other similar offenses shall
prescribe in two years, the offenses of oral defamation and slander by
deed in six months, and light offenses in two months; that when the
penalty fixed by law is a compound one the highest penalty shall be
made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first,
second and third paragraphs of this article.

It is suggested that in view of the foregoing provisions of law the
former conviction of the accused, which took place sixteen years prior
to the trial of the present case, should not be taken into
consideration as an aggravating circumstance. We cannot admit the force
of this argument. It is true that if the accused had not been
prosecuted for robbery within ten years from the date when the crime
was committed, it would have prescribed, but he was prosecuted within
that period and convicted, and we do not find anything in the law which
authorizes us to disregard that fact. Until the Legislature provides
otherwise, recidivism must be taken into account as an aggravating
circumstance, no matter how many years have intervened.

The corresponding provision of the Penal Code in force in Spain, as
amended by the Royal Decree of November 14, 1925, relating to
recidivism, is quite different from the Revised Penal Code. It reads as
follows: “Hay reincidencia cuando al ser juzgado un culpable por un
delito estuviere ejecutoriamente condenado por otro comprendido en el
mismo titulo de este Codigo o en la misma ley especial, siempre que la
pena seiialada al delito castigado anteriormente sea superior o igual a
la que este asignada al delito que se pena o, por lo menos, contenga
aqu&la alguno de los grados integrantes de esta.

“Los efectos de la reincidencia, como circunstancia
agravante, cesaran cuando haya pasado el tiempo necesario para la
prescripcion del delito que sirva para apreciarla.

“En
ningtin caso se estimara la circunstancia agravante de reincidencia
cuando el reo haya delinquido antes de cumplir diez y seis afios; y
nunca podran ser apreciadas como determinantes de reincidencia, cuando
se trate de reos mayores de diez y seis afios, las condenas que les
haya sido impuestas por delitos cometidos antes de cumplir dicha edad.”
(2 Viada [5th ed.], 292.)

It is expressly provided in the Spanish law, as amended, that the
effects of recidivism as an aggravating circumstance shall cease when
the time necessary for the prescription of the crime has elapsed.

Article 62, No. 5, relating to habitual delinquency, provides that
for the purposes of this article a person shall be deemed to be a
habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of
his release or last conviction of the crimes of robo, hurto, estafa, or falsificacion, he
is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener. It is
suggested that by analogy a prior conviction should not be regarded as
an aggravating circumstance unless the second conviction takes place
within ten years from the date of the first conviction. This contention
is untenable. In the provision quoted relating to habitual delinquency
the period of ten years is fixed by the law itself, and the penalty for
habitual delinquency in the case of the four crimes specified in the
law is an additional penalty. This court has held in the case of People
vs. Melendrez (59 Phil., 154), that in the case of said crimes
recidivism is to be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance
in fixing the principal penalty, although the prior convictions of the
accused make him a habitual delinquent.

Finally, it may be observed that even if this were a case of reiteracion under
No. 10 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the
information, the present Code does not authorize us to disregard the
former conviction, because the second paragraph of the corresponding
provision in the Penal Code (article 10, No. 17), providing that this
circumstance shall be taken into consideration by the courts according
to the circumstances of the offender and the nature and effects of the
crime, has not been included in the Revised Penal Code.

The defendant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of not less than six months of arresto mayor and not more than two years, eleven months, and eleven days of prision correccional,
and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P380, with the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. As thus
modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs
against the appellant.

Street, Hull, Butte, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

AVANCENA, C. J., dissenting in part:

I do not agree with the majority opinion in so far as it holds that
recidivism is an aggravating circumstance. Between the appellant’s
trial for the crime with which he is now charged and his previous
conviction, 16 years have intervened.

Article 14, subsections 9 and 10, of the Revised Penal Code,
relative to recidivism and previous conviction, is a reproduction of
article 10, subsections 17 and 18 of the old Penal Code, and both are
taken from article 10, subsections 17 and 18 of the Penal Code which
was in force in Spain prior to the year 1925. In a decision of April
28, 1896, the Supreme Court of Spain, interpreting this article with
reference to previous conviction, in a case where the intervening
period between the trial of the last crime and the previous conviction
was ten years, declared, among other grounds, that the aggravating
circumstance of previous conviction should not be taken into
consideration for the reason that it increases the penalty for the new
crime in consideration of a certain moral and legal relation of the
latter to the former, which shows criminal propensities or greater
perversion, and in the said case the time intervening between the two
offenses was considered so long that it cuts or interrupts such
relation.

In the year 1925, the above stated article was “by royal decree
amended in Spain, by providing that the circumstances of recidivism and
previous conviction shall not be taken into consideration in cases
where the time necessary for the prescription of the offense, and upon
which said circumstances are based, shall have intervened between the
previous conviction and the last crime charged. With such amendment, it
is noted that the said legislative act ratified the aforesaid
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Spain and furthermore definitely
established the length of time which cuts and interrupts the relation
between the previous conviction and the crime charged.

The said amendment was not adopted in the Revised Penal Code.
However, the same criterion which inspired such amendment is disclosed
in the Revised Penal Code which, in penalizing habitual delinquency
(article 62, subsection 5), requires and fixes at not more than 10 yean
the intervening period between the previous conviction and the crime
charged. However, at all events, in the absence of an express provision
fixing such period, at least there is the doctrine that, with respect
to previous conviction, 10 years is sufficient to interrupt and cut the
relation between both crimes.

MALCOLM, VILLA-REAL, ABAD SANTOS and IMPERIAL, JJ.:

We concur in the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice.