G. R. No. 40846. September 01, 1934

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JOAQUIN QUESADA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions September 1, 1934 VICKERS, J.:
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VICKERS, J.:


On February 20, 1933 the appellant was charged in the Court of First Instance with the crime of estafa, committed as follows:

“That on or about the 3rd day of December, 1932, in
the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously issue, make and deliver
check No. D-641074 drawn against the Bank of the Philippine Islands in
the amount of five hundred pesos (P500) and postdated December 7, 1932,
in favor of one Marcelino Julio, for valuable consideration; that upon
presentation of the said check for payment in said bank on the date
appearing thereon, the same was dishonored for the reason that he had
no funds therein to cover the amount thereof, his account having been
previously closed, a fact which he did not disclose to the said
Marcelino Julio at the time of issuing or delivering the said check, to
the damage and prejudice of the latter in the said amount of P500.”

He pleaded not guilty. Upon the termination of the trial he was
found guilty as charged and sentenced to suffer one year and one day of
prision correccional, and to pay the offended party (pagar a
la ofendida) the sum of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The attorney for the appellant contends that the lower court erred
in finding that the accused-appellant issued a postdated check in
payment of an obligation, knowing that he did not have funds in the
bank, without informing the seller of the land involved herein of such
circumstances, and in convicting the accused-appellant.

It appears from the evidence that in Manila on December 3, 1932
Raymunda Garganilla agreed to sell to the defendant a parcel of
registered land in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, for P500, and executed and
delivered to the defendant the corresponding deed of sale, together
with the owner’s duplicate certificate of title; that at the instance
of the defendant the consideration was stated in the deed as P1,000. On
the same date the defendant issued and delivered to Raymunda Garganilla
a check on the Bank of the Philippine Islands for P500, which at her
request was made payable to her nephew, Marcelino Julio, who was
present at the time of the transaction. The check was presented to the
bank about December 14th, but payment was refused because defendant’s
account had been closed. In the meantime the defendant had left Manila
for the provinces, and the purchase price of the land was never paid by
him.

On or about July 24, 1933, subsequent to the beginning of the
present case, the defendant filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, alleging that the certificate of title
delivered to him had been destroyed in a fire on July 3, 1933, and
praying that a new certificate of title be issued in the name of
Raymunda Garganilla. This petition was denied.

Raymunda Garganilla retained possession of the land, and shortly
prior to the trial of the present case the defendant returned to her
the deed of conveyance in his favor.

An employee of the Bank of the Philippine Islands was presented as
a witness. After he had identified the check in question, the attorney
for the defendant stated he was ready to agree that the accused did not
have any account with the bank on the date when the check was issued,
but when the accused was asked to make an admission to this effect, he
stated that he admitted that on December 7, 1933, his account with the
Bank of the Philippine Islands had already been closed. The fiscal was
satisfied with this admission, and the witness was excused. It is clear
that this statement does not amount to an admission that the defendant
did not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the check when he
issued it, but that may be inferred from his testimony.

Raymunda Garganilla was not called as a witness, and it will be
noted that she is not mentioned in the information, although the real
party in interest.

The contention of the appellant is that it was agreed between him
and Raymunda Garganilla that the check would not be presented to the
bank for payment until the deed was registered in the office of the
register of deeds, and that he would then make a deposit in the bank to
cover the check; that he presented the deed and the duplicate
certificate of title to the register of deeds of Nueva Ecija about
December 4th, but for reasons unknown to him the register of deeds
refused to register the deed and returned the documents to him; that he
then went to the provinces and could not return the deed and the
certificate of title to the vendor.

Marcelino Julio testified that he did not know that the check was
postdated when it was delivered to him and his aunt by the accused on
December 3, 1932, but that in the lawyer’s office on the same occasion
when the sale was made they noticed that it was postdated; that nothing
was done about it because the check was retained by Attorney Quilon,
who claimed a part of the sum represented by the check. Julio stated
that it was agreed by the parties that the deed should be registered
before the check should be cashed; that the deed should be registered
on December 7, 1982, but that it was never registered; that Raymunda
Garganilla retained possession of the land.

The register of deeds of Nueva Ecija was not called as a witness,
and we do not know for what reason he refused to register the deed, if
it was in fact presented to him, as claimed by the defendant.

Raymunda Garganilla retained possession of the land, and the deed
was not registered. The amount of damage, if any, sustained by her is
not shown. The most that could be said is that she was disturbed in her
property rights.

Whether the defendant did or did not inform Raymunda Garganilla and
Marcelino Julio when he issued the check that he did not have
sufficient funds in the bank to cover the check, the testimony of Julio
shows that it was agreed that the check should not be presented for
payment until December 7, 1932, in order to give the defendant an
opportunity to secure the registration of the deed. So far as the
record shows, the defendant presented the deed for registration about
December 4, 1932, but the register of deeds refused to register it. The
testimony of Julio tends to corroborate the declaration of the
defendant that the check was issued under the condition that if the
deed could be registered he would deposit in the bank a sum to cover
the check; in other words, if the deed could not be registered, the
check would not be cashed, but returned to the defendant.

Under these circumstances we are of the opinion that the lower court erred in finding the defendant guilty of estafa.

As to the agreement between the parties, the lower court said: “Lo
convenido, segun el testimonio satisfactorio de Marcelino Julio, fue
que se registraria la escritura antes de cobrarse el cheque, o sea,
antes del 7 de diciembre, sin duda para que el acusado pudiera
depositar fondos en el Banco antes de esa fecha; pero el acusado era el
que tenfa que presentar la escritura en el Registro para el traspaso
del titulo a su nombre, y no lo ha hecho ni el 7 de diciembre, ni antes
ni despues de esa fecha, pues el dia 17 de dicho mes, Marcelino Julio
se informo en la oficina del registra de que no se habia presentado aun
la escritura por el acusado, y puesto que el cheque no fue pagado,
pidio al Registrador de Titulos que no inscribiese la escritura de
venta.

“La condicion, pues, de que se registrara el titulo
antes del 7 de diciembre, dependia enteramente del acusado, pero este
voluntariamente no cumplio con esa condicion, ni poseia fondos en el
Banco para que el 7 de diciembre, fecha del cheque, o el 14 del mismo
mes, fecha en que fue” a cobrarlo Marcelino Julio, pudiera hacerse
efectivo el referido cheque.”

Since the parties agreed that the deed should be registered before
the check should be cashed, that is, on or before December 7th, and if
this agreement was made, as we think the trial judge rightly concluded,
for the purposes of giving the accused an opportunity of depositing
funds in the bank to cover the check, it is clear that the failure of
the defendant to present the deed for registration, if that were
proved, and to deposit the funds to cover the check constitute merely a
breach of his contract, a civil obligation, and not the crime of estafa.

Under the Revised Penal Code postdating a check, or issuing it in
payment of an obligation, the offender knowing that at the time he had
no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited by him in the bank were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check, and without informing
the payee of such circumstances (Posfechando un cheque, o Librandolo
contra un banco en pago de una obligacion, sabiendo que al tiempo de
hacerlo no tenia fondos, o no los tenia suficientes en dicho banco, sin
advertir de tales circunstancias al tomador) is not a crime in itself.
It is a part of article 315, which defines and punishes various forms
of estafa or swindling. The payee or the person receiving the check must be defrauded by the act of the offender (article 315, No. 2 [d],
Revised Penal Code). To defraud is to deprive of some right, interest,
or property by a deceitful device, and No. 2 of article 315 provides
that the false pretenses or fraudulent acts therein mentioned must be
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.

In the case at bar, the check itself showed that it was postdated.
The trial judge found in accordance with the evidence that the person
taking the check agreed to hold it for four days to allow the defendant
to deposit the funds to cover the check. This clearly implied that the
defendant did not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the check
when he issued it, and the parties undoubtedly so understood it. The
defendant promised to register the deed and deposit the funds by
December 7th, but that was merely a promise to perform an act in the
future, a promise to pay, and the non-fulfillment thereof gives rise to
only a civil action.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the lower court is
reversed and the appellant is acquitted of the charge, with the costs de oficio.

Avancena, C. J., Street, Abad Santos, and Hull, JJ., concur.