THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ERNESTO MALATE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

There should be a special place in hell for child molesters for
they are men who are dirty, despicable, deviant and
the dregs of society.  Such is Ernesto Malate, the appellant, who was convicted by the Court of
First Instance of Sorsogon for raping a 9-year old
girl and sentenced “to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of
P1,344.30 in concept of actual damages and P500.00 for
moral damages.”

The People’s version of the facts is the following:

“In the afternoon of May
10, 1972, upon his return to his residence at barrio Malbog, Pilar, Sorsogon, from barrio Gapo, Daraga, Albay where he harvested palay, Rafael Lustina found his
nine?year-old daughter Salvacion Lustina in bed, complaining of pain in the stomach (pp. 5,
8, 13-14, tsn., May 18, 1973).  Three days later, because the pain had not
subsided, Lustina brought his daughter to an herbolario or quack doctor at
barrio San Roque of the same municipality (p. 15, tsn., Feb. 13, 1973; pp. 8, 23, 24, tsn.,
May 18, 1973).  When the pain persisted, Lustina took his daughter to the Albay Provincial
Hospital on May 18, 1972 (p. 9, tsn.,
May 18, 1973).  Dr. Purificacion
Orense, a resident physician
thereat examined the girl (p. 10, tsn., Ibid).  On the patient’s private parts, the examining
physician found:

1.  Slight irritation of the labia majora which was reddish;

2.  Marked irritations around the urethral
opening and labia minora;

3.  An unhealed tear or rent at the forchet about 1 cm.

No other injuries were located (pp. 6-7, tsn., April 13, 1973; p. 3, tsn., August 5,
1974; Exh. “A”).

“The above injuries, in the doctor’s opinion, could have been
caused by a blunt object like a pumicent (tumescent)
penis (p. 8, tsn., April 13, 1973).  Said injuries prompted the doctor to inquire
from the girl what happened, and the latter finally confessed that she was
abused by the appellant, who threatened to hack her with his bolo if she
revealed the matter to anyone (pp. 13-14, tsn., April 13, 1973).  The doctor relayed the information to the
girl’s father, Rafael Lustina who, after obtaining
the corresponding medical certificate from the physician on May 23, 1972, lost
no time in instituting the complaint against the appellant (pp. 10, 12, tsn., May 18, 1973).

“On the witness stand, Salvacion Lustina recounted that at about 8:00 o’clock in the morning
of May 10, 1972, appellant, a neighbor living about 120 meters away from the Lustina’s house, accosted complainant who was playing alone
under a coconut tree, and covered the latter’s mouth with his hand, then
dragged her to a nearby spot with tall grasses. 
There, he made her lie on the grass, raised her skirt, removed her panty
and then his pants, after which he inserted his penis into her vagina.  The girl felt pain and cried.  After satisfying his bestial instincts, he
threatened to hack her with his bolo if she should divulge what had happened
(pp. 7-10, 13-14, 24, 45, 47, tsn., Feb. 13, 1973; p.
11, 17, tsn., May 18, 1973).”

The accused denied the rape and put up an alibi.  He attributed the charge to a personal grudge
which Rafael Lustina, Salvacion’s
father had against his family.  He also
claimed, thru Municipal Health Officer Wilhelmo Abrantes, that Salvacion’s
vaginal condition could have been due to washing with polluted water or sitting
too long in a hot place.

As in most criminal cases, the appeal raises factual issues
only.  Specifically, the appellant makes
the following assignment of errors:

“I.  THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN FULLY ACCEPTING THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS DR. PURIFICACION ORENSE AND REJECTING THE TESTIMONY OF
DEFENSE WITNESS DR. WILHELMO ABRANTES.

“II.  THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE MOTIVE
OF COMPLAINANT’S FATHER RAFAEL LUSTINA, IN FABRICATING THIS CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST
THE ACCUSED.

“III.  THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE OF RAPE THERE BEING NO MORAL CERTAINTY
OF HIS ALLEGED GUILT.

“IV. THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN BEING SEEMINGLY BIASED IN FAVOR OF
THE PROSECUTION DURING THE COURSE OF THE PRO­CEEDINGS AS THE RECORDS WILL BEAR
OUT.

“V.  THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESSES.”

The first assignment of error is easily refuted.  Both Dr. Purificacion
Orense and Dr. Wilhelmo Abrantes are general practitioners.  Dr. Orense
presumably has a wider general practice since she is a resident physician at
the Albay Provincial
Hospital whereas Dr. Abrantes‘ line is public health since he is a municipal
health officer.  Between the two
physicians, the testimony of Dr. Orense is the more
acceptable especially because she personally examined Salvacion
whereas Dr. Abrantes did not.

The second assignment of error is to the effect that Salvacion’s father fabricated the charge of rape because he
resented the fact that Ernesto Malate and his father Lucio were placed as co-tenants on a piece of land thus
reducing his share of the harvest.  The
appellant also claims that as a further ground for resenting him, he had
testified in favor of Edwin Artita whom Rafael Lustina had allegedly boxed.  We reject this assignment of error for as
very well said in the People’s brief:

“The imputation of motive is obviously a desperate, albeit,
vain attempt, at seeking exculpation by the defense.  But assuming there was such resentment, the
same could not have sufficiently impelled the victim’s father to falsely and
maliciously fabricate a charge of rape against Lucio Malate’s son, herein appellant.  The girl’s father would not have gone as far
as subjecting not only his daughter of tender age to the rigors and ordeals of
a public trial and thereafter suffer the consequent social humiliation, but his
whole family as well.  Indeed, only a
desire to bring the offender to justice for his bestial act could have moved
Rafael Lustina to rightly press the charges against
appellant.”

With particular reference to the Artita
affair, We adopt with approval its dismissal by the
court a quo as follows:

“The accused further alleged that another reason why
complainant conceived this charge against him is the fact that he (accused)
testified against complainant during the investigation of the barrio captain of
an incident when Lustina was charged of boxing Edwin Artita.  But the
accused himself explained that the case between Lustina
and Edwin was amicably settled upon payment of P5.00 by the former to the
latter.  Considering that the quarrel
between complainant and Artita was so trivial that it
was easily settled with the payment of P5.00, we cannot believe that it was
sufficient cause for Lustina to frame up the accused.  Incidentally, in the cited incident the name
of the party involved was Edwin Artita which makes us
wonder whether he is related to the defendant’s witness, Hugo Artita, who corroborated the defense of alibi.”

The third and fifth assignment of errors mean the same thing,
i.e. that the trial court erred in giving credence to the evidence of the
prosecution rather than to that of the defense. 
Involved, therefore, is the credibility of witnesses and on this score
We are not disposed to discard the appreciation of the evidence by the court a
quo because it was in a peculiar position to do so having personally
seen the witnesses testify and their demeanor while doing so.  And it should be noted that there is nothing
in the record which the trial court overlooked and could have materially
changed the result.

As previously stated, the appellant denied the rape and put up an
alibi.  He claimed that on May 10, 1972, at about 7:00 a.m. he started to plow the farm he was
cultivating.  He stopped plowing at 11:00 a.m. when he had to lend his carabao to Hugo Artita.  He also said that while he was plowing, Artita helped him pull out some weeds.  He ate lunch with Artita
at the latter’s house and at about 1:00 p.m.
they plowed Artita’s field and finished the task at
around 5:00 p.m.  Hugo Artita
substantially corroborated the alibi of the appellant.

The alibi cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Salvacion identifying the appellant as her ravisher.  It should also be borne in mind that the
place where he claimed to have worked is only 160 meters from the scene of the
crime so that it was not impossible for him to be there.

The appellant claims that the trial court was biased in favor of
the prosecution.  Illustrative of the
trial court’s conduct cited by the appellant to support his claim is the
following:

“Court:

We cannot allow that
these proceedings will run intermittently mainly because the lawyer will say
that he has a certain purpose for the question. 
The cross examination is more than one and one-half hours already and
considering the tender age of the witness, she came out with flying
colors.  Those questions are quite
complicated for a child to answer.  And
then let us be realistic.  There is
absolutely no human being on this earth even how small, who is not, in some
parts of the day, sick or is not left by the parents because sometimes the
parents go to seek for their livelihood. 
Not only that, this girl was not yet in her senses,
then how could she know.  How
could she answer your question at the age of four?  Probably she does not know what happened in
this world.  If she were already at the
age of reason it can be allowed.  But
from a child, it is improper.  Reform the
question.  If you feel that there are
still some questions, you may proceed. 
The Court would prefer that you ask your question and you should not be
stopped because it is already past twelve and the Court would like the defense
counsel to make the cross-examination as long as he believes necessary in order
that there will be absolutely no alibi later on if the Court would find the
accused responsible for this sordid and detestable crime of which he is
tried.  We want to give you the
opportunity.” (TSN, February 13, 1973, pp. 56-58.)

The trial judge made the statement during the cross-examination
of Salvacion and he had to do so because counsel for
the accused was obviously trying to confuse, bewilder, harrass
and exhaust the girl of tender years who, according to the trial judge in his decision,
“exuded an aura of innocence and simplicity devoid of artifice and
deception.” In fact if the statement is read with an unprejudiced eye, it
can easily be perceived that the court was disposed to be patient and liberal
in respect of cross-examination.  The
same patient and liberal attitude of the judge is revealed in other statements
to defense counsel which the appellant also cites to support his claim of bias,
thus:

“Court:

In the opinion of the
Court the line of questioning is very immaterial, irrelevant and impertinent,
but considering that the accused is being charged of a very serious offense and
the counsel has manifested that he has a certain objective or information which
he wants to elicit from the witness, we will give him all the chances so that
it cannot be said that the right of the accused to a just and fair trial has
not been unnecessarily curtailed by the Court. 
However, if the trend of questioning will continue and the Court will
detect that there is no material information that will be elicited from the witness, we will be constrained to stop the line of
question.” (TSN, May 18, 1973, p. 16.)

x x x              x x x                 x x x

“Court:

While it is true that
you are on cross-examination but it does not necessarily mean that you can ask
any question under the sun.  And as to
this testing of credibility is a hackneyed reason for cross examineers
to forward to the Court just to allow them to ask immaterial and irrelevant
questions.  Otherwise, if the Court will
not control those kinds of questions there will be no end to a
litigation.  The trial of a case
will be prolonged so much and the administration of justice will be
subverted.  This Presiding Judge does not
believe that we are placed in this podium powerless and without objective.  It is the belief of this Presiding Judge that
we have the right to regulate the proceedings, to stop excess not only on the
part of the counsel for one party but also the counsel for the other
party.  As it is the Court has been quite
liberal, including the prosecutor, with the defense counsel and we believe that
the defense counsel has no basis to complain as to the attitude of the Court in
allowing him to proceed with his cross examination.  But certainly there is a limit to anything,
and the Court believes with all sincerity that the cross examination is going
out of bounds.  Objection
sustained.” (TSN, May 18, 1973, p. 19.)

In view of the foregoing, We cannot take
seriously the appellant’s claim that the court a quo was biased
in favor of the prosecution and prejudiced against him.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the
same is hereby affirmed in toto.  Costs against the
appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Guerrero, De Castro, and Escolin, JJ., concur.