DY BUNCIO & COMPANY, INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ONG GUAN CAN ET AL., DEFENDANTS. JUAN TONG AND PUA GIOK ENG, APPELLANTS.

This is a suit over a rice-mill and camarin situated
at. Dao, Province of Capiz. Plaintiff claims that the property belongs
to its judgment debtor, Ong Guan Can, while defendants Juan Tong and
Pua Giok Eng claim as owner and lessee of the owner by virtue of a deed
dated July 31, 1931, by Ong Guan Can, jr.

After trial the Court of First Instance of Capiz held that the
deed was invalid and that the property was subject to the execution
which had been levied on said properties by the judgment creditor of
the owner. Defendants Juan Tong and Pua Giok Eng bring this appeal and
insist that the deed of the 31st of July, 1931, is valid.

The first recital of the deed is that Ong Guan Can, jr., as agent
of Ong Guan Can, the proprietor of the commercial firm of Ong Guan Can
& Sons, sells the rice-mill and camarin for P13,000 and
gives as his authority the power of attorney dated the 23d of May,
1928, a copy of this public instrument being attached to the deed and
recorded with the deed in the office of the register of deeds of Capiz.
The receipt of the money acknowledged in the deed was to the agent, and
the deed was signed by the agent in his own name and without any words
indicating that he was signing it for the principal.

Leaving aside the irregularities of the deed and coming to the
power of attorney referred to in the deed and registered therewith, it
is at once seen that it is not a general power of attorney but a
limited one and does not give the express power to alienate the
properties in question. (Article 1713 of the Civil Code.)

Appellants claim that this defect is cured by Exhibit 1, which
purports to be a general power of attorney given to the same agent in
1920. Article 1732 of the Civil Code is silent over the partial
termination of an agency. The making and accepting of a new power of
attorney, whether it enlarges or decreases the power of the agent under
a prior power of attorney, must be held to supplant and revoke the
latter when the two are inconsistent. If the new appointment with
limited powers does not revoke the general power of attorney, the
execution of the second power of attorney would be a mere futile
gesture.

The title of Ong Guan Can not having been divested by the so-called
deed of July 31,1931, his properties are subject to attachment and
execution.

The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed. Costs against appellants. So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Abad Santos, Vickers, and Diaz, JJ., concur.