IN RE WILL OF THE DECEASED GABINA MEDINA. ALEJANDRO SAMIA, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. IRENE MEDINA ET AL., OPPOSITORS AND APPELLANTS.

This is an appeal from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga admitting to probate a will
purporting to be that of the deceased Gabina Medina, who died in the
month of September, 1930. The will in question was originally admitted
to probate by the trial court without any opposition. However, five
days before the expiration of the period of six months provided in
section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the oppositors-appellants
filed a motion with the lower court to have the case reopened, which
was granted over the objection of the original petitioner, Alejro
Samia, who died before the rehearing of this case was substituted by
the present petitioner-appellee.

The will in question purports to have been executed on
September 22, 1928, in Arayat, Pampanga, bears the thumb mark of Gabina
Medina, with her name written by Jose Berenguer who also signed the
document. The attesting witnesses were Mariano D. Vengzon, Luis Pineda
Lorenzo Tinio.

The grounds of opposition of the oppositors-appellants are that the
will in question was not signed by the witnesses in the presence of the
others, that at the time the will purports to have been executed, the
deceased Gabina Medina was mentally incapable of executing it.

The principal witnesses of the oppositors in support of the
allegation that the deceased was mentally incapable of executing the
will in question on September 22, 1928, were Dr. Generoso Ocampo who
treated the deceased Gabina Medina in 1928, Father Roberto Roque a
servant, Juana Mallari, who, it is alleged, had taken care of the
deceased since the latter part of the year 1926 up to the early part of
the year 1930.

The first of the above-mentioned witnesses testified that in the
year 1920 he treated the deceased that since that time she has shown
symptoms of senility of an illness known as “tabes dorsalis”; that in
1924 she had slight atrophy in the hs feet could no longer st up; that
during the second quarter of the year 1928 he was again called to treat
her he found her suffering with “ataxia locomotrix with dementia
senile” that she could not talk nor hear could not move. The second
witness testified that her last confession was on or about the month of
January or February, 1928, that when he went to confess her in May of
that year, he could no longer understand her she would laugh weep in
answer to his questions. The witness Juana Mallari testified that from
the year 1926 up to the time that the deceased was moved to her new
house in the year 1928 it was difficult to understand what she said,
that two months later she had completely lost her power of speech could
not move her has feet that she was also suffering from inability to
control her urine bowel movements.

On the other h the evidence for the petitioner shows that previous
to the year 1928, during that year, in the year 1929 the deceased was
able to talk coherently intelligibly although she was suffering from
rheumatism.

In connection with the above, the trial court said in part:

“* * * Es un hecho, que el solicitante presento
varios testigos de contra pruebas que contradijeron a los de la
oposicion, encontrose entre ellos otro sacerdote cato1ico, el P. Casto
Ocampo, el cual dijo que confeso a Gabina Medina en 1929, y lo hizo
todavia bien; el Fiscal General Auxiliar Sr. Salvador A. Santos, que
afirmd haber podido hablar a aquella en mayo y noviembre de 1928, y una
vez en 1929; y el Dr. Sixto de los Angeles, que declard que la
enfermedad que aquella padecia, segun los sintomas dados por el Dr.
Ocampo, no debia ser ‘tabes dorsal,’ sino otra de la medula espinal.”

One very important exhibit in favor of the petitioner is a
photograph of the deceased with petitioner’s daughter who was then
about ten months old, which was taken about the month of October, 1928,
just one month after the date of the will in question. This photograph
its negative show the deceased seated on a chair with the child on her
lap, her arms around her and her hands clasped in front of the child.
This photograph negatives the contention of the oppositors, at least,
as to the physical condition of the deceased testatrix at about the
time the will in question was executed.

Doctor Sixto de los Angeles testifying about “tabes dorsalis”
stated that this illness has no direct relation to the mental condition
of a person affected by it, as stated by Drs. Church Peterson, in their
work entitled “Nervous Mental Diseases”, page 454, 8th edition,
“Tabetics often manifest large mental activities retain their business
capacity to the end.”

Admitting that the testatrix was physically ill in the year 1928,
physical ailments debility due to old age do not preclude the
possession of mental capacity to make a will. To have testamentary
capacity does not necessarily mean that the testator should be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties. The presumption is that
every adult is sane. In the case of Torres Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez (48 Phil., 772), this court held:

“3. Neither old age, physical infirmities,
feebleness of mind, weakness of the memory, the appointment of a
guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient singly or jointly to show
testamentary incapacity. The nature rationality of the will is of some
practical utility in determining capacity. Each case rests on its own
facts must be decided by its own facts.

“5. The presumption is that every adult is sane. * * *

“8. To constitute a sound disposing mind, it is not necessary that the
mind shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or
otherwise, or that the testator should be in the full possession of his
reasoning faculties. The question is not so much, what was the degree
of memory possessed by the testator, as, had he a disposing memory?
(Buswell on Insanity, sec. 365; Campbell vs. Campbell [1889], 130 111., 466, Bagtas vs. Paguio [1912], 22 Phil., 227.)

“10. An examination of the Philippine cases on testamentary capacity
discloses a consistent tendency to protect the wishes of the deceased
whenever it be legally possible. These decisions also show great
tenderness on the part of the court towards the last will testament of
the aged.”

Regarding the other ground advanced by the oppositors that the
formalities prescribed by law for the execution of the will have not
been complied with, the trial court had this to say:

“Leyendo las pruebas de la parte solicitante, uno
concluiria que el testamento de que se trata fue” otorgado realmente
por Da. Gabina Medina en su cabal juicio, porque los dos testigos
instrumentales, Sres. Mariano Vengson y Luis Pineda, pues el otro habia
fallecido, y el Sr. Jose Berenguer que firmo el nombre de la finada, no
solamente fueron unanimes en su examen directo, sino tambien en el
minucioso interrogativo indirecto, a que fueron sometidos por los
ilustres abogados de los opositores, y porque dos al menos de ellos,
los dos primeros, parece que deben ser dignos de credito, toda vez que
el Sr. Vengson es farmacetitico, y el Sr. Pineda, abogado y Juez de
Paz.” In view of all the evidence of record this court subscribes to
this view.

The decision of the lower court admitting the will to probate is
affirmed, with costs in this instance against the oppositors-appellants.

Malcolm, Imperial, Butte, Diaz, JJ., concur.