THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FRANCISCO BUADA ET AL., DEFENDANTS. FRANCISCO BUADA, APPELLANT.

HULL, J.:

The accused was convicted in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan of the crime of robbery committed on the night of
the 10th day of May, 1931, by cutting through the wall of a dwelling
and removing therefrom a trunk containing money and property of the
value of P470.45. The rifled trunk was found the next day in the fields
near the house from which it had been stolen.

The complaint was originally filed against appellant
only. A witness who claimed to have seen him and others armed and
rifling the trunk haying come forward, the fiscal filed a new complaint
alleging robbery by an armed band. At the trial this witness was shown
to be hostile, and his testimony being deemed improbable by the trial
court, the same was entirely disregarded and the other defendants
discharged. However, the accused was convicted, under evidence to be
later discussed, as the authbr of the crime, not in a band and not
armed.

The first contention of appellant is that this
witness having been found by the trial court to be false, under the
maxim of “Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus”, all the testimony of the
Government must be disregarded, or to express it another way, that if
one witness is false, all witnesses are false. To substantiate this
contention a new maxim would have to be created, with a considerable
variation in the Latin text.

There is no justification in human experience for
such a doctrine and, needless to say, the appellant has cited no
authority to sustain his present contention. While this court has at
times applied the old Latin maxim above quoted, it does so only in rare
cases and where the false testimony is so material and has such direct
bearing on the case that it creates the impression that the witness is
of a character that cannot be believed with any safety. We are
constantly having this doctrine presented whenever ingenuity can develop
the slightest inconsistency or when a witness is contradicted by a
witness of the other party. Needless to say, in such cases the maxim has
no application.

The day after the robbery outcry was made, the case
was investigated by the authorities, but outside of the existence of the
crime, no evidence was secured looking to the identity of the culprit
although one witness testified she had seen the accused in the vicinity
of the house on the night in question. But that standing alone was not
sufficient to point out the accused as the author of the crime. About
the month of November, the daughter of the offended party saw a
necklace, one of the articles that had been stolen, in the possession of
Marcelina Mendoza. Upon inquiry, Marcelina promptly said she had
purchased it from appellant sometime in May, and upon the matter being
reported to the Constabulary, she turned the necklace over to the
Constabulary, and it wks duly presented in court. Her testimony as to
the acquisition of the necklace was corroborated by her husband, who
also testified that appellant went to him and tried to secure the return
of the necklace by repurchase, and upon his declining he was urged not
to tell the truth and threatened by the appellant in case he did; and
that he was subsequently and before trial again threatened by the
accused in person should he testify truthfully in this case.

It is vaguely contended by appellant that the sale
of a stolen article is not possession, but a sale as owner is as much an
act of possession as treasuring the article on the person of the
accused. It is also contended that the possession of only one article is
not proof of the larceny of the other articles. This is incorrect.
Corpus Juris states the rule to be:

“Sale of Stolen Property.—The possession of
a part of the stolen property warrants the inference that accused stole
all of it.” (36 C. J., 870 and cases cited.)

The defense also attempted to prove that the
necklace Marcelina was wearing in November was sent to her through the
mail from Honolulu. Marcelina, on the witness stand, stated that the
rosary or necklace which she received from Honolulu was the one she was
then wearing, and the rosary or necklace which she purchased from
appellant was Exhibit F, then in the possession of the court.

In the ultimate analysis, the conviction of the
appellant must turn on the testimony of Marcelina Mendoza and her
husband, Jorge Mabana. The court, who saw these witnesses on the stand,
was impressed by their truthfulness and candor. The experienced trial
judge believed they were telling the truth. If they did, the accused is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as he denies all knowledge of the
article in question. (U. S. vs. Catimbang, 35 Phil.,
367.)

We have examined the record with care and find no
reason to set aside the conclusion of the trial court.

The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed.
Pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 4103, a minimum sentence of one
year prision correccional is awarded. Costs against appellant.
So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Abad Santos, Vickers, and Diaz,
JJ., concur.