TIMOTEO EVANGELISTA, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

This is a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus filed by Timoteo Evangelista praying that, after proper
proceedings, an order be issued directed to the respondent Director of
Prisons, commanding him to immediately release the petitioner from
custody on the ground that he is illegally detained.

It appears that on June 27, 1928 petitioner was convicted by the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, in case No. 7977 of said court, of
the crime of usurpation of official functions and sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for one year, eight months and twenty-one days. On appeal
this judgment was affirmed by this court on February 11, 1929 (See G. R. No. 30124) ^[1]
On November 6, 1928, petitioner was also convicted by the Court of
First Instance of Manila of the crimes of robbery and of impersonating
a public officer, in criminal cases Nos. 35916 and 35917 of said court.
The sentences in these cases remained unexecuted because of the
petitioner having absconded. Later he was found in Hongkong, and
extradition proceedings were instituted to procure his rendition upon
his conviction of the crime of robbery by the Court of First Instance
of Manila. As a result of the extradition proceedings petitioner was
brought to Manila and immediately detained in Bilibid Prison, there to
await the final outcome of his cases pending appeal in this court.
While thus detained, an order was issued by the Court of First Instance
of Laguna committing the petitioner to the custody of the respondent to
serve the sentence imposed upon him by that court. It is the legality
of his imprisonment under this order that is now in question.

Petitioner was extradited from Hongkong under the treaty between
the United States and Great Britain concluded July 12, 1889, and
proclaimed March 25, 1890. (U. S. Stat. at L., vol. 26, p. 1508.) The
specific question thus presented is whether, under the provisions of
said treaty, a person extradited may be imprisoned upon a former
conviction for an offense other than that for which his extradition has
been demanded. The determination of this question is governed by the
case of Johnson vs. Browne (205 U. S., 309; 51 Law. ed.,
816). That case involved the construction of article 2, paragraph 2,
and article 3 of the extradition treaty between the United States and
Great Britain. Said article 2, paragraph 2, reads as follows:

“No person surrendered by either of the High Contracting Parties to the other shall be triable or tried, for any political crime or offence, or for any act connected therewith, committed previously to his extradition.”

and article 3 provides:

“No person surrendered by or to either of the High
Contracting Parties shall be triable or be tried for any crime or
offence, committed prior to his extradition, other than the offence for
which he was1 surrendered, until he shall have had an opportunity of
returning to the country from which he was surrendered.”

Commenting on this treaty stipulations, the Supreme Court of the United States, through Justice Peckham, said:

“It will be perceived that the second article provides that no person surrendered shall be triable or tried, or be punished,
for any political crime or offense, while article three provides that
no person surrendered shall be triable or be tried (leaving out the
words ‘or pushised’) for any crime or offense committed prior to the
extradition, other than the offense for which he was surrendered, until
he shall have had an opportunity for returning to the country from
which he was surrendered. Hence it is urged that, as punishment for
another offense of which the person had been convicted is not in so
many words expressly prohibited in and by article 3, a requisition may
be obtained for one crime under that article, and, when possession of
the person is thus obtained, he may be punished for another and totally
different crime of which he had been convicted before extradition.

“We do not concur in this view. Although if the words ” were contained
in the 3d article the question in this case could not, of course,
arise, yet we are satisfied that the whole treaty, taken in connection
with that of 1842, fairly construed, does not permit of the
imprisonment of an extradited person under the facts in this case.

“The mere failure to use these words in the 3d article does not so far
change and alter ‘the manifest scope and object’ of the two treaties as
to render this imprisonment legal. The general scope of the two
treaties makes manifest an intention to prevent a state from obtaining
jurisdiction of an individual whose extradition is sought on one ground
and for one expressed purpose, and then, having obtained possession of
his person, to use it for another and different purpose. Why the words
were left out in the 3d article of the convention of 1889, when their
insertion would have placed the subject entirely at rest, may perhaps
be a matter of some possible surprise, yet their absence cannot so far
alter the otherwise plain meaning of the two treaties as to give them a
totally different construction.” (Johnson vs. Browne, supra, 819, 820.)

Upon the foregoing premises, it must be regarded as settled that,
under the existing extradition treaty between the United States and
Great Britain, a person extradited can not be imprisoned upon a former
conviction for an offense other than for which his extradition has been
demanded. It follows that the petitioner’s confinement in Bilibid
Prison in pursuance of the order of commitment of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, dated September 5, 1933, in case No. 7977 of said
court, was and is illegal and void.

It appearing, however, that the petitioner is now confined in
Bilibid Prison by reason of his conviction of the crimes for which he
was extradited, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be, and
the same is, hereby denied.

Street, Butte, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

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^[1]
People vs. Evangelista, not reported.

Avancena, C. J., participated in
this decision, and voted to deny the petition, but his name does not
appear signed hereto for the reason that he was on leave at the time of
the promulgation of the decision.—STREET, J.