THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. BENEDICTO URSUA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

In the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, an information was filed against Benedicto Ursua,
charging him with the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. In
the course of the trial, in which the private prosecution intervened,
after the evidence had been taken, the trial court found the following
facts to be proven.

On November 17, 1932, in the municipality of Libmanan, Province of
Camarines Sur, the accused, who was acting as municipal president,
ordered the policeman Alejro Quiro to ask the municipal president for
the latter’s revolver. When Alejro Quiro delivered the revolver to the
accused, the latter, noticing that it was not loaded, requested the
chief of police to load it. The chief of police loaded it with four
cartridges delivered it to the accused, with the cylinder in proper
place the trigger locked. Shortly after the accused had taken the
revolver in his hands, a discharge was heard which hit Alejro Quiro in
the abdomen, resulting in his death.

Upon these facts, the trial court found the accused guilty of the
crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, as charged in the
information, sentenced him to one year one day of prision correccional.
The court, however, failed to enter judgment with respect to the civil
liability of the accused in favor of the heirs of the deceased.

The judgment of the trial court was rendered on July 8, 1933, the
accused was notified thereof on July 13th, on which date the accused
filed notice of appeal. On the 18th of the same month, the private
prosecution filed with the court a motion for reconsideration of its
judgment on the ground that it failed to make any finding relative to
the civil liability of the accused to sentence him to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased. The trial court, believing that, because the
cause had been appealed by the accused said appeal had been allowed, it
had already lost its jurisdiction to pass upon the motion of the
private prosecution, denied the said motion. The private prosecution
excepted to this ruling appealed therefrom.

In this instance, this court, in its resolution dated November 28,
1933, declared the appeal of the accused abandoned. Therefore, the only
question left to be decided is the appeal of the private prosecution
with regard to the civil liability of the accused.

The trial court’s resolution that, because the cause had been
appealed by the accused, it had lost its jurisdiction to pass upon the
motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution nine days
after the date of the judgment, is unfounded.

The right of the injured persons in an offense to take part in its
prosecution to appeal for purposes of the civil liability of the
accused (section 107, General Orders, No. 58), necessarily implies that
such right is protected in the same manner as the right of the accused
to his defense. If the accused has the right within fifteen days to
appeal from the judgment of conviction, the offended party should have
the right within the same period to appeal from so much of the judgment
as is prejudicial to him, his appeal should not be made dependent on
that of the accused. If upon appeal by the accused the court altogether
loses its jurisdiction over the cause, the offended party would be
deprived of his right to appeal, although fifteen days have not yet
elapsed from the date of the judgment, if the accused files his appeal
before the expiration of said period. Therefore, if the court,
independently of the appeal of the accused, has jurisdiction, within
fifteen days from the date of the judgment, to allow the appeal of the
offended party, it also has jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration filed by the private prosecution in connection with the
civil liability of the accused.

As to the rest, it was an error for the court not to have entered
judgment with respect to the civil liability of the accused (Springer vs.
Odlin, 3 Phil., 344). Section 107 of General Orders, No. 58 expressly
imposes upon the courts the duty of entering judgment with respect to
the civil liability arising from the offense, if no reservation has
been made to ventilate it in a separate action.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that the case be remanded to the
court of origin for the purpose of determining the civil liability of
the accused (U. S. vs. Henry, 25 Phil., 600, 602). So ordered.

Street, Abad Santos, Vickers, Diaz, JJ., concur.