THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. BENEDICTO URSUA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

AVANCEÑA, C.J.:

In the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, an
information was filed against Benedicto Ursua, charging him with the
crime of homicide through reckless imprudence.
In the course of the trial, in which the private
prosecution intervened, and after the evidence had been taken, the trial
court found the following facts to be proven.

On November 17, 1932, in the municipality of
Libmanan, Province of Camarines Sur, the accused, who was acting as
municipal president, ordered the policeman Alejandro Quiro to ask the
municipal president for the latter’s revolver. When Alejandro Quiro
delivered the revolver to the accused, the latter, noticing that it was
not loaded, requested the chief of police to load it. The chief of
police loaded it with four cartridges and delivered it to the accused,
with the cylinder in proper place and the trigger locked. Shortly after
the accused had taken the revolver in his hands, a discharge was heard
which hit Alejandro Quiro in the abdomen, resulting in his death.

Upon these facts, the trial court found the accused
guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, as charged
in the information, and sentenced him to one year and one day of prision
correccional. The court, however, failed to enter judgment with
respect to the civil liability of the accused in favor of the heirs of
the deceased.

The judgment of the trial court was rendered on July
8, 1933, and the accused was notified thereof on July 13th, on which
date the accused filed notice of appeal. On the 18th of the same month,
the private prosecution filed with the court a motion for
reconsideration of its judgment on the ground that it failed to make any
finding relative to the civil liability of the accused and to sentence
him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. The trial court, believing
that, because the cause had been appealed by the accused and said appeal
had been allowed, it had already lost its jurisdiction to pass upon the
motion of the private prosecution, denied the said motion. The private
prosecution excepted to this ruling and appealed therefrom.

In this instance, this court, in its resolution
dated November 28, 1933, declared the appeal of the accused abandoned.
Therefore, the only question left to be decided is the appeal of the
private prosecution with regard to the civil liability of the accused.

The trial court’s resolution that, because the cause
had been appealed by the accused, it had lost its jurisdiction to pass
upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution
nine days after the date of the judgment, is unfounded.

The right of the injured persons in an offense to
take part in its prosecution and to appeal for purposes of the civil
liability of the accused (section 107, General Orders, No. 58),
necessarily implies that such right is protected in the same manner as
the right of the accused to his defense. If the accused has the right
within fifteen days to appeal from the judgment of conviction, the
offended party should have the right within the same period to appeal
from so much of the judgment as is prejudicial to him, and his appeal
should not be made dependent on that of the accused. If upon appeal by
the accused the court altogether loses its jurisdiction over the cause,
the offended party would be deprived of his right to appeal, although
fifteen days have not yet elapsed from the date of the judgment, if the
accused files his appeal before the expiration of said period.
Therefore, if the court, independently of the appeal of the accused, has
jurisdiction, within fifteen days from the date of the judgment, to
allow the appeal of the offended party, it also has jurisdiction to pass
upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution in
connection with the civil liability of the accused.

As to the rest, it was an error for the court not to
have entered judgment with respect to the civil liability of the
accused (Springer vs. Odlin, 3 Phil., 344). Section 107 of
General Orders, No. 58 expressly imposes upon the courts the duty of
entering judgment with respect to the civil liability arising from the
offense, if no reservation has been made to ventilate it in a separate
action.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that the case be
remanded to the court of origin for the purpose of determining the civil
liability of the accused (U. S. vs. Heery, 25 Phil., 600,
602). So ordered.

Street, Abad Santos, Vickers, and Diaz,
JJ., concur.