LI SENG GIAP & CO., APPLICANT AND APPELLANT, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLEE.

On August 16, 1932, Li Seng Giap &
Co., a partnership composed of individuals who are not citizens of the
Philippine Islands nor of the United State’s, but aliens, instituted
these proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, for
the registration in its name in the registry of deeds, of the three
parcels of land described in the plans, Exhibits A and B, and technical
descriptions attached to its application, in accordance with the
provisions of Act No. 496 and of Chapter VIII of Title II of Act No.
2874.

The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the said application
alleging as his grounds that the three parcels of land in question were
public lands belonging to the Government of the United States under the
administration and control of the Government of the Philippine Islands,
and that, being an alien, the applicant partnership cannot invoke the
benefits of the provisions of section 45 of the said Act No. 2874. The
aforecited section is contained in Chapter VIII of Title II of the said
Act invoked by the applicant. The Director of Lands has made no
reference to Act No. 496 in his opposition for the reason that the Act
in question merely prescribes, in general terms, the manner or
procedure to be followed by an applicant in the obtainment of the
certificate of title applied for, or in the denial or issuance thereof,
as the case may be, by the court or by the Government agencies therein
mentioned.

After the trial, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
rendered judgment therein denying the application of the applicant
partnership on the ground that it is an alien, and holding, at the same
time, that the parcels of land it sought to register in its name are a
portion of the public domain. The said applicant took exception to and
appealed from such judgment, claiming that the trial court committed
the following alleged errors, to wit:

“I. The trial court erred in holding that the
applicant, Li Seng Giap & Co. being a partnership made up of
individuals who are neither citizens of the Philippine Islands nor of
the United States, is not entitled, for this reason, to register the
land described in its application under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act.

“II. The lower court also erred in declaring the land described in the application a part of the public domain.

“III. The lower court also erred in denying the applicant’s motion for reconsideration as well as its motion for new trial.”

It is unnecessary to discuss further the nature of the three
parcels of land in question. The record shows that they are
agricultural lands which at present contain coconut trees, abaca and
cacao with which they have been planted for over forty years. The
coconut trees thereon range from one to forty years in age. The said
three parcels had likewise been cultivated and had actually been
occupied for many years during the Spanish regime by several natives of
the Province of Camarines Sur, named Inocencio Salon, Lazaro Ceron,
Margarito Labordes, Doroteo Quitales and Cornelio Vargas. The
occupation or possession thereof by the above-named persons was under
claim of ownership but neither the exact date when such possession
began nor the circumstances under which they acquired the property in
question has been determined. However, it seems certain that such
occupation began some fifty-five years ago and continued without
interruption from that time until said persons decide to sell them to
Sebastian Palanca who is also an alien like the herein applicant.
Neither is there anything of record to show when the sale was made but
it also seems certain that it took place during the Spanish regime.
Sebastian Palanca continued in possession of the aforesaid three
parcels of land from the time he acquired them in the manner
hereinbefore stated until July 22, 1930, when he sold them to the
herein applicant-appellant. However, before selling them and while he
was in possession thereof under claim of ownership, as alleged, he
failed to obtain a gratuitous title or even a mere possessory
information therefor, which would serve to protect his claim of
ownership, by taking advantage of the benefits afforded by the Royal
Decree of February 13, 1894, which was promulgated in the Philippines
and published in the Gaceta de Manila, No. 106, of April 17th of the same year.

The pertinent parts of said decree, which are also articles 1, 19
and 21 of the Maura Law, and which had been in force in the Philippines
during the last years of the Spanish regime and continued to be so
until the enactment of the Public Land Act and the amendments thereto,
read as follows:

“ARTICLE 1. All uncultivated lands, soil, earth,
and mountains not included in the following exceptions shall be
considered alienable public lands: First, those which have become
subjected to private ownership and have a legitimate owner. Second,
those which belong to the forest zones which the State deems wise to
reserve for reasons of public utility.

* * * * * * *

“ART. 19. Possessors of alienable public lands
under cultivation who have not obtained nor applied for composition on
the date this decree shall be published in the Gaceta de Manila;
may obtain a gratuitous title of property, by means of a possessory
information in conformity with the law of civil procedure and the
mortgage law whenever they establish any of the following conditions:

“First. Having, or having had, them under cultivation without interruption during the preceding six years.

“Second. Having had possession of them for twelve consecutive years,
and having had them under cultivation until the date of the
information, and for three years before that date.

“Third.
Having had them in possession ostensibly and without interruption, for
thirty or more years, although the land is not under cultivation.

* * * * * * *

“ART. 21. A term of one year, without grace, is
granted in order to perfect the informations referred to in articles 19
and 20.”

Article 80 of the regulations for the carrying out of the Royal Decree above-mentioned provided as follows:

“ART. 80. By virtue of the provision of article 21 of the Royal Decree
of February 13, 1894, the inextensible period for carrying out the
informations referred to in the two preceding articles, shall be
counted as closed on the 17th day of April, 1895.

“Upon the expiration of this period the right of cultivators and
possessors to the obtainment of free title shall lapse, and the full
property right in the land shall revert to the State or, in a proper
case, to the public domain.”

Therefore, there can be no doubt but that under the last aforecited
article the three parcels of land in question reverted to the State as
property of the public domain upon the expiration of the period
specified therein, by reason of negligence on the part of the
possessors thereof.

The applicant-appellant contends that under the provisions of
section 54, paragraph 6, of Act No. 926, it has necessarily acquired
the right to have the corresponding certificate of title issued to it
upon registration of the said parcels of land in its name in the
registry of deeds, inasmuch as it had actually been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereof, under claim of
ownership, not only by itself but also through Sebastian Palanca from
whom it had purchased them, for more than ten years prior to July 26,
1904, the date on which the aforesaid Act went into effect, in
accordance with the proclamation of the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands of the same date.

The section invoked by the applicant-appellant reads as follows:

“SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their
legal successors in right, occupying public lands in the Philippine
Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may apply to the
Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation
of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor to
wit:

“1. All persons who prior to the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to the United States had fulfilled all the
conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the
Kingdom of Spain for the purchase of public lands, including the
payment of the purchase price, but who failed to secure formal
conveyance of title;

“2. All persons who prior to the
transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, having applied
for the purchase of public lands and having secured a survey, auction,
and an award, or a right to an award, of such lands, did not receive
title therefor through no default upon their part;

“3. All
persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States, having applied for the purchase of public lands and
having secured a survey and award of same, did not, through negligence
upon their part, comply with the conditions of full or any payment
therefor, but who after such survey and award shall have occupied the
land adversely, except as prevented by war or force majeure, until the taking effect of this Act;

“4. All persons who were entitled to apply and did apply for adjustment
or composition of title to lands against the Government under the
Spanish laws and royal decrees in force prior to the royal decree of
February thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, but who failed
to receive title therefor through no default upon their part;

“5. All persons who were entitled to a gratuitous title to public lands
by ‘possessory proceedings’ under the provisions of articles nineteen
and twenty of the royal decree of the King of Spain issued February
thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, and who, having complied
with all the conditions therein required, failed to receive the title
therefor through no default upon their part; and

“6. All
persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been
in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of
Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide
claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of
ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when
prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government
grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter.

“All applicants for lands under paragraphs one, two, three, four and
five of this section must establish by proper official records or
documents that such proceedings as are therein required were taken and
the necessary conditions complied with: Provided, however, That such requirements shall not apply to the fact of adverse possession.”

It may be noted that the case of the applicant does not come under
paragraph 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 of the aforecited section, which, by the way,
conclusively shows that prior to the enactment of Act No. 926, the said
Maura Law was the last law which regulated the acquisition of alienable
public lands and the issuance of the corresponding title to those who
could establish their claim that they were entitled thereto. Being
aware of this fact, the applicant has never invoked said paragraphs. He
merely confines himself to invoking the provisions of paragraph 6
thereof, in support of which he cites the rulings of this court in the
cases of Tan Yungquip vs. Director of Lands (42 Phil., 128) and of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez (40 Phil., 883).

In the former case, it was held that inasmuch as the applicant Tan
Yungquip, who was a Chinaman, had proven: That he had acquired the
parcels of land which he sought to register in his name, some by
purchase and others by inheritance; that he and his predecessors in
interest had been in the open, peaceful, continuous and notorious
possession of the same for at least thirty years, and that such parcels
of land were agricultural lands, therefore, he was entitled to have
them registered in his name under the provisions of the aforecited
section 54 of Act No. 926, for the reason that he filed his application
to that effect more than one year prior to the enactment and
enforcement of Act No. 2874. It was likewise held therein that the
matter should be decided in favor of said Tan Yungquip on the ground
that no valid law could be found, at least on that occasion, which
prohibited the registration in his name in the registry of deeds, of
the parcels of land of which he claimed to be the owner.

In the latter case above cited, that is, the case of Central Capiz vs.
Ramirez, it was likewise held that lands held in private ownership
constitute no part of the public domain and cannot, therefore, come
within the purview of said Act No. 2874 on the ground that said subject
(lands held in private ownership) is not embraced in any manner in the
title of the Act, and that the intent of the Legislature in enacting
the same was to limit the application thereof exclusively to lands of
the public domain.

Although nothing has been said in the decision rendered in the aforecited case of Tan Yungquip vs.
Director of Lands to the effect that the application of the therein
applicant should be granted on the ground that the provisions of
section 54 of Act No. 926, which were therein under consideration and
interpretation, do not distinguish between citizens of the Philippine
Islands or of the United States and aliens, however, the appellant
contends that the aforecited section has such scope and that the
question raised in this case should be decided under the latter
interpretation.

We do not believe that the rulings in the aforecited two cases and that in the case of Agari vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands (42 Phil., 143), are decisive and
applicable to the case under consideration, on the ground that although
it is true that Agari, who was the applicant in the last case, was an
alien, it was likewise true that the persons, from whom he had acquired
the land which he sought to register in his name in the registry of
deeds during the time Act No. 926 was still in force, were natives of
the Philippine Islands, who, in turn, had acquired it through their
father, who was likewise a native of the Islands, by composition with
the State in accordance with the laws then in force; nor that, under
the provisions of the aforecited section 54 of Act No. 926, the
applicantappellant Li Seng Giap & Co. could have succeeded in
securing the certificate of title which it now seeks; in the first
place, because the three aforecited decisions refer to cases which are
different from the one now under consideration ; in the second place,
because said decisions were based on the supposition that the parcels
of land in question therein were of private ownership and because at
that time no law was known to be in existence, which prohibited the
registration of said parcels of land in the registry of deeds, in the
name of the aforesaid applicants Tan Yungquip, Central Capiz and Agari,
and in the third place, because while Act No. 926 was still in force
(it is no longer in force, having been expressly repealed by section
128 of Act No. 2874, on December 28, 1919), it should have been
interpreted in the light of the provisions of the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, commonly known as the Organic Law of the Philippine
Islands, inasmuch as the former had been approved under the authority
of sections 13, 14, 15 and 62 of the latter Act. The very title of Act
No. 926 above referred to shows that one of the purposes for which it
was approved was to carry out the provisions of sections 13, 14, 15 and
62 of the aforecited Act of Congress, which title reads in part:

“An Act * * * providing for the determination by
the Philippines Court of Land Registration of all proceedings for
completion of imperfect titles and for the cancellation or confirmation
of Spanish concessions and grants in said Islands, as authorized by
sections thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, and sixty-two of the Act of
Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, entitled ‘An Act
temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of civil
government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes’.”

Sections 14 and 15 of the aforesaid Act of Congress, which bear
relation to the question under consideration, provide as follows:

“SEC. 14. That the Government of the Philippine
Islands is hereby authorized and empowered to enact rules and
regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to
perfect their title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the
transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, had fulfilled
all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal
decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of legal title
thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title; and the Philippine
Commission is authorized to issue patents, without compensation, to any
native of said Islands, conveying title to any tract of land not more
than sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands and had been
actually occupied by such native or his ancestors prior to and on the
thirteenth of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

“SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby
authorized and empowered, on such terms as it may prescribe, by general
legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to
actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such
parts and portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral
lands, of the United States in said Islands as it may deem wise, not
exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person and for the sale and
conveyance of not more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to
any corporation or association of persons: Provided, that the grant or
sale of such lands, whether the purchase price be paid at once or in
partial payments, shall be conditioned upon actual and continued
occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for a
period of not less than five years, during which time the purchaser or
grantee cannot alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto; but
such restriction shall not apply to transfers of rights and title of
inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates of
decedents.”

It may be noted that both of the above-cited sections provide that
gratuitous title to property may be issued only to natives of the
Philippine Islands who are in possession of the necessary
qualifications specified therein. It may therefore be inferred from the
foregoing that Act No. 926 could not have a different scope from that
given it by the aforecited Act of Congress and, therefore, the phrase
“all persons” employed in paragraphs of section 54 of the former Act
should be understood to mean only citizens of the Philippine Islands or
citizens of the United States or of any insular possession thereof.

The parcels of land involved in this case, which as hereinbefore
stated, have reverted to the State after April 17, 1895, by virtue of
the Maura Law, are not of private ownership. Neither were they so on or
after the aforesaid date. The applicant herein did not show any title
thereto either by possessory proceedings or otherwise, which may be
considered as having been issued by the Government. The only basis on
which it now claims the right to have them registered in its name is
its alleged possession thereof together with that of Sebastian Palanca
and of the former possessors, as if to say, that it is entitled to the
registration thereof in its name, inasmuch as the parcels of land in
question already belong to it, having acquired them by prescription
through the continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession
thereof, under claim of ownership, at least since the Spanish regime in
the Philippine Islands. However, the truth is that the law expressly
provides that no public land may be acquired by prescription, and that
such mode of acquisition does not hold as against the Government. This
provision is contained precisely in the very law invoked by the
applicant, that is section 54, paragraph 6, of Act No. 926. In the case
of Ongsiaco vs. Magsilang (50 Phil., 380, 386), this court said:

“* * * in a controversy between private
individuals, where the Government has not intervened, and where it
appears that the land has ceased to be of public domain and has come to
be of private ownership, a petitioner may obtain registration of land
upon a title acquired by adverse possession as against individual
opponents. The same rule does not maintain with respect to land claimed
by the Government and as to which the Government is opposing.” In the
case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abad (56
Phil., 75, 80), this court, deciding a question similar to the one
raised herein by the appellant, said as follows: “Subsection (b)
of section 45 of Act No. 2874 is not obnoxious to the constitutional
provision relied upon by the appellant, as depriving the appellant of
property without due process of law. That provision has reference to
property to which the citizen has acquired a vested right. It does not
extend to privileges and inchoate rights which have never been asserted
or perfected. The contention of the appellant * * * is therefore
without merit.” There is no justifiable reason for disturbing the
holdings of this court in the aforecited two cases. On the contrary, it
is considered timely to reiterate them herein inasmuch as they decide
the same question.

The provisions of section 54 of Act No. 926 as well as those of section 45, paragraph (b),
of Act No. 2874 should necessarily be so construed as not to permit
aliens to obtain title to lands in their favor. It should not be
understood, however, that the constitutional guaranty that no person
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws, is violated thereby,
because, as this court has said in the case of In re
Patterson (1 Phil., 93, 95, 96), “Unquestionably every State has a
fundamental right to its existence and development, as also to the
integrity of its territory and the exclusive and peaceable possession
of its dominions which it may guard and defend by all possible means
against any attack * * *. Superior to the law which protects personal
liberty, and the agreements which exist between nations for their own
interest and for the benefit of their respective subjects is the
supreme and fundamental right of each State to self-preservation and
the integrity of its dominion and its sovereignty.” It is upon grounds
of public policy that the rights of individuals, particularly of
aliens, cannot prevail against the aforesaid right of the Government of
the Philippine Islands, and more particularly when, as in the present
case, far from violating any constitutional law, it deals precisely
with the enforcement of the provisions of the first organic law of the
country and those of the Jones Law (section 9), to the effect that
lands of the public domain should not be disposed of or alienated to
persons who are not inhabitants or citizens of the Philippine Islands.

Wherefore, finding that the judgment appealed from is in accordance with the law, it is hereby affirmed in toto, with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, and Butte, JJ., concur.

IMPERIAL, J.:

---

STREET and GODDARD, JJ., It is settled by the decision of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez
(40 Phil., 883), that Act No. 2874 is applicable only to land of the
public domain; and the undersigned are of the opinion that the land
which has been held in private character from a date anterior to July
26, 1894, as occurred in the case of the land which is the subject of
this application, should not be considered public domain. The land
covered by this application should therefore have been registered in
the name of the applicants, exactly as was done in Tan Yungquip vs.
Director of Lands (42 Phil., 128). Any other interpretation makes Act
No. 2874, as applied to this land, subject to the objection that it
deprives the applicants of the equal protection of the law.