THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, APPLICANT, VS, DOMINGO ITALIA ET AL., CLAIMANTS AND APPELLANTS. MARIANO B. BANZON ET AL., CLAIMANTS AND APPELLEES.

Two months after the promulgation of
the judgment rendered by this court affirming that of the Court of
First Instance of Bataan, which adjudicated to the Banzon claimants lot
No. 26 of Cadastral Record No. 6 (G. L. R.O. Record No. 179) of the
municipality of Balanga of the said province, and before the
corresponding decree to the said lot could actually be issued to the
aforesaid claimants by the General Land Registration Office, in
accordance with the order contained in the judgment in question (G. R.
No. 35657) ^[1], the herein
claimants-appellants surnamed Italia, filed in the aforesaid court a
petition for review of the decree under section 38 of Act No. 496, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 3630, for the purpose of having the
judgment in question annulled and set aside on the ground that the
aforesaid Banzon claimants, who are the appellees herein, had obtained
said decree through fraud. Said petition was opposed by said Banzon
appellees who contended that inasmuch as the questions raised therein
had already been fully discussed and decided during the hearing of the
said case on its merits, they can not now be discussed for the second
time on the ground that they already constitute res judicata.

After trial, the lower court, in an order dated April 24, 1933, denied
the said petition for review of the decree, holding that the same is
not well-founded. The claimants-appellants filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said order and it was denied by the same court.

The claimants-appellants Italia contend that the only question to
decide is whether their petition for review of the decree, which was
denied by the lower court, should have been presented in accordance
with the provisions of section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure or
with the provisions of section 38 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No.
3630. They further contend that no other question should be decided in
view of the fact that, according to them, the trial court failed to
decide their aforesaid petition for review of the decree on its merits.

This court is of the opinion that the question is just the reverse:
what should really be decided is whether or not the aforesaid petition
for review has any merit.

The record shows that the trial court actually decided the question
referred to herein, that is, whether or not the said petition for
review of the decree filed by the appellants has any merit. The trial
court decided it in the negative and this court entirely agrees with
the said decision because it is obvious that the questions and facts
discussed in the petition in question are not new. They are the very
questions which had already been raised and decided by the lower court
as well as by this court when in the corresponding case there was
presented for determination the question whether lot No. 26 of
Cadastral Record No. 6 of the municipality of Balanga, Bataan, belonged
to the herein appellants or to the appellees and to which of the said
claimants it should be adjudicated. Both the trial court and this court
then held that Exhibit D, which the appellants now claim as they have
from the beginning claimed to be apocryphal, whereby they aim to prove
the alleged fraud committed by the appellees, is not really apocryphal
but, on the contrary, is genuine and that it had been signed by Mariano
Italia and the said appellants’ mother named Exequiela Samson.

In fact the appellants’ purpose in filing their so-called petition
for review of the decree is merely to obtain a new trial in order that
the same question, which had already been determined in the decision
rendered in the aforesaid case G. R. No. 35657, may again be passed
upon, presenting the same evidence which had already been presented and
taken into consideration in said case. If such procedure, which is not
permitted in this jurisdiction, were followed, there would be no end to
litigation.

It having been held, and it cannot otherwise be held, that the
appellants’ petition for review of the decree has no merit, it
necessarily follows that their appeal should be dismissed. Such
dismissal naturally makes it unnecessary to decide the principal
question raised by the said appellants all the more because in the case
of Elvina vs. Filamor and Domingo (56 Phil., 305), and in that of De los Reyes vs.
De Villa (48 Phil., 227), it has already been held that, when the
decree of registration has not yet been issued, the proper remedy
should be that indicated in said section 113 of Act No. 190, not that
indicated in section 38 of Act No. 496.

On the other Hand, the fraud which gives rise to the remedy therein
provided is of a different nature. It is that fraud which has not
previously been brought to the knowledge of the court and not passed
upon by the same after hearing the party who claims to have been
aggrieved thereby, not that fraud for the determination of which all
the interested parties have had and have been given an opportunity to
prove it, as in this case.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Street, Abad Santos, Hull, and Butte, JJ., concur.