LA URBANA, SOCIEDAD MUTUA DE CONSTRUCCION Y PRESTAMOS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. SUSANA VILLASOR AND HER HUSBAND, EUGENIO VILLANUEVA, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

On or about the 4th of January, 1932, the
defendant Susana Villasor offered to buy from plaintiff a house and lot
situated in the Province of Cavite for the price of P11,000, of which
P2,000 was to be paid down and the balance to be paid in monthly
installments of P100 a month, all without interest.

At the time that defendant Villasor made this offer, her husband,
defendant Eugenio Villanueva, was absent from the Islands. Upon his
return his wife told him of the proposition, which, after he had looked
into it, did not meet with his approval. There were a number of
interviews between Villasor and the agent of plaintiff, La Urbana, the
exact character thereof being in some doubt due to the conflicting
testimony of the parties, but on January 22, defendant Villasor wrote
to plaintiff that the contract should be placed in the name of her
mother-in-law, who was the real party in interest. On the same date
plaintiff wrote a letter formally accepting the offer and calling upon
her to make the deposit and sign the necessary mortgage.

No payment was made, the property remained in the possession of
plaintiff, and defendants declined to go ahead with the purchase.
Whereupon, plaintiff brought suit in the Court of First Instance of
Cavite demanding specific performance.

After trial, judgment was given in favor of the defendants, and
plaintiff brings this appeal and asserts that the lower court was in
error in holding that the contract was not enforceable due to lack of
marital consent on the part of the husband.

There can be no question that at the time the wife made the offer
the husband was out of the Islands and the wife did not have that
consent. Plaintiff, although it knew that the party with whom it was
dealing was under the disability of coverture, made no attempt to
secure the consent of the husband. Its contention is virtually that
such contracts are only voidable, that the husband’s consent need not
be expressed but may be implied from the circumstances, and that in the
absence of a prompt disavowal on the part of the husband, his consent
must be presumed.

Such a contention overlooks the fact that the consent must be an
affirmative act on the part of the husband. The law does not provide
that all the contracts of the wife shall be valid unless promptly
disapproved by the husband. His affirmative act, provided by law, is
concurrence not disapproval. Concurrence may well be presumed when by
his conduct he has led other parties to believe that his wife was
acting with his authority and consent. But such a case is not here
presented.

Plaintiff-appellant has therefore no right to specific performance
against defendants, and the judgment appealed from denying that alleged
right, is affirmed. Costs against appellant. So ordered.

Malcolm, Villa-Real, Imperial, and Goddard, JJ., concur.