IN RE WILL OF PEDRO PANGANIBAN Y JACOB, DECEASED. FRANCISCO SEBASTIAN, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. IRENE PANGANIBAN ET AL., OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES.

This is an appeal from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan denying the probate of the will of
Pedro Panganiban y Jacob upon the ground that the attestation clause
was fatally defective in that it did not strictly comply with the law.

The attestation clause in question and the will are in the Tagalog
dialect. As translated into Spanish by the Honorable Judge of the trial
court the attestation clause is as follows:

“Nosotros, Francisco Sebastian, Gregorio Sebastian
y Miguel Martin, todos casados y mayores de edad y vecinos de Hagonoy,
afirmamos que este testamento del Sr. Pedro Panganiban y Jacob, de
cuatro paginas utiles, fue finnado por el testador al pie y en los
mdrgenes de todas sus hojas en, presenda de nosotros tres, y nosotros
firmamos igualmente al pie y en los mdrgenes de todas las pdginas en
presenda del senor Pedro Panganiban y Jacob quien, segun vimos,
estaba en su sano y cabal juicio, aunque padeciendo de cierta
enfermedad, aqui en Hag6noy, hoy 14 de mayo de 1927.”

The appellant assigns the following error:

“Al dictar decision en el presente asunto, el
Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Bulacan incurrio en error, al concluir
‘que la clausula de atestiguamiento en cuestion no esta redactada
estrictamente de acuerdo con las disposiciones de la ley. En ella no se
hace constar aup los testigos firmaron al pie y en todas las paginas
del testamento, en presencia de los otros.'”

The appellees make no objection to the translation of the trial
court while the appellant contends that a more liberal translation
could have been made. From an examination of several Tagalog-English
dictionaries it is quite possible that this could have been done.
However this court accepts the translation made by the trial court.

In the case of the Estate of the deceased Magdalen Ozoa, G. R. No.
37208, 58 Phil., 928, this court, speaking through Justice Malcolm,
stated:

“At once it can be conceded that Jhe attestation
clause is not written as clearly as it should have been. It can,
however, be further conceded that, while precision of language in
drafting an attestation clause is desirable, it is sufficient if from
the language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation
clause fulfills the requirements of the law. In this instance it is
contended on the one hand that the attestation clause fails to state
that the testatrix signed each and every page of the will in the
presence of-the three witnesses and in the presence of each other, and
on the other hand that the language is susceptible of a contrary
meaning. In this connection it should be recalled that the attestation
clause was a part of the will prepared in the Visayan dialect, which
may be deficient in words properly usable in a will, and that in the
translation therefrom, clauses may be placed out of the regular order.
While the words ‘we have each signed, the same and each page thereof in
the presence of said testatrix and in the presence of each other’ would
be expected to relate to the attesting witnesses, it is possible to
find that the quoted words also relate to the testatrix. Otherwise
stated, the word ‘we’ could include both the testatrix and the
attesting witnesses.

“The basic decision in this respect, grounded on the doctrine of reasonableness and intention, is found in the case of Abangan vs.
Abangan ([1919], 40 Phil, 476). Following that decision have appeared
others which culminated last year in the decision in the case of
Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza ([1932], 57 Phil., 437),
where an attestation clause was held not to be fatally defective and to
conform to the law. Just the other day, in division, in the case of In re
Jennings ([1933], 58 Phil., 924), the same salutary result was reached.
In conformity with these doctrines, we think that the trial judge was
wrong in holding that a defective attestation clause requires that the
will be not legalized.”

In view of the facts in this case and the decisions cited above,
this court is of the opinion that the error assigned by the
petitioner-appellant should be sustained and the judgment of this court
will be that the will of the deceased Pedro Panganiban y Jacob be
ordered admitted to probate, and accordingly the judgment of the trial
court is reversed without special pronouncement as to costs.

Malcolm, Villa-Real, Hull, and Imperial, JJ., concur.