CEBU TRANSIT CO., INC., PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. AGUSTIN JEREZA, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

This is an appeal taken by the Cebu Transit Co., Inc., to set aside the
decision rendered by the Public Service Commission in case No. 33431,
granting Agustin Jereza’s application to operate five (5) midget
taxicabs within the City of Cebu, its suburbs and neighboring
municipalities, under the rates stated in the said decision.

The appellee herein applied for a certificate of public convenience to
begin operating five (5) midget taxicabs, reserving for himself the
right to increase the service to fifteen (15). The appellant Cebu
Transit Co., Inc., the Cebu Autobus Company and Mrs. Trinidad M. Cui,
operator of “Cui’s Garage”, filed oppositions to the application in
question. Upon Mrs. Cui’s petition and with the consent of both the
appellant and the appellee herein, the commission designated the
justice of the peace of the City of Cebu to take the depositions of the
witnesses to be presented by the parties concerned and to receive all
the evidence which they might deem proper to submit in support of their
respective claims. In the order issued to that effect, a day was set
for the hearing thereof and the parties thereto, together with their
respective counsel, were enjoined to present on that occasion all the
evidence they might deem proper. Furthermore, the order in question was
published in a local paper. All the interested parties, together with
their respective counsel, appeared on the day and at the hour set for
the hearing thereof and presented their evidence. The testimony of the
witnesses therein was taken in the form of depositions. In the taking
of depositions, objections were filed during the examination of the
witnesses, which were not passed upon immediately by the commissioner.
After the hearing and when the depositions had been taken and all the
evidence presented received, the justice of the peace forwarded them
all to the commission in Manila, which proceeded to pass upon the
evidence thus forwarded and later rendered the decision appealed from,
without holding any further hearing nor serving any notice thereof to
the counsel of the parties concerned.

In granting the
certificate of public convenience applied for and in overruling the
oppositions thereto, the commission based its decision upon the
following proven facts as stated therein:

“The
City of Cebu, which is the most important district to be served by the
proposed taxicab service, has a population of approximately 66,000
living within the city proper and its barrios, about 53,000 of whom
live in places accessible to the proposed service (1918 figures). In
addition, there are transient residents, not a few in number, coming
from foreign and inter island or coastwise steamers calling at the port
of Cebu.

“To furnish transportation service to this population there are tartanillas
drawn by horses; motor service by means of the autobuses of the Cebu
Transit Co. and the Cebu Autobus Co.; taxicab service of the opponents;
garage cars and PU cars.

“The service rendered by the Cebu
Transit Co., through its autobuses, is more or less limited, benefiting
mostly those persons living near its fixed lines or routes. Altho its
rates are low, its service is not desired by certain people due to the
fact that they are required to walk to their lines. Most of the people
living outside of the city and in the barrios which are far distant
from the poblacion have to depend on the service of garage cars, PU cars, tartanillas
and taxicabs. But, aside from the fact that no opposition was filed by
the parties concerned, the services of garage cars, the PU cars and the
tartanillas, with their different rates of charges, do not and
cannot meet the varying demands of residents of various stations of
life in a growing and progressive place like the City of Cebu. The same
observation may be made of the present taxicab service of the
opponents. As to the service of the animal drawn vehicles called tartanillas,
with their cheap rates, it is obvious that they cannot render the same
service as the proposed taxicabs of the applicant as this means of
transportation is safer, more comfortable and speedy. In short, the
commission is satisfied from the evidence that the taxicab service
proposed is necessary and no ruinous competition will result from it.

“In
view of the foregoing, the commission believes that the granting of
this application will promote the public convenience in a proper and
suitable manner as provided for in section 15 of Act No. 3108, as
amended, and it therefore decides that, upon payment of the
corresponding fees, the certificate of public convenience applied for
by the applicant, Agustin Jereza, should be issued to him, said
certificate to be subject to the following conditions: * * *.”

In this appeal, the petitioner contends that the commission erred in
granting the certificate applied for without first holding a hearing
and without any evidence before it to justify its conclusions. He
contends further that even assuming that the depositions taken before
the justice of the peace may be considered duly presented and admitted
in evidence, nevertheless, the commission erred on the ground that it
granted the respondent herein rates so unreasonable and so low that
they constitute a ruinous competition with the other taxicab operators
within the same territory.

With respect to the first
assignment of error, the petitioner contends that the depositions in
question should not have been considered as evidence on the ground that
no hearing was held before the commission and that they were not
presented, read, nor admitted in accordance with the requirements of
section 364 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

We are of the
opinion that this contention is unfounded. Above all, we should not
lose sight of the fact that the justice of the peace was designated by
the commission upon petition of the opponent, Mrs. Cui, with the
consent of the other parties. Section 23 of the Public Service Law
expressly provides that the technical rules of legal evidence contained
in the Code of Civil Procedure should not be applied to the procedure
followed in the commission. Section 25 expressly authorizes the said
commission to take depositions before it or before a commissioner. Upon
examination of the language employed in the order authorizing the
justice of the peace to take and receive the depositions under
consideration, it appears clearly therein that the aforesaid official
was in reality designated commissioner for the purpose of receiving all
the evidence which the parties concerned might present, including the
depositions in question. Inasmuch as the Public Service Commission is
an entity created with quasi-judicial powers, we do not hesitate to
declare that it is authorized to designate commissioners for the
purpose of receiving evidence, particularly when such designation has
been made by agreement of all the parties concerned, as in the instant
case. The law does not contain any prohibition to that effect and
inasmuch as the act complained of does not prejudice any of the parties
concerned on the ground that they were not deprived of the opportunity
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses, we do not find in such
procedure anything contrary to law or to public interests.

It is contended that the commission should have called the case for
hearing and that the depositions in question should have been presented
as evidence and read as usual in order that the objections contained
therein could have been discussed and passed upon. In answer thereto,
it may be stated that the hearing held before the justice of the peace
constitutes the hearing or due process required by the law and that the
objections filed therein should be understood as waived on the ground
that they were not reiterated when the depositions in question were
received at the commission. Furthermore, the fact that the commission
has considered the depositions and rendered decision therein
establishes the presumption that it had passed upon all the objections
presented, inasmuch as the commissioners could not have discussed the
said depositions without taking such objections into account.

Neither has the next assignment of error any merit. The commission
granted the respondent two (2) kinds of rates the last being applicable
from 10 o’clock p. m. to 5 o’clock a. m. He was thereby authorized to
charge an initial fare of P0.10 for the first 1,000 meters, P0.05 for
every succeeding 700 meters, and P0.05 for every six (6) minutes of
waiting. For a night rate, he was permitted to charge an initial fare
of P0.10 for the first 800 meters, P0.05 for every succeeding 600
meters, P1.00 for every hour of waiting, P0.80 for every 45 minutes of
waiting and P0.60 for every half hour of waiting. For religious
functions and funerals the operator should apply the first rate plus an
additional fare of P0.20. The petitioner claims that these rates would
ruin his business on the ground that he is required to charge a higher
rate of P0.20 as the initial fare for the first 500 meters and P0.05
for every succeeding 500 meters. We hold that the alleged ruinous
competition and unreasonable discrimination do not exist, inasmuch as
the taxicabs to be operated by the respondent herein are smaller and
less comfortable than those operated by the petitioner. Consequently,
the public will have the option to choose the service more suited to
its convenience.

The last assignment of error is merely a matter of form and does not require any further discussion.

Not finding anything objectionable nor susceptible of reversal or
modification in the decision appealed from, it is hereby affirmed, with
the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, and Hull, JJ., concur.