THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ONG CHIAT LAY ET AL., DEFENDANTS. ONG CHIAT LAY, APPELLANT.

Appellant and two others, Ong Ban Hua and Kua
Sing, were jointly informed against by the provincial fiscal of
Zamboanga, charging them with having feloniously burned a building in
which was located a store belonging to the appellant. Upon a plea of
“not guilty” appellant and his codefendants were tried jointly upon
said information; and, after trial, while Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing were
acquitted, appellant was found guilty of the crime of arson and
sentenced to suffer sixteen years and one day of reclusion temporal, with
the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify Francisco Barrios
and Mariano Atienza in the sums of P16,000 and P5,000, respectively,
and to pay one-third of the costs.

In support of this appeal, appellant has assigned the following errors:

“First. The lower court erred in holding that the
evidence presented against the accused Ong Chiat Lay is sufficient to
establish the corpus delicti, namely, that the crime of arson had been committed.

“Second. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence presented
against the accused Ong Chiat Lay is sufficient to establish his guilt
of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.”

In order to convict a defendant as principal in the commission of a
crime, it must be shown either (1) that he took a direct part in the
execution of the criminal act; (2) that he directly forced or induced
another or others to commit it; or (3) that he cooperated in the
commission of the offense by an act without which it would not have
been accomplished. (Revised Penal Code, article 17.) They take direct
part in the execution of a criminal act who, participating in the
criminal design, proceed to carry out their plan and personally take
part in its execution by acts which directly tend to the same end.
(Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., vol. 1, p. 341; Albert’s Revised Penal Code Ann., 144.)

In the instant case, it is not claimed that appellant had taken a
direct part in the burning of the building. In fact, the prosecution
lays stress on appellant’s absence from the scene of the fire as one of
the suspicious circumstances indicating his guilt. Appellant was
prosecuted on the theory that he induced his said codefendants to set
fire to the building. Hence the three were charged jointly on an
information alleging conspiracy among them. This allegation of
conspiracy, however, has been negatived by the acquittal of appellant’s
codefendants. The same may be said with regard to the theory that
appellant had induced his codefendants to perpetrate the unlawful deed;
for it seems clear that one can not be held guilty of having instigated
the commission of a crime without its first being shown that the crime
has been actually committed by another.

In acquitting Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, the lower court said: “Pero
las pruebas de la acusacion, a juicio del Juzgado, no establecen que
los acusados Ong Ban Hua y Eua Sing hayan cooperado directa o
indirectamente a su coacusado Ong Chiat Lay en la comision del delito.
Las pruebas indiciarias preaentadas contra los referidos acusados Ong
Ban Hua y Kua Sing no pueden producir mas que mera sospecha de que
dichos acusados tuvieron conocimiento de lo que habia realizado Ong
Chiat Lay, pero esta sospecha no puede servirse de base para una
sentencia condenatoria, y por ende se debe absolver a los mismos
acusados Ong Ban Hua y Kua Sing de la querella.”

While not exactly in point, the principle discussed in State vs.
Join (13 N. C. [2 Dev. L.], 669), is pertinent to the question now
under consideration. In that case, the court held that although more
than two persons are charged with conspiracy, the acquittal of all but
one of those charged amounts to the acquittal of that one, since there
can be no conspiracy unless at least two unite. Ruffin, J., therein
said: “Conspiracy being a crime, requiring the guilty cooperation of
two, at least, to constitute it, in which there is a mutual dependence
of the guilt of each person upon that of the other, principle would
seem to demand that all the accused should be jointly tried and
convicted, or acquitted. In other cases of dependent crimes, that upon
which the rest depends must be first established. Such is the law
between principal and accessory. The reason is that there may be as
full defence as possible upon the very point of the principal’s guilt,
by that principal himself, who is best able to make it. To make that
rule effectual, it became necessary to establish another that, but by
the accessory’s own consent, no proof of the principal’s guilt should
be heard against him until it was first established against the
principal himself. The rule arises out of the nature of dependent
criminality. Now conspirators may be said to be co-principals. The
guilt of both must concur to constitute that of either; and it must
consist of a joint act, and it makes one crime in both. As the trial of
one need not precede that of the other, the trial of both ought to be
concurrent I think it more than probable that anciently such was the
course. But, clearly, now it is otherwise. There are many precedents of
the separate trial of person indicted for offences that could not be
committed by less than two. (* * * Rex vs. Kinnersly [1719], 1 Strange, 193; Rex vs.
Niccolls [1745], 2 Strange, 1227.) It is too late now to question it.
But it can never follow from those cases that where one of the persons,
the establishment of whose guilt is essential to the conviction of the
other, has been legally acquitted, the other does not thereby become
discharged. It cannot be that a man can be held guilty to any purpose
who has, in due course of law, been found not guilty. The analogy
between this case and that of the accessory is strict. The acquittal of
the principal is an immediate and absolute discharge of the accessory.
For there can be no aid given to a deed when the deed itself was never
perpetrated. So, where guilt consists in the joint act or intent of
two, and it is found that one of them did not join in the act or
intent, it is conclusive as to both. For A could not conspire with B if
the latter did not conspire at all. In all the cases, therefore, a
verdict affirming the guilt of fewer persons than could commit the
crime, and affirming the innocence of all others charged, has been held
to be an acquittal of all.” (4 B. R. C, 930.)

While the crime charged in the present case is not conspiracy as a
distinct offense, it is clear from the nature of the evidence presented
that appellant alone could not have committed the unlawful act. As
already stated, the theory of the prosecution was that he conspired
with or induced his codefendants to commit the crime. The gravamen of
the charge was conspiracy, and the acquittal of his codefendants is
clearly inconsistent with appellant’s guilt.

This leads us to the consideration of another aspect of this case.
Appellant was convicted wholly on circumstantial evidence. As stated in
the decision of the trial court: “Las pruebas de la acusacion son todas
indiciarias, que son las que siempre se presentan para probar esta
clase de delito, porque su autor o autores ordinariamente no lo
practican en presencia de un tercero.” Continuing, the court further
said: “El traslado de los muebles del acusado Ong Chiat Lay a varios
sitios antes de ocurrir este incendio, su indiferencia a todo lo que
ocurria en la madrugada de autos, su ausencia del lugar donde estaba
instalado su bazar mientras ardia el edificio ocupado por este, y el
hecho de no haberse negado que f uera el el autor del incendio ante el
teniente Piccio, son pruebas indiciarias muy fuertes contra este
acusado. E1 hecho de que se olia a gasolina dentro de la casa ocupada
por el establecimiento ‘China Bazaar’ en la ocasion en que el repetido
Ong Chiat Lay trasladaba sus muebles y su residencia a otro sitio, y el
haber sido encontradas varias latas de petroleo o gasolina vaciasen el
mismo terreno donde estuvo levantada dicha casa inmediatamente despues
de ocurrir el incendio de esta, son tambien pruebas indiciarias muy
fuertes contra el susodicho acusado Ong Chiat Lay. Todas estas pruebas
apreciadas en su conjunto constituyen una evidencia clara de la
culpabilidad del acusado Ong Chiat Lay.”

It is a well-settled principle of criminal law that a conviction for crime can not be had unless the corpus delicti is first established. (State vs. Sullivan, 17 L. R. A., 902.) To establish the corpus delicti
in arson the proof of two elements is required, namely, (1) the burning
of the house or other thing, and (2) the criminal agency in causing it.
(Spears vs. State, 16 L. R. A. [N. S.], 285.) The corpus delicti may be proved by circumstantial evidence. (State vs. Sullivan, supra.)
However: “Before a conviction can be had upon circumstantial evidence,
the circumstances proven should constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion, which points to the
defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. It is
indispensable that the evidence be derived from interrelated facts and
duly proven in a manner that will lead to a logical and rational
conclusion, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the accused is the author
of the crime. In other words, there must be, from all the
circumstances, a combination of evidence which, in the ordinary and
natural course of things, leaves no room for reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused.” (Moran, The Law of Evidence, 453; numerous cases
cited in support of the text)

While the facts proved in the present case are sufficient to raise
grave suspicions against the appellant, they fall far short of
establishing his guilt clearly and satisfactorily, as required by the
well-settled rules of evidence. This court held in United States vs.
Levente (18 Phil., 439), that to warrant a conviction upon
circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. The chain of circumstances which would
have pointed to the appellant as the guilty person was broken by the
acquittal of Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing. As already explained, the
acquittal of his said codefendants is not only consistent with the
hypothesis that the appellant is innocent, but is inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is guilty.

It results that the judgment appealed from must be reversed and the. appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Avancenia, C. J., Street, and Vickers, JJ., concur.

BUTTE, J.;

I concur in the result.