NIEVES E. SAÑGA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SEGUNDO ZABALLERO AND FILOMENA SANTOS, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

“1.º Condenando a los demandados a pagar a la demandante los catorce
(14) plazos de la hipoteca vencidos y no pagados correspondientes a los
meses de Julio de 1931 a julio de 1932, con excepcion de la cantidad de
P350 cobrada por la demandante de los demandados por cuenta del primero
de dichos plazos (junio de 1931), o sea la cantidad de P8,050, cuya
cantidad debera descomponerse en catorce (14) meses, de los cuales el
primero es de P250 y todos los restantes de P600, debiendo dichos
plazos devengar interes a razon de 6 por ciento al ano, a partir del
dia 11 de junio de 1931 en lo que respecta al primer plazo no pagado en
parte, y en lo que respecta a Ios demas a partir del 10 de cada uno de
los meses sucesivos de julio de 1931 a julio de 1932, durante los
cuales fueron venciendo los referidos plazos de la hipoteca; y

“2.º Condenando a Ios demandados al pago de los sucesivos plazos
mensuales de P600, a partir del mes de agosto de 1932 que vayan
venciendo hasta que todos los plazos que integran la referida hipoteca
por P22,000, otorgada por los demandados a favor de la demandante,
hayan quedado satisfechos.

“Se ordena a los demandados que
para los efectos de esta decision, depositen en la Escribania de este
Juzgado o paguen a la demandante, dentro del plazo de 90 dias, la
expresada cantidad de P8,050 con sus intereses legales, coraputados
como se ha dicho, y las costas del presente juicio, ordenandose que en
caso de que los demandados dejaren de hacerlo asi, se vendan en publica
subasta las fincas hipotecadas para hacer efectivas dicha cantidad y
sus intereses; y

“Se absuelve a la demandante de la contrademanda de los demandados.”

the defendants make the following assignments of error:

“1.
That the lower court erred in not declaring that the
defendants-appellants are entitled to the reduction of P5,540, from the
purchase price of the sale in question.

“2. That the lower
court erred in declaring that the defendants-appellants had only paid
the plaintiff-appellee, the sum of P8,750 out of the mortgage price of
P22,000, instead of P10,200.

“3. That the lower court
erred in declaring that the mortgage executed by the
defendants-appellants in favor of the plaintiff-appellee could be
foreclosed upon failure to pay some of the installments due, in spite
of the absence of any expressed stipulation, and in spite of the fact
that the total indebtedness is not yet due upon the commencement of the
said action.”

By a public instrument dated
March 11, 1930, Nieves E. Sanga sold two parcels of land to Mr. and
Mrs. Segundo Zaballero for the sum of P32,000. By the terms of the
agreement, the purchasers were to make payment of P10,000 on the filing
of the document in the registry of property and were to pay the balance
by installments at the rate of P600 a month. The same instrument
included a mortgage in favor of the vendor for the sum of P22,000. On
the failure of the vendees to make good some of the installments,
action was begun in the lower court for the foreclosure of the mortgage
with the result as above indicated.

1. It
   is the contention under the first specified error that, since the land
   did not contain the stipulated number of coconut trees, that is, 3,000,
   but only 2,446, the vendees are entitled to a proportionate reduction
   of P5,540. There is no merit in this argument. The vendees have not
   received less land than they bargained for. The fact that within the
   perimeter of the land there happened to be not as many coconut trees as
   was estimated gives no ground for rescission, complete or partial, when
   the evidence shows that the parties all live in the same neighborhood
   and had identical opportunities to inspect the land. Where the means of
   knowledge are at hand and equally available to both parties, the buyer
   will not be heard to say that he has been deceived. And if any act is
   done by the complaining party after discovering the alleged fraud or
   mutual mistake toward carrying out the contract, it shows an
   irrevocable election to abide by the contract.

2. The trial judge declared that the payments made by the vendees came to
   P8,750. Counsel for the appellee concedes that this was error, and that
   the amount should have been P9,500. Counsel for the appellants insists
   that the sum should be even more, or P10,200. The arithmetical addition
   of the exhibits confirms the statement made for the appellants.
   Inasmuch as the plaintiff admits that her estimate is merely a
   calculation, since her records have been burned, even in the face of
   certain corrections in the receipts we think that we will have to abide
   by the figures appearing therein, which means that the defendants have
   paid on their debt P10,200, leaving a balance due from them of P11,800.

3. The more important question before the court relates to the right of
   the plaintiff to foreclose the mortgage upon failure to pay some of the
   installments, before the debt has become entirely due. In this
   connection, it is pointed out that the mortgage contained no
   acceleration clause. Although not cited by either party, the answer to
   the question is found in the provisions of section 259 of the Code of
   Civil Procedure. This section regulates fully the proceedings in cases
   where the mortgage debt is payable in installments.

The generally accepted rule is, that where the secured debt is payable
in installments, default in the payment of any installment gives the
mortgagee a right to foreclose as to such installments without waiting
for the maturity of the whole debt. We can rely the more assuredly on
this rule because section 259 of the Code of Civil Procedure was
derived from California, and California is one of the states adhering
to that rule. So much to sustain the action of the trial court in
ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage for the installments due; but
its action in providing for future contingencies can also be sustained,
because by codal section 259, as often as more of the debt becomes due
for principal or interest, the court may, on motion, order more
property to be sold. It lies within the power of the plaintiff to
present the matter by motion to the trial court. (41 C. J., p. 856;
Grattan vs. Wiggins, [1863], 23 Cal., 16; Diaz vs. Foote [1920], 28 P. R., 131; Banzon and Rosauro vs. Sellner, 58 Phil., 453.)

In résumé, therefore, we overrule the first specified error, we
sustain the second specified error, and we overrule, with explanation,
the third specified error. Agreeable to these pronouncements, the
judgment will be affirmed, with the modification that instead of the
sum of P8,750, it will be understood that the defendants have paid
P10,200 on the mortgage, and with the right conceded to the plaintiff,
by motion, to ask for foreclosure for the installments not due when the
action was instituted but which have accrued during the pendency of the
action. So ordered, without special pronouncement as to costs in this
instance.

Villa-Real, Hull, Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concur.