ROBUSTIANA MONDEJAR, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. CRISPINA DAGANI, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED VALENTINO YU ALBURO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

The question raised in this case is
whether the two parcels of land described in the complaint belong to
the plaintiff or, on the contrary, to the intestate estate of the
deceased Valentino Yu Alburo.

The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that the parcels of land in
question exclusively belong to her; that during the lifetime of the
deceased Valentino Yu Alburo, she had placed them under his
administration because he was her legitimate son and he had been living
with her in her own house; that upon the death of the said deceased,
the defendant, as administratrix of his estate began to deny and ignore
entirely the said plaintiffs rights as owner and possessor thereof and
thenceforth claimed that they belonged to the deceased, for which
reason she held them under administration.

In her original as well as in her amended answer, the defendant, in
turn, alleged that the said parcels of land belonged to the deceased
Valentino Yu Alburo, having been allotted to him as his share in the
extra judicial partition of the conjugal partnership property of the
plaintiff and her deceased husband Miguel Yu Alburo, and that from the
time the said partition was made in 1912, said deceased had been in
possession thereof under claim of ownership, peacefully, publicly and
exclusively, without any interruption whatsoever until his death which
took place on March 4, 1930; that the plaintiff’s right of action to
recover ownership of the parcels of land in question, if any, had
already prescribed many years ago; and that the said deceased acquired
ownership thereof by prescription, having been in possession of the
same under claim of ownership, peacefully, openly, to the exclusion of
others, and without any interruption whatsoever, from 1912 until his
death; and by way of counterclaim, she furthermore alleged that the
said deceased, through his own labor and with his own money, had
introduced improvements on the parcels of land in question; that the
said improvements are now valued at about P20,000 and on that account
she prays that, in case the said parcels of land are declared to be the
plaintiff’s property, the latter be ordered to pay her, as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased Valentino Yu Alburo, the
said sum of 120,000 plus 18,000, to cover expenses for preservation
thereof, and 150 as damages.

As may be seen from the pleadings of the parties and the evidence
presented by them at the trial, the parcels of land in question
originally belonged to the plaintiff at least until 1912. In or about
that year the said plaintiff, then a widow, delivered them to her son
Valentino Yu Alburo, of whose estate the defendant is the
administratrix, as an advancement on his inheritance from her, in the
same manner as she delivered other property in the same concept to her
other children named Yapburga and Leoncio Presno. It is true that she
executed no document that would establish such fact more conclusively,
but it is also true that since then Valentino Yu Alburo had possessed,
cleaned and improved the parcels of land in question as the exclusive
owner thereof, having spent his own money for that purpose; and under
such circumstances the plaintiff, in 1919, caused the deceased to file
tax declarations for said parcels of land in his own name, as in fact
he did, in order that they would thenceforth be considered as
exclusively belonging to him. The deceased’s possession of the property
in question was, as aforesaid, under claim of ownership, uninterrupted,
and furthermore peaceful and open, to the exclusion of all other
persons, not excepting the plaintiff herself, not only from the said
year 1919 but also from the year 1912 until March, 1930 when, as
aforesaid, his death took place. All of which unquestionably shows that
the special defense of prescription alleged and proven by the defendant
is very well founded, all the more because after the plaintiff had
transferred to her son, now deceased, the parcels of land in question
as an advancement on his inheritance, which act was ratified by her in
1919 by changing her name appearing in the land tax records to that of
her son, thus naturally inducing him to believe that they already
belonged to him, she cannot now be permitted to retract nor deny what
she formerly affirmed, particularly after the lapse of more than
seventeen years. Having arrived at this conclusion, it becomes
unnecessary to pass upon the defendant’s counterclaim, inasmuch as this
court is of the opinion that the judgment appealed from, being in
accordance with the law, should be affirmed.

Wherefore, the said judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Malcolm, Abad Santos, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.