G.R. No. 38552. December 07, 1933

ENRIQUE SOMES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. VICENTE SOMES ET AL., DEFENDANTS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE; NIEVES CHOFRE, INTERVENOR AND APPELLEE.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions December 7, 1933 IMPERIAL, J.:


IMPERIAL, J.:


On
March 22, 1926, the plaintiff herein ceded, transferred and delivered
to the herein defendant, Vicente Somes, his son, the real property,
together with the improvements thereon, described in transfer
certificate of title No. 5069, for the sum of P35,000, which sum was to
be deducted from the hereditary portion to which said Vicente Somes
would be entitled to receive from the aforesaid plaintiff, pursuant to
the terms of the deed, Exhibit A, executed to that effect. On May 4th
of the same year, Vicente Somes executed a mortgage deed in favor of
the Director of Lands, copy of which is marked Exhibit 1, whereby he
constituted a mortgage on the aforesaid property described in transfer
certificate of title No. 5069 in favor of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, to secure the payment of a loan of P8,000 which he
had obtained therefrom.

The plaintiff herein brought this
action to annul the deeds of conveyance and of the mortgage in question
on the alleged ground that the first deed was obtained by his son
Vicente Somes under threat of death. The said plaintiff appealed from
the judgment absolving all of the defendants, with costs, and holding
that the aforesaid deeds of conveyance and of mortgage were valid.

On appeal, the plaintiff insists vigorously that the court should have
annulled the sale on the alleged ground that he has proved conclusively
that he had given his consent thereto under threat of death made
against him by his son, the co-defendant Vicente Somes. The alleged
threats, however, cannot be inferred satisfactorily from the evidence
we have reviewed. We are of the opinion that when the plaintiff signed
the so-called deed of sale, he did not do so under the influence of any
threat or illicit act against his person by his son. In the language of
the court, he signed the deed and ceded the property in question to his
son because the latter had just married and he was desirous of
providing him with a means of support for his wife and the children
they might have. He could not have acted under the influence of any
serious threat, inasmuch as, even after the execution of the deed, it
was the plaintiff himself who collected the rents from the tenants,
delivering them personally to his son.

It is unnecessary to
discuss herein the mortgage executed in favor of the Government. The
Director of Lands was wholly unaware of the plaintiff’s claim. He gave
full faith and credit to the deed of conveyance which the assignee had
shown him and, likewise, relied upon the records of the registry of
deeds.

From the terms of the deed, we are more inclined to
believe that the donation made by the plaintiff was a conditional
donation inter vivos and not an absolute sale, inasmuch as,
among other limitations thereto, it had been stipulated that the
assignee would not be able to sell the property during the lifetime of
the assignor. However, the donation is, at any rate, valid on the
ground that all the essential requisities therefor, prescribed by law,
had been complied with, and the acceptance thereof was made in the same
instrument.

The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Malcolm, Villa-Real, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.