QUINTIN DE BORJA, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MARCELO DE BORJA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. FRANCISCO DE BORJA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The
plaintiff herein, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the
estate of the deceased Marcelo de Borja, instituted this action in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, to recover from the defendant the sum
of P61,376.56 which, according to the amended complaint, the said
defendant owed the aforesaid deceased, for certain sums of money loaned
to and collected by him from other persons with the obligation to
render an accounting thereof to the said deceased.

In his amended answer, the defendant interposed various
counterclaims for alleged sums of money owed him by the
aforesaid deceased.

After the trial thereof and the presentation of voluminous evidence
therein, the trial court reached the conclusion and held that, from his
various causes of action, the
plaintiff was entitled to recover the sum of P33,218.86 from
the defendant, and that, by way of counterclaim, the said
defendant, in turn, was entitled to collect the sum of
P39,683 from the plaintiff, and rendered judgment in favor
of the defendant in the sum of P6,464.14 with legal interest
thereon from the date of the counterclaim, with the costs.
Both parties appealed therefrom.

The trial court made a very careful analysis of the oral
and documentary evidence presented therein, and from the
preponderance thereof, inferred the findings of fact stated
in its decision. We are convinced that, from the evidence
presented, the liquidation made by the trial court is the
nearest approach to its findings of fact, and for this reason
we do not feel inclined to alter or modify it.

The plaintiff-appellant’s contention that the counterclaims presented by the defendant have already prescribed,
is untenable. The counterclaims in question are based on
instruments in writing marked Exhibits 1 to 6. The period
of prescription thereof is not six (6) years, as claimed, but
ten (10) years, in accordance with the provisions of section 43 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Neither is the plaintiff entitled to the interest claimed
by him upon the alleged sums loaned to and collected by
the defendant from various persons for his deceased father.
In all the aforementioned transactions, the defendant acted
in his capacity as attorney-in-fact of t his deceased father,
and there being no evidence showing that he converted the
money entrusted to him to his own use, he is not liable for
interest thereon, in accordance with the provisions of article
1724 of the Civil Code.

The defendant-appellant’s claim to the effect that he is
entitled to collect the rents for the use of the earthen jar
factory and the buildings thereof, is, likewise, unfounded.
The trial court held that all there existed between the parties was a mere gratuitous commodatum and that the most
that the deceased bound himself to do was to pay the taxes
on the properties in question. There is nothing in the
records of the case to justify reversing the judgment rendered therein.

The judgment appealed from being, in our opinion, in
accordance with the law and sufficiently supported by a
preponderance of the evidence presented therein, it is hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement as to the costs
of this instance. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, and Hull, JJ.,
concur.