THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. VALERIANO DUCOSIN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
convicting the appellant of the crime of frustrated murder was referred
by the first division to the court in banc for the proper
interpretation and application of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine
Legislature approved on December 5, 1933, commonly known as the
“Indeterminate Sentence Law”. As this is the first case which has come
before us involving the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it will be
convenient to set out here some of its provisions.

Section 1 of Act No. 4103 is as follows:

“Hereafter,
in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by acts of the
Philippine Legislature, otherwise than by the Revised Penal Code, the
court shall order the accused to be imprisoned for a minimum term,
which shall not be less than the minimum term of imprisonment provided
by law for the offense, and for a maximum term which shall not exceed
the maximum fixed by law; and where the offense is punished by the
Revised Penal Code, or amendments thereto, the court shall sentence the
accused to such maximum as may, in view of attending circumstances, be
properly imposed under the present rules of the said Code, and to a
minimum which shall not be less than the minimum imprisonment period of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by said Code for the offense.
Except as provided in section two hereof, any person who shall have
been so convicted and sentenced and shall have served the minimum
sentence imposed hereunder, may be released on parole in accordance
with the provisions of this Act.”

Section 2 is as follows:

“This
Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with
death penalty or life imprisonment; to those convicted of treason,
conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those convicted of
misprision of treason, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of
piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have
escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated
the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not
exceed one year; nor to those already sentenced by final judgment at
the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in section five
hereof.”

Section 3 of Act No. 4103 creates
a “Board of Indeterminate Sentence” to be composed of the Secretary of
Justice as chairman and four members to be appointed by the
Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate.
This section describes the qualifications of the members. Section 4
gives the board authority to adopt rules of procedure and provides for
the compensation of the members.

Section 5 makes it the duty
of the board to study the physical, mental and moral record of the
prisoners who shall be eligible to parole and authorizes the board to
determine the proper time for the release of such prisoners. After a
prisoner has served the “minimum penalty” imposed upon on him and the
board is satisfied that such prisoner is fitted by his training for
release and that there is a reasonable probability that he will not
violate the law again and that his release “will not be incompatible
with the welfare of society”, the board may in its discretion authorize
the release of such prisoner on parole. The board may also recommend
the release on parole of other prisoners previously convicted of any
offense other than those named in section 2.

Section 6
provides for the surveillance of prisoners released on parole for a
period “equivalent to the remaining portion of the maximum sentence
imposed upon him or until final release and discharge by the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence.” Section 7 provides that a certified copy of
the board’s order of conditional or final release shall be filed with
the court and with the Chief of Constabulary.

Section 8
provides that any prisoner who violates any of the conditions of his
parole, who violates any law during the period of surveillance for
which he has been convicted, shall be subject to re-arrest and
confinement and “shall serve the remaining unexpired portion of the
maximum sentence for which he was originally committed to prison”
unless the board grants a new parole.

Section 9 provides
that Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, shall not be
construed to impair the powers given to the Governor-General under
section 64 of the Administrative Code or the Organic Act of the
Philippine Islands.

By its terms, Act No. 4103 became law upon its approval, that is to say, on December 5, 1933.

In the case before us, Valeriano Ducosin was tried on September 30,
1932, for the crime of frustrated murder upon the following information:

“That
on or about the 23d day of September, 1932, in the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill, treacherously
attack, assault and wound one Rafael Yanguas by then and there suddenly
and without any warning, stabbing the latter with a knife, thereby
inflicting upon him several wounds in different parts of the body, some
of which are necessarily mortal, thus performing all the acts of
execution which would produce the death of the said Rafael Yanguas as a
consequence, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of said accused, that is, by the timely
intervention of medical assistance.

“Contrary to law.”

Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to ten years and one day of prision mayor
with the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to pay the costs.
The penalty for the crime of murder, under article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. Under article 50, the penalty for a frustrated felony is the one
next lower in degree to that prescribed for the consummated felony,
which in the present case is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal,
in its medium period, or from ten years and one day to seventeen years
and four months. The accused having pleaded guilty, this extenuating
circumstance, in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, fixes the
penalty within the minimum period, that is to say, from ten years and
one day to twelve years, leaving to the discretion of the court the
precise time to be served within said range, i. e., not less than ten
years and one day nor more than twelve years. The penalty imposed by
the trial judge being within this range is correct and therefore is the
penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense which this
accused has committed.

As Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, was enacted after this appeal was lodged in this court,
we are now required to revise the sentence imposed upon the appellant
and to bring the same into conformity with Act No. 4103.

It
will be observed from section 1 of said Act that the court must now,
instead of a single fixed penalty, determine two penalties, referred to
in the Indeterminate Sentence Act as the “maximum” and “minimum”. The
prisoner must serve the minimum penalty before he is eligible for
parole under the provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the period
between the minimum and maximum penalty indeterminate in the sense that
he may, under the conditions set out in said Act, be released from
serving said period in whole or in part. He must be sentenced,
therefore, to imprisonment for a period which is not more than the
“maximum” nor less than the “minimum”, as these terms are used in the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.

This leads up to the important question: How shall the “maximum” and the “minimum” penalty be determined?

The maximum penalty must be determined, in any case punishable by the
Revised Penal Code, in accordance with the rules and provisions of said
Code exactly as if Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, had
never been passed. We think it is clear from a reading of Act No. 4103
that it was not its purpose to make inoperative any of the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code. Neither the title nor the body of the Act
indicates any intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal or
amend any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. The legislative
history of the Act further shows that attention was called to the
necessity for taking care “so as not to bring the provisions of this
bill in conflict with the provisions of our penal laws, especially with
those treating with penalties.” (Committee Report, House of
Representatives, H-3321, Ninth Philippine Legislature, Third Session.)

The last mentioned report gives an illustration of the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law to offenses penalized by the Revised
Penal Code:

“Suppose that a man is found
guilty of malversation of public funds in the amount of P10,000. No
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present. Under this law
the court may impose on him a maximum sentence not exceeding ten years
and eight months but not less than nine years, four months and one day (see
art. 217, No. 3, Revised Penal Code), and a minimum which shall not be
less than four years, two months and one day (the minimum imprisonment
period of prision correccional in its maximum to prision mayor
in its minimum. See article 61, Revised Penal Code). The court,
therefore, may sentence the accused to be imprisoned for not less than
five years nor more than ten years or for not less than seven years or
more than ten years and eight months, etc.”

It will be seen from the foregoing example that the “maximum” is
determined in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
In the example given reference is made to article 217, paragraph 3, of
the Revised Penal Code which provides that the defendant shall suffer
the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum
period. The penalty is placed in the medium degree because of the
absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstance, that is to say,
anywhere between nine years, four months and one day and ten years and
eight months in the discretion of the court. In the case on appeal here
the penalty was imposed in the minimum of the proper penalty under the
Revised Penal Code because of the plea of guilty, that is to say,
between ten years and one day and twelve years in the discretion of the
court. This discretion is in nowise impaired or limited by Act No.
4103. The trial court, in conformity with the discretion conferred upon
it by the Revised Penal Code, might have assessed the penalty at, let
us say, eleven years. We wish to make it clear that Act No. 4103 does
not require this court to assess the said penalty at 12 years, which is
the longest time of imprisonment within the minimum degree.

We find, therefore, that ten years and one day of imprisonment conforms
to the provisions and rules of the Revised Penal Code and is therefore
fixed and established as the maximum of the sentence which shall be
imposed upon the appellant.

We come now to determine the
“minimum imprisonment period” referred to in Act No. 4103. Section 1 of
said Act provides that this “minimum which shall not be less than the
minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by said Code for the offense.” We are here upon new ground.
It is in determining the “minimum” penalty that Act No. 4103 confers
upon the courts in the fixing of penalties the widest discretion that
the courts have ever had. The determination of the “minimum” penalty
presents two aspects: first, the more or less mechanical determination
of the extreme limits of the minimum imprisonment period; and second,
the broad question of the factors and circumstances that should guide
the discretion of the court in fixing the minimum penalty within the
ascertained limits.

We construe the expression in section 1
“the penalty next lower to that prescribed by said Code for the
offense” to mean the penalty next lower to that determined by the court
in the case before it as the maximum (that is to say the correct
penalty fixed by the Revised Penal Code, see our discussion
above). In the example which the Legislature had before it in the
Committee Report above mentioned, the maximum of the sentence was
correctly stated to be the medium degree of prision mayor in its medium and maximum period. The penalty next lower is prision correccional in its maximum degree to prision mayor
in its minimum degree (article 61, paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code),
that is to say, anywhere from four years, two months and one day to
eight years. The Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103, simply
provides that the “minimum” shall “not be less than the minimum
imprisonment period of the penalty next lower.” In other words, it is
left entirely within the discretion of the court to fix the minimum of
the penalty anywhere between four years, two months and one day and
eight years. In the example given by the committee they stated that the
court might fix the minimum penalty at five years or seven years.

In the case before us on this appeal the next lower penalty to the maximum already determined as aforesaid, is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its medium period, that is to say, from four years, two months and
one day to ten years. As stated, it is in the discretion of the court
to fix the time of imprisonment within the said range without reference
to the technical subdivisions of maximum degree, medium degree and
minimum degree, and in this particular the courts are vested as stated
with a wider discretion than they ever had before.

We come
now to the second aspect of the determination of the minimum penalty,
namely, the considerations which should guide the court in fixing the
term or duration of the minimum period of imprisonment. Keeping in mind
the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law “to uplift and
redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness” (Message of
the Governor-General, Official Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI, August 3,
1933), it is necessary to consider the criminal, first, as an
individual and, second, as a member of society. This opens up an almost
limitless field of investigation and study which it is the duty of the
court to explore in each case as far as is humanly possible, with the
end in view that penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far
as is possible to the individual, with due regard to the imperative
necessity of protecting the social order.

Considering the
criminal as an individual, some of the factors that should be
considered are: (1) His age, especially with reference to extreme youth
or old age; (2) his general health and physical condition; (3) his
mentality, heredity and personal habits; (4) his previous conduct,
environment and mode of life (and criminal record if any); (5) his
previous education, both intellectual and moral; (6) his proclivities
and aptitudes for usefulness or injury to society; (7) his demeanor
during trial and his attitude with regard to the crime committed; (8)
the manner and circumstances in which the crime was committed; (9) the
gravity of the offense (note that section 2 of Act No. 4103 excepts
certain grave crimes—this should be kept in mind in assessing the
minimum penalties for analogous crimes).

In considering the
criminal as a member of society, his relationship, first, toward his
dependents, family and associates and their relationship with him, and
second, his relationship towards society at large and the State are
important factors. The State is concerned not only in the Imperative
necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal
acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual
for economic usefulness and other social ends. In a word, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to individualize the administration of
our criminal law to a degree not heretofore known in these Islands.
With the foregoing principles in mind as guides, the courts can give
full effect to the beneficent intention of the Legislature.

It is our duty now to assess the minimum imprisonment period under Act
No. 4103 in the case before us on this appeal. Unfortunately, as this
defendant was convicted before Act No. 4103 became effective, and as we
know nothing of his antecedents because his plea of guilty rendered it
unnecessary to take any testimony, we are confined to the record before
us. He plead guilty to all of the acts which constitute the crime of
murder and only the timely intervention of medical assistance prevented
the death of his victim and the prosecution of the appellant for
murder. He was given the full benefit of the plea of guilty in the
fixing of the maximum of the sentence. With such light as we have
received from the record in this case, we have concluded that a
reasonable and proper minimum period of imprisonment should be seven
years, which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to
the maximum, that is to say, within the range from four years, two
months and one day to ten years of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its medium period. We repeat that Act No. 4103 does not require the
court to fix the minimum term of imprisonment in the minimum period of
the degree next lower to the maximum penalty.

The judgment
of the court below is modified to this extent: that the
defendant-appellant is hereby sentenced to a maximum penalty of ten
years and one day of prision mayor in its maximum degree, and
to a minimum imprisonment period of seven years, and as thus modified,
the judgment appealed from is affirmed. With costs de oficio.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.