THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. BITDU, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the following decision of Judge A. Horilleno in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga:

“There
is no dispute between the prosecution and the defense as to the fact
that Mora Bitdu was married to Moro Halid before an Imam in Lamitan of
this Province of Zamboanga in accordance with Mohammedan rites more
than twelve years ago, and that about seven months ago she was also
married to Moro Hajirol before a Hadji in accordance with Mohammedan
customs.

“It is therefore a fact admitted by both the
prosecution and the defense that the accused contracted two marriages,
one with Halid and another with Hajirol. She claims, however, that the
second marriage contracted by her with Hajirol took place after she had
been divorced from her first husband Halid in accordance with
Mohammedan customs, said divorce having taken place before Datu Gavino
Cuevas, of Isabela de Basilan.

“With this defense, two very
important questions are raised before this court: first whether or not
the alleged divorce took place in accordance with Mohammedan customs,
and second, assuming that the divorce took place in accordance with
such customs, is such divorce legal?

“With reference to the
first question, two witnesses testified, one for the prosecution and
the other for the defense. The first witness testified that the divorce
between Mohammedans in Mindanao may be obtained before any person
designated and agreed upon by the parties. The second testified that
divorce, like any other act relative to marriage and separation of
Mohammedan spouses, is obtained under certain conditions, to wit, the
interested parties or the spouses intending to secure a divorce select
the person before whom the divorce is to take place, and both parties
are represented by persons designated by them.

“Chapter IV, section 35 of the Koran says:

”
’35. And if you fear a breach between the two, then appoint a judge
from his people and a judge from Her people; if they both desire
agreement, Allah will effect harmony between them; surely Allah is
knowing; Aware.’

“The court is inclined
to believe that the testimony of the witness for the defense on this
question is more in harmony with the doctrines of the Koran than that
of the witness for the prosecution.

“Now, has the defense
established that the divorce took place in accordance with the
commandments of the Koran? The defense presented no evidence to show
that the conditions prescribed by the Koran had been complied with by
the parties when they obtained their divorce before Datu Cuevas. Said
divorce therefore between the defendant and Halid does not satisfy the
conditions prescribed by the Koran and consequently said divorce seems
to be of doubtful religious validity.

“However, even
admitting that this divorce was secured in accordance with the
conditions prescribed by Mohammedan doctrines, is such divorce legal?
The laws governing marriage and its incidents are moral in nature and
as such they are laws relating to public policy. In the Philippine
Islands we have a law (Act No. 2710) enumerating the causes and the
conditions under which divorce may be secured and granted. Any divorce
obtained in the Philippine Islands for causes and under conditions
other than those enumerated in said law, would have no legal effect.
The habits and customs of a people, the dogmas or doctrines of a
religion cannot be superior to or have precedence over laws relating to
public policy, because as stated above laws relating to marriage and
its incidents are moral in nature and as such they affect public policy.

“The
court therefore is of the opinion that even if the divorce alleged by
the defense was secured in conformity with Mohammedan doctrines, such
divorce cannot prevail against the Divorce Law of the Philippine
Islands prescribing the causes and conditions under which divorce may
be obtained. In this case, as above demonstrated, the divorce in
question has not been obtained in accordance with the law.

“Examined
from whatever angle, the divorce alleged by the defense cannot be
accepted by this court for the reasons above set forth.

“In
view of the foregoing facts and considerations, we cannot escape the
conclusion that the defendant herein contracted a second marriage
without her former marriage having been first dissolved.

“In
the consideration of this case, however, the court cannot but take into
account that the defendant is a Mohammedan woman; and being a follower
of Mohammedan doctrines she no doubt contracted the second marriage
honestly believing that in doing so she was not committing any
violation of the law, although of course her belief does not justify
her act.

“In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that
the defendant is only seventeen years of age and therefore in the
opinion of the court it would be more convenient for her to be sent to
the Philippine Training School in Mandaluyong, Manila, (Rizal), it is
ordered that the accused be sent to said institution, to be kept there
until she reaches the age of majority, all the proceedings in this case
being hereby suspended.”

The attorney for
the appellant alleges that the lower court erred in finding that the
accused committed the crime of bigamy, and in ordering her to be sent
to the Philippine Training School in Mandaluyong, Rizal.

Appellant’s attorney admits that the appellant was twice married as
alleged in the information, but contends that she was divorced from her
first husband in accordance with Mohammedan religious practices, and
that said divorce was valid; that if it be true that said divorce is
not in accordance with Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature, the
appellant is nevertheless not guilty of bigamy, because she believed
that she had been validly divorced and had no criminal intent when she
contracted the second marriage.

The Solicitor-General agrees
with the attorney for the appellant, and is of the opinion that the
divorce was granted in accordance with the precepts of the Koran and
Moro customs and traditions; that fraudulent or criminal intent is an
essential element of the crime of bigamy, and that since the appellant
believed that her first marriage had been legally dissolved because she
had been granted a divorce under the Mohammedan laws, she cannot be
considered guilty of the crime with which she is charged.

The Solicitor-General further argues that since it is the practice of
the Government not to interfere with the customs of the Moros,
especially their religious customs, divorces among them granted in
accordance with the Koran ought to be recognized as a matter of public
policy.

There is little to add to the well considered
decision of the trial judge. It seems to us unnecessary to determine
whether or not the divorce in question was granted in accordance with
the Mohammedan religious practices, as to which there seems to exist
considerable uncertainty, because in our view of the case a valid
divorce can be granted only by the courts and for the reasons specified
in Act No. 2710. It is not claimed that the appellant was divorced from
her first husband in accordance with said Act.

In the case of Francisco vs.
Tayao (50 Phil., 42), it was held that in the Philippines the causes
for divorce are prescribed by statute or Act No. 2710 and that the
grounds for divorce are two only: Adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband.

In the recent decision of People vs.
Bituanan (Moro), (56 Phil., 23), where the defendant and a Moro woman
were married by a datu according to Moro customs and usages and
afterwards divorced by the datu according to the same customs and
usages, it was held that the marriage performed according to the rites
of the Mohammedan religion was valid, and assumed, for the purpose of
that case, that the defendant and his wife were not legally divorced.

Section 25 of the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613) provides that marriages
between Mohammedans may be performed in accordance with the rites or
practices of their religion, but there is no provision of law which
authorizes the granting of divorces in accordance with the rites or
practices of their religion.

A divorce cannot be had except
in that court upon which the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then
only for those causes and with those formalities which the state has by
statute prescribed (19 C. J., 19).

It is conceded in all
jurisdictions that public policy, good morals, and the interests of
society require that the marriage relation should be surrounded with
every safeguard and its severance allowed only in the manner prescribed
and for the causes specified by law. And the parties can waive nothing
essential to the validity of the proceedings (19 C. J., 20).

With respect to the contention that the appellant acted in good faith
in contracting the second marriage, believing that she had been validly
divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that every one
is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that
his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the
consequences thereof. The case of the United States vs.
Enriquez (32 Phil., 202), cited by the Solicitor-General is not in
point. In that case the defendant left his wife in the municipality of
Orion, Province of Bataan, in the year 1895, going to the Province of
Laguna as a postal employee. When he returned in 1901, after the
revolution, he could not find his wife or obtain the slightest
information as to her whereabouts notwithstanding his persistent and
diligent search. Believing her to be dead, he contracted a second
marriage in Orion on February 1st, 1905. In December, 1913, his first
wife made her appearance in Orion. She had been in Manila, Tarlac, and
Victoria from 1895 to 1913. The defendant was acquitted on appeal to
this court because no fraudulent intent could be charged to him. He
believed that his first wife was dead, and that was a well-founded
belief, although it was subsequently proved to be erroneous. It was a
mistake of fact and not of law.

The decisions of American
courts, cited by the Solicitor-General, sustaining the validity of
divorces granted to members of Indian tribes according to the customs
and usages thereof, are likewise not in point. The various Indian
tribes in the United States were dealt with by the Government of the
United States as independent nations and treaties were made with them.

As to the suggestion of the Solicitor-General that divorces among the
Moros according to their religious practices should be recognized as
valid as a matter of public policy, because in the contrary case “there
would be no end of criminal prosecutions, for polygamy still abounds
among them, and the remarriages of people divorced under the Koran are
the order of the day,” that is a matter for the consideration of the
Legislature and the Governor-General.

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.

Street, Malcolm, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.