MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB CO., INC., AND ACRO TAXICAB CO., INC., PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. FRANCISCO JAVIER, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

The question here submitted pertains to the practice which should be followed
where, by certiorari or petition, application is made for the review of an order
of the Public Service Commission, and specifically is as to whether the time
authorized for making the application is thirty days from the date upon which
the order of the commission becomes effective, not counting the time which the
commission takes Before rendering an order denying the motion for a rehearing,
or is thirty days from the date of notice of the order denying the motion for a
rehearing. For the first time the question is squarely presented for decision,
for we have found no authoritative precedent on the matter and there are no
rules governing it.

The decision of the Public Service Commission in this case was served upon
the parties concerned on July 29, 1932. In the last paragraph of the decision it
was provided that it shall go into effect immediately and shall become final
thirty days after notification. On August 22, 1932, the Manila Yellow Taxicab
Co., Inc., filed a motion for a rehearing. This motion was denied on August 24,
1932, a copy of the same having been received by the petitioner on August 25,
1932. A petition for review was presented in the Supreme Court on September 21,
1932. It is thus evident that more than thirty days had elapsed after the date
when the original order became effective, but that more than thirty days had not
elapsed from the date when the order denying the motion for a rehearing became
effective.

Section 35 of the Public Service Law, Act No. 3108, provides that “Any order
made by the Commission may be reviewed on the application of any person or
public service affected thereby, by certiorari in appropriate cases, or by
petition, to the Supreme Court, within thirty days from the date upon which such
order becomes effective, as herein provided * * *.” Section 29 of the same law
provides that “* * * All orders of the Commission to continue service or rates
in effect at the time said order is made shall be immediately operative; all
other orders shall become effective upon the date specified therein.” Section 28
of the law provides that “The Commission, at any time, may order a rehearing to
extend, revoke, or modify any order made by it. Once a case has been decided
after the rehearing, any interested party may, if he so desires, take an appeal
to the Supreme Court by following the procedure prescribed in section
thirty-five of this Act, * * *.” Recurring again to section 35 above cited, its
concluding sentence reads: “The procedure for review, except as herein provided,
shall be prescribed by rules of the Supreme Court.”

We thus have before us the question conceded to be at issue, the controlling
facts admitted to be such, and the applicable law to which the parties direct
attention. We think there can be no uncertainty as to the correct rule to
enunciate. This court has heretofore announced that an application for a
rehearing and a decision thereon by the Public Service Commission are conditions
precedent to appeal to the Supreme Court (Philippine Shipowners’ Association vs.
Public Utility Commission [1925], 47 Phil., 489). But in this decision there was
not the slightest intimation that the thirty-day period should begin to run from
the date when the application for a rehearing was denied, but on the contrary it
was intimated that the same practice should be followed as’ in Courts of First
Instance. The tenability of this result is easily demonstrable when the
phraseology of section 35 of the Public Service Law is considered, for it makes
the thirty-day period commence from the date upon which the order becomes
effective, and the order herein became immediately effective. The Public Service
Law indicates a purpose to expedite proceedings coming from the commission to
the Supreme Court, and this purpose can be better effectuated by strictly
limiting the time for, appeal. Of course, when a rehearing is granted, an
entirely different state of affairs exists, but that is not what is now before
us. As a consequence, we reach the following conclusion: The time allowed for
making application to the Supreme Court for the review of an order of the Public
Service Commission by certiorari or petition is thirty days from the date upon
which the order becomes effective, not counting the time which the commission
take? before rendering an order denying the motion for a rehearing, and is not
thirty days from the date of the overruling of the application for a rehearing.

The foregoing is not all there is to the case. It has an equitable aspect. As
pointed out, the question is one of first impression. Nevertheless the Public
Service Law has been on the statute books for a number of years and many cases
have been elevated to this court from the Public- Service Commission which,
under the rule now announced, could very well have been dismissed. Under
observation are two such cases, and we are made to understand that others with
similar facts arer on the way to this court. Should we make a rule effective
immediately, it would go against accepted practice, would take by surprise
parties and attorneys who have given a different interpretation to the law, and
would necessitate the dismissal of a number of important cases. Since,
therefore, the law appears to be susceptible to divergent interpretations, and
since until this time the court has not prescribed rules of procedure for review
of public utility cases, we think it only just to make the rule effective at a
future date.

Summarizing the foregoing, the court announces a rule of procedure for the
review of public service cases as follows: The time allowed for making
application to the Supreme Court for the review of an order of the Public
Service Commission by certiorari or petition is thirty days from the date upon
which the order becomes effective, not counting the time which the commission
takes before rendering an order denying the motion for a rehearing. This rule
shall take effect on January 1, 1933.

Subject to the above observations, the motion to dismiss the petition for
review of the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc., is denied.

Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Hull, Vickers, Imperial, and
Butte, JJ., concur.

Avanceña, C. J.: I dissent.