NORTHERN LUZON TRANSPORTATION, INC., PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. SANTIAGO SAMBRANO, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

This is a petition for review filed by the Northern Luzon
Transportation, Inc., to set aside the Public Service Commission’s
decision of July 29, 1932, by virtue of which Santiago Sambrano, the
respondent herein, was authorized to increase the number of trips of
his auto-trucks operating on the lines between Vigan and Laoag and
Vigan and San Fernando, and vice versa.

Santiago Sambrano,
through an application docketed as case No. 16029, obtained a
certificate of convenience to operate, under a fixed time-schedule, a
certain number of trucks on the lines, between Vigan and Laoag and
Vigan and San Fernando, and vice versa. Having obtained authority to
operate without a fixed time-schedule between Vigan and San Fernando,
as both a regular and an irregular operator, on October 3, 1931,
Sambrano filed another petition docketed as case No. 28517, seeking a
permit to increase the number of trips to be made by his trucks on both
lines alleging that public service so demanded. This petition was
opposed by the Northern Luzon Transportation, Inc., but after due
hearing the commission rendered the decision appealed from granting the
additional trips requested.

The appellant-corporation assigns the following alleged errors:

“FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

“The commission erred in granting to Santiago Sambrano additional trips
without finding and declaring that the public interests will be
promoted in a proper and suitable manner by the operation of such
additional service.

“SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

“The commission erred in granting the additional trips where there was no evidence to reasonably support the decision.

“THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

“The commission acted irregularly when it decided the application
during the absence of the associate commissioner who heard this case.

“FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

“The commission erred in denying the motion for rehearing.”

The first two errors may be considered jointly. In said assignments of
error it is alleged that the commission erred in granting additional
trips without sufficient evidence to reasonably support the decision
and without any showing that the public interests would be promoted
thereby.

Leaving aside for the moment the facts established
by the evidence, it appears in the decision that there was enough
traffic on the lines in question requiring the granting of additional
trips as prayed for. Such finding is more than sufficient to justify
that the decision is based on public necessity.

The evidence
presented in support of the application for additional trips justifies
the commission’s conclusion that there was sufficient traffic on the
lines served by the appellee and that the public interests would be
better served by granting additional trips. The Public Service Law does
not authorize this court to set aside a decision of the commission
unless it clearly appears that it is not supported by the evidence. We
are of the opinion that these assignments of error are without any
legal foundation and, for this reason, they are overruled.

In the third assignment of error, it is alleged that the proceeding
followed by the commission in this case was irregular on the ground
that the evidence was heard by one commissioner and the decision penned
by another. It is intimated that the commissioner who decided the same
could not have been acquainted himself with the evidence therein in
view of the fact that the stenographic notes were not transcribed until
more than one month after the decision in question had been promulgated.

The law does not prohibit a commissioner other than the one who has
taken the evidence therein from deciding a case pending before the
commission. This is so clear that the law itself permits the
presentation of evidence before commissioners. All that is required is
that a hearing be held during which the interested parties are given
the opportunity to present the evidence they may deem convenient and
this has been strictly complied with. The assertion that Commissioner
De Vera decided the case without a knowledge of the evidence therein
solely because the stenographic notes were transcribed by the
stenographer after the publication of the decision, is unfounded, and
the reason for this is that said commissioner could have considered and
studied the evidence without the necessity of the transcript by merely
having said notes read to him by the stenographer who took them, and
this was, undoubtedly, what happened in this case.

The case of Soriano and Santos vs.
Del Rosario and Rural Transit Co. (55 Phil., 934), cited by the
appellant, is not applicable in this case because its theory was not
sustained therein. If the proceedings in said case were found
insufficient and irregular and the corresponding resolution was set
aside, it was due to the fact that the interested parties had not been
properly heard. At all events, no rule was laid down in that case to
the effect that a case within the jurisdiction of the commission cannot
be decided by a commissioner other than the one who originally heard
the same or before whom all or part of the evidence therein was
presented. It was, of course, suggested that it would be advisable to
have the same commissioner, who tried a case or heard the evidence,
render decision therein.

Not finding any error to justify
revocation or modification of the decision appealed from, the same is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant. So
ordered.

Villamor, Villa-Real, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.